- Because There Is a Reason to Do It: How Normative Reasons Explain Action.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):208-233.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reinforcement learning and artificial agency.Patrick Butlin - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):22-38.details
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An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):374-395.details
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Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains.Elia Haemmerli - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):75-87.details
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The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.details
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Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Anscombe on Acting for Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):561-582.details
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Virtues, ecological momentary assessment/intervention and smartphone technology.Jason D. Runyan & Ellen G. Steinke - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology:1-24.details
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Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Expressing Moral Belief.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
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Getting what you want.Lyndal Grant & Milo Phillips-Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1791-1810.details
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Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought.Demian Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553.details
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Structural Equations and Analysis of Dispositions.Toby Friend - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains.Elia Haemmerli - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):75-87.details
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Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459.details
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