We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

We introduce and consider the inner-model reflection principle, which asserts that whenever a statement \varphi(a) in the first-order language of set theory is true in the set-theoretic universe V, then it is also true in a proper inner model W \subset A. A stronger principle, the ground-model reflection principle, asserts that any such \varphi(a) true in V is also true in some non-trivial ground model of the universe with respect to set forcing. These principles each express a form of width (...) reflection in contrast to the usual height reflection of the Lévy–Montague reflection theorem. They are each equiconsistent with ZFC and indeed \Pi_2-conservative over ZFC, being forceable by class forcing while preserving any desired rank-initial segment of the universe. Furthermore, the inner-model reflection principle is a consequence of the existence of sufficient large cardinals, and lightface formulations of the reflection principles follow from the maximality principle MP and from the inner-model hypothesis IMH. We also consider some questions concerning the expressibility of the principles. (shrink)

Assuming that GCH holds and [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-supercompact, we construct a generic extension [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] in which [Formula: see text] remains strongly inaccessible and [Formula: see text] for every infinite cardinal [Formula: see text]. In particular the rank-initial segment [Formula: see text] is a model of ZFC in which [Formula: see text] for every infinite cardinal [Formula: see text].

We show that the predicate “x is the power set of y” is ‐definable, if V = L[E] is an extender model constructed from a coherent sequences of extenders, provided that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. Here is a predicate true of just the infinite cardinals. From this we conclude: the validities of second order logic are reducible to, the set of validities of the Härtig quantifier logic. Further we show that if no L[E] model has (...) a cardinal strong up to one of its ℵ‐fixed points, and, the Löwenheim number of this logic, is less than the least weakly inaccessible δ, then (i) is a limit of measurable cardinals of K, and (ii) the Weak Covering Lemma holds at δ. (shrink)

Assume that there is no transitive class model of [Formula: see text] with a Woodin cardinal. Let [Formula: see text] be a singular ordinal such that [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Suppose [Formula: see text] is a regular cardinal in K. Then [Formula: see text] is a measurable cardinal in K. Moreover, if [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text].

Given sets and a regular cardinal μ, let be the statement that for any function, there are functions and such that for all,. In, the statement is false. However, we show the theory (which is implied by + “” + “ω1 is measurable”) implies that for every there is a such that in some inner model, κ is measurable with Mitchell order.

Let P be a forcing notion and $G\subseteq P$ its generic subset. Suppose that we have in $V[G]$ a $\kappa{-}$ complete ultrafilter1,2W over $\kappa $. Set $U=W\cap V$.

We study Σ1-definable sets in the presence of large cardinals. Our results show that the existence of a Woodin cardinal and a measurable cardinal above it imply that no well-ordering of the reals is Σ1-definable, the set of all stationary subsets of ω1 is not Σ1-definable and the complement of every Σ1-definable Bernstein subset of ${}_{}^{{\omega _1}}\omega _1^{}$ is not Σ1-definable. In contrast, we show that the existence of a Woodin cardinal is compatible with the existence of a Σ1-definable well-ordering (...) of H and the existence of a Δ1-definable Bernstein subset of ${}_{}^{{\omega _1}}\omega _1^{}$. We also show that, if there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals and a measurable cardinal above them, then there is no Σ1-definable uniformization of the club filter on ω1. Moreover, we prove a perfect set theorem for Σ1-definable subsets of ${}_{}^{{\omega _1}}\omega _1^{}$, assuming that there is a measurable cardinal and the nonstationary ideal on ω1 is saturated. The proofs of these results use iterated generic ultrapowers and Woodin’s ℙmax-forcing. Finally, we also prove variants of some of these results for Σ1-definable subsets of κκ, in the case where κ itself has certain large cardinal properties. (shrink)

James Earl Baumgartner (March 23, 1943–December 28, 2011) came of age mathematically during the emergence of forcing as a fundamental technique of set theory, and his seminal research changed the way set theory is done. He made fundamental contributions to the development of forcing, to our understanding of uncountable orders, to the partition calculus, and to large cardinals and their ideals. He promulgated the use of logic such as absoluteness and elementary submodels to solve problems in set theory, he applied (...) his knowledge of set theory to a variety of areas in collaboration with other mathematicians, and he encouraged a community of mathematicians with engaging survey talks, enthusiastic discussions of open problems, and friendly mathematical conversations. (shrink)

Let κ be a cardinal of cofinality \omega_1 witnessed by a club of cardinals (κ_\alpha | \alpha < \omega_1) . We study Silver's type effects of collapsing of κ^+_\alphas 's on κ^+ . A model in which κ^+_\alphas 's (and also κ^+) are collapsed on a stationary co-stationary set is constructed.

We examine the number of normal measures a successor cardinal can carry, in universes in which the Axiom of Choice is false. When considering successors of singular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results assuming instances of supercompactness, together with the Ultrapower Axiom (introduced by Goldberg in [12]). When considering successors of regular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results only assuming the existence of one measurable cardinal. This allows for equiconsistencies.

We give a model of set theory in which the strongly non‐stationary ideal over is weakly presaturated below some canonical set. Here μ is a regular uncountable cardinal. The model is the forcing extension with the Lévy collapse of a Woodin cardinal to the successor of μ. This improves on results of Goldring and of the first author.

After showing that \ refutes \ for all regular cardinals \, we present a diamond-plus principle \ concerning all subsets of \. Using a forcing argument, we prove that \ holds in Steel’s core model \}}\), an inner model in which the axiom of determinacy can hold. The combinatorial principle \ is then extended, in \}}\), to successor cardinals \ and to certain cardinals \ that are not ineffable. Here \ is the supremum of the ordinals that are the surjective (...) image of the set of reals \. (shrink)