- Compatibilism and the notion of rendering something false.Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (3):409-428.details
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Semikompatybilizm J. M. Fischera w kontekście alternatywnych możliwości działań.Krzysztof Rojek - 2015 - Idea. Studia Nad Strukturą I Rozwojem Pojęć Filozoficznych 27:177-197.details
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A Defense of Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom.Rick Repetti - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):540-564.details
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Powers, laws and freedom of the will: Steven Horst: Laws, mind, and free will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, 277pp, $36.00 HB.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - Metascience 23 (3):491-495.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):287 - 306.details
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The modality of freedom.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:349-375.details
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Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology.Hugh J. McCann (ed.) - 2016 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Analytical Approaches to Determinism.Douglas Odegard - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (2):271-280.details
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Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism.Shane Oakley - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.details
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Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.details
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‘Animals run about the world in all sorts of paths’: varieties of indeterminism.Jesse M. Mulder - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-17.details
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Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):147-198.details
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Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):147-198.details
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Free will and paranormal beliefs.Ken Mogi - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism.Pedro Merlussi - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (3):86-107.details
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Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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A timid response to the consequence argument.Michael McKenna - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):155-169.details
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Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism.Penelope Mackie - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):593-603.details
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Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.details
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Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.details
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What Freedom in a Deterministic World Must Be.Brian Looper - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):863-885.details
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What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.details
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Do group agents have free will?Christian List - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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On the notion of free will in the Free Will Theorem.Klaas Landsman - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57:98-103.details
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Sellars on compatibilism and the consequence argument.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2361-2389.details
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Traction without Tracing: A Solution for Control‐Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Matt King - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):463-482.details
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Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.details
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Free will: The elusive ideal. [REVIEW]Robert Kane - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):25-60.details
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Potentialism and S5.Jonas Werner - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):622-635.details
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Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):119-131.details
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Freedom and the Fixity of the Past.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.details
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Freedom from the Inside Out.Carl Hoefer - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:201-.details
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Transformative Moral Luck.Marcela Herdova - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):162-180.details
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Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.details
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Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.details
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Dennett’s Prime-Mammal Objection to the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):467-470.details
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‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Ratio 27 (2):173-189.details
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The Machine Scenario: A Computational Perspective on Alternative Representations of Indeterminism.Vincent Grandjean & Matteo Pascucci - 2020 - Minds and Machines 31 (1):59-74.details
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A defense of local miracle compatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.details
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Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):177-187.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Chaos and free will.James W. Garson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.details
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On the Foundations of the Problem of Free Will.Paolo Galeazzi & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - forthcoming - Episteme:1-19.details
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Zdolność reagowania na racje a odpowiedzialność moralna.John Martin Fischer, Marcin Iwanicki & Joanna Klara Teske - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (4):467-496.details
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