What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. My (...) reading of Husserl proceeds by means of a comparison between his description of touch in Ideas II and Merleau-Ponty’s early appropriation of this account in the Phenomenology of Perception, as well as through an unlikely rapprochement between Husserl and Irigaray on the question of touch. Moreover, by revisiting the limitations in Husserl’s approach to the body—limitations of which any feminist appropriation must remain cognizant—I attempt to take Husserl’s phenomenology of touch beyond its initial methodologically solipsistic frame and to ask whether and how it can contribute to thinking gendered and racialized bodies. The phenomenology of touch, I argue, can allow us to understand the interplay between subjective, felt embodiment and social-historical context. In opening up Husserl’s account of touch to other dimensions—intersubjective and affective—sociality is revealed as residing within, and structuring of, touch. Such touch can allow us to think embodiment anew. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

Irigaray's reading of Plato's Symposium in Ethique de la difference sexuelle illustrates both the advantages and the limits of her textual practise. Irigaray's attentive listening to the text allows Diotima's voice to emerge from an overlay of Platonic scholarship. But both the ahistorical nature of that listening and Irigaray's assumption of feminine marginality also make her a party to Plato's sabotage of Diotima's philosophy. Understood in historical context, Diotima is not an anomaly in Platonic discourse, but the hidden host of (...) Plato's banquet, speaking for a pre-Socratic world view against which classical Greek thought is asserted. Understood in historical context, Plato is not the authoritative founder of Western thought against whom only marginal skirmishes can be mounted, but a rebellious student who manages to transform Diotima's complex teaching on personal identity, immortality, and love into the sterile simplicities of logical form. (shrink)

This article seeks to open up a discussion of issues relating to the significance of sexual difference, the thinking and politics emerging from it and how it might affect educational philosophy. It briefly examines the initial work of Luce Irigaray, which has become quite influential in parts of the English speaking world, particularly focussing on the idea that there are implications for our educational objectives if gender equality were to be put in question as one of the underlying paradigms with (...) which to measure children's performance. It then looks at the work of some groups of Italian philosophers and educationalists who have not been translated into English and are consequently less well known. Their work has been devoted to exploring Irigaray's challenge to re-think the world from the perspective of sexual difference. In particular, in tune with the theme of this special issue, this article shows how this work puts forward the practice and philosophy of relationship for consideration at different stages of the educational process, focussing particularly on Luisa Muraro's philosophical ‘invention’ of the symbolic order of the mother as a way to bring into the shared world the erased sexual difference that Irigaray had articulated. Muraro's work considers the meaning of the first relationship between mother and infant and suggests that the mother, or the one doing her work, is in fact the first and ongoing educator and transmitter of philosophy, a fact that is only partially recognised in our formal educational structures. The article introduces, finally, the idea that as the historical patterns of mainly women teaching younger children and men teaching older children are shifting, to understand the need for and argue for a more sexuate world, with both sexes participating in the educational process at all stages would allow for the possibility of a new discussion of concepts that are already central to educationalists such as equality, freedom, autonomy, authority, flourishing and the relationship with parents. (shrink)

Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...) enactive approach, but not in the radical sense of transcendental arguments. We propose difference, instead, as a more generative concept. Following Simondon, we see norms and values manifest in webs of past and future acts together with their potentialities for becoming. We propose a transindividual concept of moral attunement that includes ethical know-how and consciousness raising. Through generative difference and attunement to configurations of becoming, enaction underpins an ethics of participation linking virtue ethics and ethics of care. (shrink)

“Sorcerer Love” is the name that Luce Irigaray gives to the demonic function of love as presented in Plato's Symposium. She argues that Socrates there attributes two incompatible positions to Diotima, who in any case is not present at the banquet. The first is that love is a mid-point or intermediary between lovers which also teaches immortality. The second is that love is a means to the end and duty of procreation, and thus is a mere means to immortality through (...) which the lovers lose one another. Irigaray argues in favor of the first position, a conception of love as demonic intermediary. E.K. (shrink)

This paper explores the symbolic implications of Luce Irigaray's images of the female body, particularly the two lips and the mucous. It suggests that Irigaray's work reveals some of the problems attendant on "positive images of women.".

The aim of this paper is to show that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex has been mistakenly interpreted as a theory of gender, because interpreters have failed adequately to understand Beauvoir's aims. Beauvoir is not trying to explain facts, events, or states of affairs, but to reveal, unveil, or uncover (découvrir) meanings. She explicates the meanings of woman, female, and feminine. Instead of a theory, Beauvoir's book presents a phenomenological description of the sexual difference.

