The illusion of conscious experience

Synthese:1-22 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KAMTIO-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-03-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 74 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Self-Building Technologies.Kammerer, François

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-01-02

Total views
1,773 ( #1,283 of 50,437 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
612 ( #409 of 50,437 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.