Critics of the computational connectionism of the last decade suggest that it shares undesirable features with earlier empiricist or associationist approaches, and with behaviourist theories of learning. To assess the accuracy of this charge the works of earlier writers are examined for the presence of such features, and brief accounts of those found are given for Herbert Spencer, William James and the learning theorists Thorndike, Pavlov and Hull. The idea that cognition depends on associative connections among large networks of neurons (...) is indeed one with precedents, although the implications of this for psychological issues have been interpreted variously — not all versions of connectionism are alike. (shrink)

Species, endowed with an open-ended capacity for learning, which is one of the highest evolutionary achievements,will profit most from this ability, if they are urged one way or other to invest any surplus of energy in expanding and refining their behavioural repertoire and in adapting it to prevailing circumstances, while incurring as little risk and stress as possible.It is therefore argued that an open-ended capacity for learning is maximally adding to survival if paired to two distinct tendencies: a tendency to (...) seek high-arousal evoking situations whenever surplus energy is available, and a tendency to seek arousal reducing situations as soon as the surplus energy is exhausted.This suggests that a bi-stable “telic/paratelic” system of prefered levels of arousal, as described for humans by Apter & Smith's theory of motivational reversals, and as expressed in Kortmulder's model of the “centripetal/centrifugal” bi-polarity of animal behavioural tendencies, can be considered an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy , as compared to homeostatic systems of arousal and motivation. (shrink)

The target article extends molar behaviorism in two positive ways: beyond average aggregates and beyond restricted laws of Although a molar framework based on purely overt events shows promise for advancing behavior theory, Rachlin's specific form of teleological behaviorism is in need of clarification.

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...) or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span. Key Words: cognitive development; dynamical systems theory; embodied cognition; infant development; motor control; motor planning; perception and action. (shrink)