Minkälaista ontologista ajattelua Merleau-Ponty kehitteli myöhäisfilosofiassaan? Tarkastelen seuraavassa Merleau-Pontyn ontologian hahmotelmaa ennen kaikkea keskeneräiseksi jääneen ja postuumisti julkaistun teoksen Le visible et l’invisible muotoilujen pohjalta. Selkeytän Merleau-Pontyn teksteissä tulkinnanvaraiseksi jäänyttä lihan ontologista ulottuvuutta kahden hänen myöhäisfilosofiassaan keskeisen käsitteen, kaksoiskosketuksen ja käännettävyyden, avulla. Lihan rakenteen kuvauksessa käytän apuna Merleau-Pontyn esille nostamia taide-esimerkkejä. Esitykseni mukaan Merleau-Pontyn myöhäisfilosofian muotoilut viittaavat olemisen ajatteluun dynaamisena, aina vasta muotoutumassa olevana kudelmana, joka kykenee ylläpitämään sekä yhteyttä ja samuutta että erottumista. Merleau-Pontyn fenomenologiassa lihan ontologinen ulottuvuus mahdollistaa elettyjen (...) kokemustemme moniselitteisyyden ja keskeneräisyyden. (shrink)

Метою статті є порівняння антропології статі В. Розанова та етики статевої відмінності Л. Ірігаре, виявлення подібностей та відмінностей цих концепцій, оцінка їхньої ролі у становленні гендерних досліджень. Теоретичний базис об’єднує компаративістський метод та гендерний підхід, основою якого є не просто опис різниці статусів, ролей та інших аспектів життя чоловіків та жінок, а й подолання андроцентризму сучасного світу. Наукова новизна полягає, в тому, що в статті вперше в контексті гендерних досліджень було зроблено спеціальне філософсько-антропологічне порівняння концепцій статі Розанова та Ірігаре. Це (...) дозволило розанівську концепцію зарахувати до есенціалізму, а концепцію Ірігаре – до анти-есенціалізму. У статті також виявлена схожість антропології статі Розанова та етики статевої відмінності Ірігаре в аспекті поняття сексуальності, проаналізовані та детально зіставлені їхні основні ідеї. Висновок. Спільним в концепціях Розанова та Ірігаре є утвердження жіночої суб’єктивності, яка є рівноцінною чоловічий. Жіночий еквівалент сексуальності у Розанова проявляється в понятті "самочності", а у Ірігаре – в метонімії "двох губ". Методологічною основою їхніх концепцій виступає непереборна опозиція "чоловічого" та "жіночого". Розанов прагне до ототожнення "чоловічого" та "жіночого", а Ірігаре більше зосереджується на їхній радикальній відмінності. За Розановим гендерні відмінності детерміновані біологічно або метафізично, що визначає їхній вічний та незмінний характер. У свою чергу Ірігаре стверджує, що гендерні відмінності обумовлені фалоцентричною культурою та можуть бути подолані разом зі зміною мовних структур. Принципова ж схожість концепцій двох філософів полягає в тому, що в них сексуалізовоно не лише чоловіче, а й жіноче начало. Таким чином, Розанов у своїй стилістиці, акцентованій на увазі до тілесності, напрочуд близький теперішній гендерній антропології та може розглядатися як її предтеча. Разом з тим вплив філософських концепцій Ірігаре на сучасні гендерні дослідження полягає в тому, що вона вперше вказала на необхідність створення жіночого іншого дискурсу, який поважає статеву відмінність, та показала проблематичність виділення відмінності жіночого іншого від будь-якого іншого в ньому. (shrink)

This article considers a range of responses to Plato's Symposium, paying particular attention to Diotima's speech on eros and philosophy. It argues that Diotima's teachings contain resources for a relational pedagogy, but that these resources come more sharply into focus when Plato's text is read through the lens of contemporary (20th and 21st century) thinkers. The article therefore draws on the work of David Halperin, Hannah Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard and Luce Irigaray to argue that Diotima points us towards the value (...) of educative encounters as reciprocal and unpredictable events of initiation and becoming. Diotima's rhetorical emphasis on birth is shown to be especially important for refiguring pedagogical relations in terms of natality, understood as a capacity for new beginnings, and hence for reclaiming education as a potentially generative encounter, rather than one governed by the logic of reproduction. The final section of the article turns to work by Christine Battersby, bell hooks, Richard Smith and Morwenna Griffiths to resituate the discussion in relation to questions of autonomy. As a corrective to the modern bias towards the value of the autonomous individual, it argues that dependencies and unequal power relations can be a constitutive and enabling aspect of the educative process. Attention to such relations should thus form a key part of a relational pedagogy. (shrink)

