Switch to: References

Citations of:

Freedom as Independence

Ethics 126 (4):1043–1074 (2016)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Systemic Domination, Social Institutions and the Coalition Problem.Hallvard Sandven - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594X2092792.
    This article argues for a systemic conception of freedom as non-domination. It does so by engaging with the debate on the so-called coalition problem. The coalition problem arises because non-domination holds that groups can be agents of power, while also insisting that freedom be robust. Consequently, it seems to entail that everyone is in a constant state of domination at the hands of potential groups. However, the problem can be dissolved by rejecting a ‘strict possibility’ standard for interpreting non-domination’s robustness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Value of Constitutions and Judicial Review.Laura Valentini - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):817-832.
    In his thought-provoking book, Why Law Matters, Alon Harel defends two key claims: one ontological, the other axiological. First, he argues that constitutions and judicial review are necessary constituents of a just society. Second, he suggests that these institutions are not only means to the realization of worthy ends, but also non-instrumentally valuable. I agree with Harel that constitutions and judicial review have more than instrumental value, but I am not persuaded by his arguments in support of this conclusion. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Freedom Without Law.Harrison P. Frye - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (3):298-316.
    Untangling the relationship of law and liberty is among the core problems of political theory. One prominent position is that there is no freedom without law. This article challenges the argument that, because law is constitutive of freedom, there is no freedom without law. I suggest that, once properly understood, the argument that law is constitutive of freedom does not uniquely apply to law. It also applies to social norms. What law does for freedom, social norms can do too. Thus, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Social Bases of Freedom.Harrison Frye - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Freedom and Actual Interference.Jonah Goldwater - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).
    Liberal and republican conceptions of freedom differ as to whether freedom consists in noninterference or non-domination. Pettit defends the republican non-domination conception on the grounds that one can be unfree without being interfered with if one is dominated, and that one can be interfered with yet free if not dominated. I show that these claims mistake the scope of actual interference. In particular, I show that cases said to involve unfreedom without interference do involve interference, and that cases said to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. Pelotas: NEPFil. pp. 63-89.
    Este texto tem como objetivo apresentar a principal motivação filosófica para se defender uma teoria causal da memória, que é explicar como pode um evento que se deu no passado estar relacionado a uma experiência mnêmica que se dá no presente. Para tanto, iniciaremos apresentando a noção de memória de maneira informal e geral, para depois apresentar elementos mais detalhados. Finalizamos apresentando uma teoria causal da memória que se beneficia da noção de veritação (truthmaking).
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gruesome Freedom: The Moral Limits of Non-Constraint.John Lawless - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Many philosophers conceive of freedom as non-interference. Such conceptions unify two core commitments. First, they associate freedom with non-constraint. And second, they take seriously a distinction between the interpersonal and the non-personal. As a result, they focus our attention exclusively on constraints attributable to other people’s choices – that is, on interference. I argue that these commitments manifest two distinct concerns: first, for a wide range of options; and second, for other people’s respect. However, construing freedom as non-interference unifies these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Does a Mugger Dominate? Episodic Power and the Structural Dimension of Domination.Dorothea Gädeke - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (2):199-221.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView. -/- Imagine you are walking through a park. Suddenly, a mugger points a gun at you, threatening to shoot you if you do not hand over your valuables. Is this an instance of domination? Many authors working within the neo-republican framework - including Philip Pettit himself - are inclined to say 'yes'. After all, the mugger case seems to be a paradigmatic example of what it means to be at someone's mercy. However, I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Neorepublican Challenge to Egalitarian-Liberalism: Evaluating Justifications of Redistributive Institutions.Jürgen Sirsch & Doris Unger - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-24.
    Neorepublicans like Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett claim that neorepublicanism provides a superior normative research program compared to egalitarian-liberalism. Particularly, they argue that neorepublicanism offers a better justification of redistributive policies, which are normally associated with egalitarian-liberalism. According to Lovett and Pettit, the neorepublican justification is superior because it rests on parsimonious theoretical assumptions and is more suitable to persuade people of redistributive institutions. We contest these claims on the grounds of methodological and substantive moral reasons. We argue that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Law and Ethics of Virtual Sexual Assault.John Danaher - forthcoming - In Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Woodrow Barfield & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Marc Blitz (eds.), The Law of Virtual and Augmented Reality. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Press.
    This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom: A Critique of the Little Alex Problem.John Danaher - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:233-250.
    A common objection to moral enhancement is that it would undermine our moral freedom and that this is a bad thing because moral freedom is a great good. Michael Hauskeller has defended this view on a couple of occasions using an arresting thought experiment called the 'Little Alex' problem. In this paper, I reconstruct the argument Hauskeller derives from this thought experiment and subject it to critical scrutiny. I claim that the argument ultimately fails because (a) it assumes that moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms.Gianfranco Pellegrino - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):811-823.
    According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither responsible for climate harms, nor they have mitigation duties. If this view were true, there would be collective responsibility for climate harms without individual responsibility and collective mitigation duties without individual duties: this is puzzling. This paper explores a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark