How, exactly, must we strike the balance between security and equality? Must we insist, out of respect for the equality of persons, that the police refrain from using ethnic profiling and opt for some other strategy in their pursuit of terrorists, or must we allow the police to continue with this policy, which seems to sacrifice equality for the sake of security? This paper assesses the ethical status of ethnic profiling from the perspective of the ideal of equality. The paper (...) shows how the ethical status of ethnic profiling changes depending on how exactly we specify the egalitarian ideal. Furthermore, it argues that on a plausible interpretation of the ideal of equality, ethnic profiling is not in principle objectionable. (shrink)

Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We show that freedom as (...) independence retains the virtues of its liberal and republican counterparts while shedding their vices. Our aim is to put this conception of freedom more firmly on the map and to offer a novel perspective on the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the idea of a ‘balance’ between security and liberty. Set against the background of ever greater demands for security, the article argues that the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism's key category is not liberty, but security. This fact, it is suggested, undermines any possibility of liberalism challenging current demands for greater security, as witnessed by the thoroughly authoritarian ‘concessions’ to security by some (...) contemporary liberals. More ambitiously, the article also suggests that attempts to develop a ‘radical’ politics of security are misplaced, and that what is needed is more a political critique of the concept. (shrink)

Corporate behaviour is often regulated through the criminal law by means of reverse onus offences. Such offences are alleged to involve violations of the Presumption of Innocence. Such allegations almost always assume natural persons as defendants. The arguments supporting reverse onus offences are typically instrumental, to do with the importance of the social goals promoted and the ease of proof. The Presumption of Innocence is taken to be an autonomy right of natural persons and so not subject to being sidelined (...) for reasons of law enforcement expediency. Corporations, however, are not natural persons: they have no autonomy right not to be treated as means. It may well be, then, that reverse onus offences are justified in the case of corporate defendants. I argue that the Presumption is not violated by such offences in the case of corporate defendants. I develop a broad concept of the criminal justice system as an allocative system, and argue that reverse onus offences properly allocate the burden of proof for corporations. Specifically, I argue that the normative demand for legal innocence is sufficiently met by the availability of a due diligence defence; that the responsibility of corporations when prohibited harms occur is properly a form of outcome-responsibility; and that taking into account issues of reciprocity, legitimacy and power reverse onus offences justly allocate the burden of proof in the case of corporate defendants. (shrink)

This paper examines the legitimacy of the US government’s argument that it must “balance liberty and security” with regard to its policy of trying enemy belligerents in military commissions rather than federal courts. I distinguish between three senses of “balance,” and argue that the policy is ambiguous between the second (internal) and third (emergency external) senses of balance. Neither line of reasoning justifies the policy, however. On the second sense, it is unjustified because it constitutes an arbitrary limitation of the (...) rights of some for the sake of the security of others. It thus violates the government’s duty to decide questions of policy in accordance with accepted legal procedures. Alternately, if the policy is intended to be an exercise of emergency powers, then it violates what I call the government’s juridical duty to serve as a guardian of justice. I offer an alternative justification for emergency measures, one that is based on the model of self-defense. I conclude that although the exercise of military commissions in times of emergency can be justified, the current exercise is illegitimate. (shrink)

A common view has it that since we are far likelier to be killed in some road or household accident than in a terror attack, our fear of the latter is exaggerated. I argue that terrorism's relatively limited death toll need not mean that fearing it is unreasonable, nor does it immediately imply that counter‐terrorism policies are unjustified – whatever other, legitimate concerns these policies give rise to. First, I argue that in the special case of terrorism, it is misleading (...) to focus on risk per capita, as critics typically do. Second, while terrorism has a probabilistic component which should be relevant to decision‐making, risk is not entirely or even primarily what terrorism is all about. Third, I argue that fearing terrorism may be reasonable even while recognizing the small probability of personal harm. Due to terrorism's random character, the belief that one will escape harm rests on little more than statistical evidence. As I explain, this leaves some room for reasonable doubt, and a justified level of fear. (shrink)