"Sorcerer Love" is the name that Luce Irigaray gives to the demonic function of love as presented in Plato's Symposium. She argues that Socrates there attributes two incompatible positions to Diotima, who in any case is not present at the banquet. The first is that love is a mid-point or intermediary between lovers which also teaches immortality. The second is that love is a means to the end and duty of procreation, and thus is a mere means to immortality through (...) which the lovers lose one another. Irigaray argues in favor of the first position, a conception of love as demonic intermediary. (shrink)

An incidental extension of the central domain of argumentation theory with non-classical ways of constructing arguments seems to automatically raise a question that is otherwise rarely posed, namely whether or not it is useful to consider the sex of the arguer. This question is usually posed with regard to argumentation by women in particular. Do women rely more, or differently than men do on non-canonical modes of reasoning stemming from the realm of the emotional, physical and intuitive, instead of the (...) logical? One may simply refer this question to folk-linguistics. One may also take the question seriously, given the findings on women's linguistic behaviour, and for various other reasons that will be explained below.Section 1 sums up the most frequently quoted differences in language use between women and men. This is followed by a non-exhaustive, interdisciplinary review of studies on male/female differences in verbal and written argumentation.Section 2 discusses the role of language and texts in generating and maintaining ideas on gender. These gender messages not only influence the actual argumentation behaviour of women and men, but also the way such behaviour is valued.Section 3 subsequently shows that our ideas on rationality are gendered, and therefore also our ideas on the proper central domain of argumentation theory.Section 4 briefly reflects on why this kind of wrong question about the reasoning of women should sometimes be addressed seriously anyway. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojama seksualinės skirties sampratos transformacija Luce Irigaray filosofijoje. Straipsnio euristinė schema – esencializmo-konstruktyvizmo kontroversija giminės filosofijoje. Ja remiantis teigiama, kad ankstyvoji Irigaray psichoanalitinė seksualinės skirties samprata ir mimesis kaip moteriškosios subjektyvybės steigties būdas atitinka tik „strateginį esencializmą“, o transformaciniame filosofijos etape, ginčijant Hegelio subjekto paradigmą, Irigaray pateikta natūralistinė seksualinės skirties samprata jau implikuoja ontologinį esencializmą. Taip pat į analizę įtraukiamas Irigaray nenagrinėtas Hegelio giminės tapatybės principas, kuris implictiškai apima lyčių diferenciacijos aspektą. Tuo siekiama ne tik atskleisti Irigaray moteriškosios subjektyvybės (...) sampratą, kuri apima moteriškumo neredukuojamumą į reprodukcijos funkciją, vyriškosios ir moteriškosios subjektyvybių nebendramatiškumą, bet taip pat išryškinti giminės tapatybės ir seksualinės skirties kontroversiją kaip dvi skirtingas subjekto filosofijos paradigmas. (shrink)

Practice, Spatiality and Embodied Emotions: An Outline of a Geography of Practice The paper outlines an approach to social analysis/human geography taking off from a social ontology of practice. This means a focus of attention to embodied or practical knowledges and their formation in people's everyday lives, to the world of experiences and emotions, and to the infinitude of encounters through which we make the world and are made by it in turn. The paper proceeds in three parts. First, considering (...) the way in which subjectivity and identity are created in and through practices sets the ground. The two following sections are extensions from that discussing "embodiment and spatiality" and "affectivity and emotion" respectively. The purpose is threefold; to develop the sensuous character of practice, to consider the spatialities involved in that character, and to discuss possible developments including power and the social differentiation of bodies. The paper is concluded by a short discussion of the geographies following from the suggested account. (shrink)

Irigaray and Le Dœuff diagnose the problem of woman and philosophy in terms of love. The differing solutions to the problem can be found in their styles. Irigaray's style is loving and dialogic, transforming the inherent structure of love and reminding us of the traditional feminine position defined by men. Le Dœuff's style is critical and pluralistic and relates to her perception of the feminine way of philosophical writing. These styles take into account the undervaluation of the feminine in the (...) apparently `neutral' practices of philosophizing and surpass the traditional or unreflected notions of the feminine style. Ultimately, the consciously `subjective' styles, with the inherent aims of self-reflectivity and openness for other persons and texts, prove necessary when striving for truth and objectivity. Thus, Le Dœuff and Irigaray question the standard notion of philosophical style as neutral `non-style'. (shrink)

Antigone fascinates G. W. F. Hegel and Luce Irigaray, both of whom turn to her in their explorations and articulations of ethics. Hegel and Irigaray make these re-turns to Antigone through the double and related lenses of nature and sexual difference. This essay investigates these figures of Antigone and the accompanying ethical accounts of nature and sexual difference as a way of examining Irigaray's complex relation to and creative uses of Hegel's thought.

