In recent work, Amie Thomasson has sought to develop a new approach to the philosophy of the categories which is metaphysically neutral between traditional realist and conceptualist approaches, and which has its roots in the ‘correlationalist’ approach to categories put forward in Husserl’s writings in the 1900s–1910s and systematically charted over the past few decades by David Woodruff Smith in his studies of Husserl’s philosophy. Here the author aims to provide a recontextualization and critical assessment of correlationalism in a Husserlian (...) vein. To this end, the author presents, first, the reasons why, later in his life, Husserl himself found his earlier treatment of categories philosophically naive, and why he increasingly advocated for a more genetic-teleological account. The author then draws upon arguments made a century earlier by Schelling and Hegel, in criticism of Fichte, to point up what might remain philosophically unsatisfying about even the post-correlationalist genetic position of the later Husserl, in light of the pronounced trend in Husserl’s own development, on the questions of reason and spirit, toward absolute idealism. (shrink)

This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons’s analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, The Structure of Social Action, Parsons positively referred to Husserl’s Logical Investigations. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the (...) factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established. (shrink)

Nowhere does the theory-laden character of Husserl’s phenomenological intuitions become as apparent as in his reflections on cultural philosophy. It is his theory that the qualification of one‘s own tradition as one of many manifestations of something valid in itself and binding for all is a unique achievement of Greek-European philosophy. However, that conviction can be found equally in South Asian “doctrines of Oneness” as well as in East Asian instances of the “Golden Rule”. Every person with a command of (...) a natural language is capable of such an insight.The most appropriate model for individual civilizations is not the sphere metaphor, which draws on a Platonic idea of organism, the model that Husserl adopted for his conception of “home” and “foreign worlds”, but rather the image of tinkering introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss for illiterate societies and used by François Jacob to illustrate the present biological concept of organism.Regarding cultural universals, Husserl also relies on classical ontological reflections rather than on recent biological models. The most inter-esting anthropological universals from the point of view of cultural philosophy are, however, not essential, but contingent universals.En ninguna parte el carácter cargado de teoría de las intuiciones fenomenológicas de Husserl se vuelve tan aparente como en sus reflexiones sobre la filosofía cultural. Según su teoría, la calificación de la propia tradición como una de las muchas manifestaciones de algo válido en sí mismo y vinculante para todos es un logro único de la filosofía greco-europea. Sin embargo, esa convicción se puede encontrar igualmente en las "doctrinas de la unidad" del sur de Asia, así como en las instancias del este asiático de la "regla de oro". Cada persona con un dominio de un lenguaje natural es capaz de tal idea.El modelo más apropiado para las civilizaciones individuales no es la metáfora de la esfera, que se basa en una idea platónica del organismo —el modelo que adoptó Husserl para su concepción de "hogar" y "mundos extranjeros"— sino la imagen de retoque introducida por Claude Lévi Strauss para las sociedades analfabetas y utilizado por François Jacob para ilustrar el concepto biológico actual del organismo.Con respecto a los universales culturales, Husserl también se basa en reflexiones ontoló-gicas clásicas más que en modelos biológicos recientes. Sin embargo, los universales antropológicos más interesantes desde el punto de vista de la filosofía cultural no son esenciales, sino universales contingentes. (shrink)

The philosophers agree that philosophy begins in wonder. How wonder is understood, however, is not at all clear and has implications for contemporary work in feminist phenomenology. Luce Irigaray, for example, has insisted on wonder as the passion that will renew relationships between women and men, provide a foundation for democracy, and launch a new era in history. She calls on women to enact practices of wonder in relation to men. In what follows I briefly review the most significant claims (...) about wonder in the history of philosophy generally, and as related to the phenomenological practice of the epoché particularly. I consider Irigaray’s claims about wonder as they arise out of this tradition, and try to spell out both what is promised to women and what is asked of them through affirmations of wonder. I suggest that this prescriptive notion is at the heart of a new conservatism in “feminist” thought that turns on nostalgia for age-old beliefs about women’s proper mode of relation toward men and their accomplishments, and is deeply homophobic. I urge readers to adopt a more critical attitude toward wonder as related to sexual difference by historicizing the inquiry in keeping with the phenomenological practice of Simone de Beauvoir. Drawing on Kant, Beauvoir, and contemporary work by Sara Ahmed, I suggest that there is a politics of wonder at work here which feminists have every reason to question. Reflecting on the politics of wonder also discloses some key features of critical feminist phenomenological practice. (shrink)

Resumen: El principal objetivo de este trabajo es pensar el concepto de meditación en la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset. La meditación es la esencia de la filosofía para Ortega. Meditar y filosofar son sinónimos. La filosofía no es mera teoría, sino que implica también práctica. El elemento teórico sólo tiene sentido cuando surge de la vida, pero ante todo la teoría sólo vale si vale para vivir. El ser humano para Ortega piensa porque vive, pero lo fundamental es que (...) piensa para vivir. Sólo los pensamientos que se alcanzan viviendo tienen valor para vivir. La meditación filosófica está siempre supeditada a la vida.The principal aim of this work is to think the concept of meditation in the Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy. For Ortega, meditation is the essence of philosophy. To meditate and to philosophize are synonymous. Philosophy isn’t simply theory, but it also implies practice. The theoretical element only makes sense when it arises from life, but above all theory only have value if it have value for life. For Ortega, human being thinks because he lives, but is fundamental that he thinks for life. Only thoughts reached by living have value for life. Philosophical meditation is always subordinated to life. (shrink)

The paper presents a semiotic interpretation of the phenomenological debate on the notion of person, focusing in particular on Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein. The semiotic interpretation lets us identify the categories that orient the debate: collective/individual and subject/object. As we will see, the phenomenological analysis of the relation between person and social units such as the community, the association, and the mass shows similarities to contemporary socio-semiotic models. The difference between community, association, and mass provides an explanation (...) for the establishment of legal systems. The notion of person we inherit from phenomenology can also be useful in facing juridical problems raised by the use of non-human decision-makers such as machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence applications. (shrink)

This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with – and critique of – experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology – due to its naturalism – as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an (...) analysis of Husserl’s views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl’s earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of “inner perception” as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler’s 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl’s writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl’s work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time. (shrink)

This article discusses the Idea of Europe as it is developed within the phenomenological tradition by Edmund Husserl, Jacques Derrida and Jan Patočka. It shows how Derrida and Patočka try to preser...

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 297 - 307 In 1962–62, Derrida presented two series of lectures at the Sorbonne, the first of which was entitled “Method and Metaphysics,” and the second “Phenomenology, Theology and Teleology in Husserl.” The author was present as a student at these lectures, and presents below a summary of their contents.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la crítica de Kierkegaard a la metafísica. Para ello analizaré en primer lugar el concepto kierkegaardiano de existencia como interesse , en virtud del cual Kierkegaard lleva a cabo su crítica a la metafísica no sólo por su carácter ideal y abstracto, sino especialmente por su encubrimiento de lo ético. Por este motivo finalmente trataré de mostrar el fundamento ético del pensamiento existencial así como su oposición a toda pretensión originaria de pensar lo (...) ético como filosofía primera. The aim of this article is to examine Kierkegaard's criticism of Metaphysics. Therefore, firstly I will analyze Kierkegaard¿s concept of being as interesse , which allows Kerkegaard's criticism, not just because Metaphysics implies ideality and abstraction, but also because it hides the ethical. That is why I will finally argue the ethical background of the existential thought and its opposition to any tentative of thinking the ethical as a First Philosophy. (shrink)