Over the past decade, the Five Eyes Intelligence community has argued cryptosystems with end-to-end encryption (E2EE) are disrupting the acquisition and analysis of digital evidence. They have labelled this phenomenon the ‘problem of going dark’. Consequently, several jurisdictions have passed ‘responsible encryption’ laws that limit access to E2EE. Based upon a rhetorical analysis (Cunningham in Understanding rhetoric: a guide to critical reading and argumentation, BrownWalker Press, Boca Raton, 2018) of official statements about ‘going dark’, it is argued there is a (...) need for a domain-specific principle of cryptographic justice to reorient the debate away from competing technocratic claims about the necessity, proportionality, and accountability of digital surveillance programs. This article therefore specifies a principle of cryptographic justice by adapting more general norms of information justice to decision-making about encryption law and policy. The resulting principle is that encryption laws and policies should be designed to empower the comparatively powerless to protect themselves from domination (i.e., morally arbitrary forms of surveillance). It is argued this principle can reorient decision-making about encryption law and policy towards consideration of how cryptography impacts systems-level power dynamics within information societies. (shrink)

Freedom and security are often portrayed as things that have to be traded off against one another, but this view does not capture the full complexity of the freedom-security relationship. Rather, there seem to be four different ways in which freedom and security connect to each other: freedom can come at the cost of security, security can come at the cost of freedom, freedom can work to the benefit of security, and security can work to the benefit of freedom. This (...) paper analyses each of these connections in turn. It shows that particular understandings of freedom can help us to see particular connections between freedom and security. The practical examples used to illustrate these connections are drawn from the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be suggested that, in the face of challenges such as this one, taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can ultimately help decision-makers in upholding both. (shrink)

Douglas Husak contends that both criminalization and punishment can serve preventive goals, so long as they respect retributive culpability constraints. This Essay draws on Husak’s work to argue that, while Husak is right to defend the legitimacy of criminal law as a preventive endeavor, preventive coercion is also permissible on consequentialist grounds alone, outside the culpability constraints of the criminal law. The Essay presents a unified consequentialist theory of preventive coercion, addresses deontological objections to ‘pure’ preventive detention, and argues that (...) a consequentialist approach to prevention might ultimately be more protective of liberty and equality interests than the deontological ‘mad or bad’ approach that currently dominates Anglo-American jurisprudence and legal theory. (shrink)

This paper analyses how security affects well-being. Security is understood as someone’s sureness of enjoying some good in the future; well-being is treated as a matter of human flourishing. Security can contribute to our well-being in various ways: if we are in fact bound to enjoy a good, in principle this is positive for our flourishing in the future; if we also believe that we will enjoy this good, we can be more efficient in pursuing our well-being; if we also (...) feel secure, this supports our enjoyment of our physical and mental capacities. For some of these benefits to obtain fully, however, it is important that our beliefs and feelings align with the facts. Furthermore, mirroring security’s upsides, there are also ways in which security can hamper our flourishing: it can obstruct the change, surprise, and pleasurable fear that are sometimes required for a good life too. (shrink)

Tekst stanowi próbę pomyślenia instytucji stanu wyjątkowego w ramach logiki monistycznej, która by nie naruszała podstaw demokracji liberalnej: jako instrumentu prawnego do zwalczenia zagrożenia, przed którym stoi państwo, przy użyciu narzędzi z porządku norm sprzed wystąpienia sytuacji ekstraordynaryjnej. Autor analizuje trzy możliwości takiej logiki, wywodząc ją z koncepcji m. in. libertarianizmu Roberta Nozicka, instytucjonalizmu Nomi Claire Lazar czy liberalnego realizmu Jeremy’ego Waldrona i aplikując do zapisów Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.