In this essay I follow one argument strand from Linda Singer's Erotic Welfare. How can we have a forward-looking and affirmative ideal of sexual freedom when the AIDS panic has altered the sexual landscape and instigated new justifications for oppressive sexual disciplines? How can we be sexual subjects when processes of commodification and disciplinary practices have constrained sexual expression while proliferating sexual fetishes? These are some of the questions this book formulates, without answering.

My essay incorporates Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental, a dynamic attempt to reconstitute the body/mind dualism which founds Western thought, into a reading of the practice of European concert dance. I contend that Irigaray's efforts toward articulating a language of the body as active agent have much to offer analyses of dance practice, and develop this claim through a reading which reflects philosophically on the changing nature of my own dance activity.

Emmanuel Levinas's Totality and Infinity (1961) is explicitly con cerned with the suppression of the voice of the Other by the synoptic totalizations of the voice of western philosophy. Levinas contests this emergence of Being and the systems of totality it indicates with the irruption of the face of the other, which signifies through contact and sensibility the presence of infinity within the human situation. Derrida's reading of this fundamental testing of western ontology rests on the accusation that western philosophy (...) already has a term for this: empiricism. That is, Derrida exposes an alien voice within Levinas's exposure of the voice alienated from ontological formulations. In the later Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) Levinas implic itly recognizes the truth of Derrida's demonstration of a residual con ceptualism, and shifts from the thematization of infinite exteriority given by the Other, alterity and the face-to-face relation, to the search for a signifyingness that will breach the noema's identificational closure, that is, to the direct and exposed gesture of saying. Both the limit terms of Totality and Infinity and the response they produced in Derrida have become the starting-point of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence: the testimony that is irreducible to a thematizing knowledge. What saves this saying from becoming in its turn another theme is that, in addition to its acting in the text, it acts upon and as HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES Vol. 10 No. 3 © 1997 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) [0952-6951(199708)10:3] the text. The vocabulary, form of composition and mode of address of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence strain against their inherited limits. And the work this obliges the reader to undergo is, of course, an ethical necessity, given the work's message. (shrink)

This paper examines the ways in which Luce Irigaray and Jean-François Lyotard critique western metaphysics by drawing on notions of birth and infancy. It shows how both thinkers position birth as an event of beginning that can be reaffirmed in every act of initiation and recommencement. Irigaray's reading of Diotima's speech from Plato's Symposium is positioned as a key text for this project alongside a number of essays by Lyotard in which he explores the potency of infancy as the condition (...) of philosophy itself. Despite this potency, however, Lyotard suggests that metaphysics is haunted by a melancholia that is inseparable from the limits of thought. I argue that Irigaray is able both to explain why western metaphysics is constitutively melancholic and to offer a shift in perspective that means we are not inevitably condemned to melancholia. The paper concludes that while Lyotard's account of infancy challenges the terms of western metaphysics from within, Irigaray's reassessment of our beginnings in birth offers the possibility of an alternative metaphysical horizon. (shrink)

Luce Irigaray is often cited as the principle feminist who adheres to phenomenology as a method of descriptive philosophy. A different approach to Irigaray might well open the way to not only an avoidance of phenomenology's sexist tendencies, but the recognition that the breach between Irigaray's ideas and those of phenomenology is complete. I argue that this occurs and that Irigaray's work directly implicates a Bergsonian critique of the limits of phenomenology.

Aunque Descartes pretende hablar de cuestiones morales en general, y de las pasiones en particular, como si nadie hubiera escrito antes sobre ellas, lo cierto es que, en el caso de la admiración, es clara su referencia al mundo antiguo. En concreto, en este caso el pensador francés se sitúa críticamente en contra de la postura aristotélica, que entiende la admiración como el inicio de la filosofía. Frente a la propuesta clásica, que convierte dicha emoción en el motor permanente de (...) la investigación de las primeras causas, para Descartes la curiosidad excesiva y el estupor del asombro son rechazables. No obstante, algunos han señalado el carácter ambivalente de las declaraciones cartesianas. No en vano la admiración es no sólo la primera de las pasiones, sino también un componente fundamental de todas ellas. Y si bien en el campo del conocimiento debe superarse, en otros ámbitos, como el de la contemplación de la divinidad o en el goce de la libertad de la voluntad humana, tal desdén desaparece. En ese sentido, pretendemos explorar el modo en que Descartes separa admiración y conocimiento para luego reivindicar su importancia en el plano práctico. Palabras clave: Admiración, asombro, curiosidad, libre albedrío, pasión. (shrink)

A critical analysis of Diana Fuss's Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference (1989a) and Elizabeth Grosz's Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (1989).