- Property dualism without substance dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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More on prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Toward a Mature Science of Consciousness.Wanja Wiese - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):811-836.details
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Should we continue to study consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.details
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Brute necessity.James Van Cleve - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (9):e12516.details
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Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.details
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Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience.Brandon N. Towl - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):187 - 202.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.details
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Conscious and nonconscious control of action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.details
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Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):201-225.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Identity theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.details
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Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):141-164.details
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A-consciousness: The local newspaper of the mind?David Navon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-265.details
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How access-consciousness might be a kind of consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.details
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Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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