After a recent spate of terrorist attacks in European and American cities, liberal democracies are reintroducing emergency securitarian measures that curtail rights and/or expand police powers. Political theorists who study ESMs are familiar with how such measures become instruments of discrimination and abuse, but the fundamental conflict ESMs pose for not just civil liberty but also democratic equality still remains insufficiently explored. Such phenomena are usually explained as a function of public panic or fear-mongering in times of crisis, but I (...) show that the tension between security and equality is in fact much deeper and more general. It follows a different logic than the more familiar tension between security and liberty, and it concerns not just the rule of law in protecting liberty but also the role of law in integrating new or previously subjected groups into a democratic community. As liberal-democratic societies become increasingly diverse and multicultural in the present era of mass immigration and global interconnectedness, this tension between security and equality is likely to become more pronounced. (shrink)

This is a study of the treatment of library patron privacy in licenses for electronic journals in academic libraries. We begin by distinguishing four facets of privacy and intellectual freedom based on the LIS and philosophical literature. Next, we perform a content analysis of 42 license agreements for electronic journals, focusing on terms for enforcing authorized use and collection and sharing of user data. We compare our findings to model licenses, to recommendations proposed in a recent treatise on licenses, and (...) to our account of the four facets of intellectual freedom. We find important conflicts with each. (shrink)

Anonymising technologies are cyber-tools that protect people from online surveillance, hiding who they are, what information they have stored and what websites they are looking at. Whether it is anonymising online activity through ‘TOR’ and its onion routing, 256-bit encryption on communications sent or smart phone auto-deletes, the user’s identity and activity is protected from the watchful eyes of the intelligence community. This represents a clear challenge to intelligence actors as it prevents them access to information that many would argue (...) plays a vital part in locating and preventing threats from being realised. Moreover, such technology offers more than ordinary information protections as it erects ‘warrant-proof’ spaces, technological black boxes that no matter what some authority might deem as being legitimately searchable is protected to the extent that there are very limited or non-existent means of forcing oneself in. However, it will be argued here that not only is using such anonymising technology and its extra layer of protection people’s right, but that it is ethically mandatory. That is, due to the en masse surveillance—from both governments and corporations—coupled with people’s limited awareness and ability to comprehend such data collections, anonymising technology should be built into the fabric of cyberspace to provide a minimal set of protections over people’s information, and in doing so force the intelligence community to develop more targeted forms of data collection. (shrink)

Citizenship status is meant to be secure, that is, inviolable. Recently, however, several democratic states have adopted or are considering adopting laws that allow them the power to revoke citizenship. This claimed right forces us to consider whether citizenship can be treated as a “conditional” status, in particular whether it can be treated as conditional on the right sort of behavior. Those who defend such a view argue that citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, and thus in principle (...) is revocable. Participating in a foreign state's military, treason, spying, or committing acts that otherwise threaten the national security of one's state may all warrant revocation. This article assesses the justifications given for the claimed power to revoke citizenship in democratic states and concludes that, ultimately, such a power is incompatible with democracy.I begin with a brief account of the claims given by contemporary democratic states for the “right to revoke.” Democratic citizenship is today commonly understood to beegalitarian, that is, it protects an equal basic package of rights for all citizens; and to be “the highest and most secure legal status,” that is, it is meant to be secure from unilateral withdrawal by the state. Formally, many democratic states have revocation laws on the books, but most of these have long been in disuse. Although I argue in this article that all revocation laws are inconsistent with democratic citizenship, I focus on the recent surge in proposed and implemented revocation laws, which are justified as essential to protecting national security.In the second section I outline three reasons to object to revocation laws. First, revocation laws discriminate between citizens based on their citizenship status. Second, since they single out those who are eligible for revocation, they apply unequal penalties for the same crime. Third, they are inadequately justified, in general, but also particularly to those who may be subject to them, because they are not adequately connected to the policy goal they are said to fulfill. I conclude with some brief observations concerning the ways in which revocation permits states to abrogate their shared responsibility for protecting the global community from dangerous individuals. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the idea of a ‘balance’ between security and liberty. Set against the background of ever greater demands for security, the article argues that the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism's key category is not liberty, but security. This fact, it is suggested, undermines any possibility of liberalism challenging current demands for greater security, as witnessed by the thoroughly authoritarian ‘concessions’ to security by some (...) contemporary liberals. More ambitiously, the article also suggests that attempts to develop a ‘radical’ politics of security are misplaced, and that what is needed is more a political critique of the concept. (shrink)

