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Faultless or Disagreeement

In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 287 (2008)

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  1. Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 207.
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  • El pluralismo moral de David Hume.Agustin Arrieta & Agustin Vicente - 2013 - Critica 45 (134):17-42.
    In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume’s idea that there are foru sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.
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  • The Semantics of Implicit Content.Dan Zeman - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Barcelona
    The main aim of the thesis is to give a semantic account of implicit content – the kind of content that plays a crucial role in implicit communication. Implicit communication is a species of communication in which a speaker communicates certain contents that go over and above the contents retrievable from the linguistic meaning of the words used. The focus of the thesis is a certain kind of implicit communication involving locations (when sentences such as “It is raining” are used (...)
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  • In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):97-118.
    I begin by describing the solution to the problem of skepticism propounded by contextualists, which constitutes the background of the rest of the paper. I then address the question of what happens when a skeptic and a non-skeptic are confronted in dialogue to the standards in play for correct knowledge ascription, on the assumption that contextualism about knowledge is right. I argue against Keith DeRose that there are reasons, both intuitive and theoretical, to conclude that the standards will be raised (...)
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  • Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth.Isidora Stojanovic - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.
    In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn, according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence (...)
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  • The Sorites is Nonsense Disguised by a Fallacy.L. Goldstein - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):61-65.
    It is uncontroversial that, on any run through a Sorites series, a subject, at some point, switches from an ‘F’ verdict on one exhibit to a non-‘F’ verdict on the next. (Where this ‘cut-off’ point occurs tend to differ from trial to trial.) It is a fallacy to infer that there must be a cut-off point simpliciter between F items and non-F items. The transition is from firm ground to swamp. In the Sorites reasoning, some conditionals of the form ‘If (...)
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  • The Relativity of Evaluative Sentences: Disagreeing Over Disagreement.Justina Díaz Legaspe - 2013 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 54 (127):211-226.
    Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the (...)
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  • Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):252-280.
    Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on (...)
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  • On Contextual Domain Restriction in Categorial Grammar.Erich H. Rast - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2085-2115.
    Abstract -/- Quantifier domain restriction (QDR) and two versions of nominal restriction (NR) are implemented as restrictions that depend on a previously introduced interpreter and interpretation time in a two-dimensional semantic framework on the basis of simple type theory and categorial grammar. Against Stanley (2002) it is argued that a suitable version of QDR can deal with superlatives like tallest. However, it is shown that NR is needed to account for utterances when the speaker intends to convey different restrictions for (...)
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  • Assertion and Assessment Sensitivity.Matías Gariazzo - 2019 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 60 (143):355-376.
    ABSTRACT Gareth Evans and Sven Rosenkranz have respectively formulated two objections to truth relativism that would show that this view does not cohere with our practice of asserting. I argue that the relativist should answer such objections by appealing to the notion of assessment sensitivity. Since the relativist accounts for this notion by means of a technical truth predicate relating propositions to contexts of assessment, the task left to her turns out to be to make sense of assessment sensitivity by (...)
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