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Epistemic Authority

Christoph Jäger

In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2024)

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Lying by explaining: an experimental study.Grzegorz Gaszczyk & Aleksandra Krogulska - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-27.details The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
False Authorities.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - Acta Analytica.details An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Healthy Mistrust: Medical Black Box Algorithms, Epistemic Authority, and Preemptionism.Andreas Wolkenstein - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-10.details In the ethics of algorithms, a specifically epistemological analysis is rarely undertaken in order to gain a critique (or a defense) of the handling of or trust in medical black box algorithms (BBAs). This article aims to begin to fill this research gap. Specifically, the thesis is examined according to which such algorithms are regarded as epistemic authorities (EAs) and that the results of a medical algorithm must completely replace other convictions that patients have (preemptionism). If this were true, it (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations

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