The paper critically engages with some of the normative arguments in Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson’s book Unfit for the Future. In particular, it scrutinizes the authors’ argument in denial of a moral right to privacy as well as their political proposal to alter humankind’s moral psychology in order to avert climate change, terrorism and to redress global injustice.

First responders to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) events face decisions having significant human consequences. Some operational decisions are supported by standard operating procedures, yet these may not suffice for ethical decisions. Responders will be forced to weigh their options, factoring-in contextual peculiarities; they will require guidance on how they can approach novel (indeed unique) ethical problems: they need strategies for “on the spot” ethical decision making. The primary aim of this paper is to examine how first responders should (...) approach on the spot ethical decision-making amid the stress and uncertainty of a CBRN event. Drawing on the long-term professional CBRN experience of one of the authors, this paper sets out a series of practical ethical dilemmas potentially arising in the context of a large-scale chemical incident. We propose a broadly consequentialist approach to on the spot ethical decision-making, but one which incorporates ethical values and rights as “side-constraints”. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the idea of a 'balance' between security and liberty. Set against the background of ever greater demands for security, the article argues that the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism's key category is not liberty, but security. This fact, it is suggested, undermines any possibility of liberalism challenging current demands for greater security, as witnessed by the thoroughly authoritarian 'concessions' to security by some (...) contemporary liberals. More ambitiously, the article also suggests that attempts to develop a 'radical' politics of security are misplaced, and that what is needed is more a political critique of the concept. (shrink)

This article joins in and extends the contemporary debate on the right to privacy. We bring together two strands of the contemporary discourse on privacy. While we endorse the prevailing claim that norms of informational privacy protect the autonomy of individual subjects, we supplement it with an argument demonstrating that privacy is an integral element of the dynamics of all social relationships. This latter claim is developed in terms of the social role theory and substantiated by an analysis of the (...) role of privacy in intimate relationships, in professional relationships and in social interactions between strangers in public. We conclude by arguing that it is not always reasonable to assume a conflict between individual privacy on the one hand and society on the other. Legislators and participants in public debate also have to take into account the consequences of limiting privacy on social interaction and the integration of the society. (shrink)

In this contribution, I will argue that the image of a balance is often used to defend the idea of a trade-off. To understand the drawbacks of this line of thought, I will explore the relationship between online security technologies and fundamental rights, notably privacy, nondiscrimination, freedom of speech and due process. After discriminating between three types of online security technologies, I will trace the reconfiguration of the notion of privacy in the era of smart environments. This will lead to (...) an inquiry into the metaphor of the scale, building on the triple test regarding the justification of the limitation of fundamental rights such as privacy. The conclusion will be that in the case of a trade-off, infringing measures will have to be balanced by effective safeguards. No trade-off without balance. (shrink)

The central focus of this essay is Isaiah Berlin’s arguments about the concepts of negative freedom and positive freedom, developed in his philosophical work Two Concepts of Liberty. By adopting a philosophical standpoint, this essay explores the application of Berlin’s notions of freedom at the organizational level, within the workplace, and in the management field. This essay presents three philosophical arguments that provide some clarifications about the potential challenges associated with autonomy in organizations. These arguments incorporate Berlin’s ideas of freedom (...) with philosophical insights from Heidegger, Sartre, Frankfurt, and Confucius to highlight the missing elements of autonomy in management literature and its implementation in organizations, explaining the challenges of autonomy and the reasons for some unexpected results. Recommendations for future studies and managerial implications are discussed. (shrink)