24 found
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  1. The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):208-218.
    Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms – sometimes even biases – in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming true beliefs or doxastic attitudes (...)
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  2. Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In Sect. 2, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In Sect. 3, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In Sect. 4, (...)
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  3. Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement.Thomas Grundmann - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. New York: Routledge. pp. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
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  4. Fake News: The Case for a Purely Consumer-Oriented Explication.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Our current understanding of ‘fake news’ is not in good shape. On the one hand, this category seems to be urgently needed for an adequate understanding of the epistemology in the age of the internet. On the other hand, the term has an unstable ordinary meaning and the prevalent accounts which all relate fake news to epistemically bad attitudes of the producer lack theoretical unity, sufficient extensional adequacy, and epistemic fruitfulness. I will therefore suggest an alternative account of fake news (...)
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  5. How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.
    In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I (...)
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  6. Experts: What are they and how can laypeople identify them?Thomas Grundmann - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...)
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  7. Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition.Thomas Grundmann - 2021 - In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. In this paper, I will (...)
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  8. Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgments.Thomas Grundmann - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):407-427.
    Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Second, I will argue (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Episteme:1-18.
    Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut (...)
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  10. Platonism and the Apriori in Thought Experiments.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge.
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  11. The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to My Critics.Thomas Grundmann - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (12):28-35.
    In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), I address a phenomenon that is widely neglected in the current literature on nudges: intentional doxastic nudging, i.e. people’s intentional influence over other people’s beliefs, rather than over their choices. I argue that, at least in brute cases, nudging is not giving reasons, but rather bypasses reasoning altogether. More specifically, nudging utilizes psychological heuristics and the nudged person’s biases in smart ways. The goal of my paper is to defend the claim that nudging, (...)
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  12. Ist Wissen erkenntnistheoretisch fundamental? Eine Kritik an Williamson.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - In Gerhard Schönrich (ed.), Wissen und Werte. mentis. pp. 45-69.
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  13. Perceptual Representations as Basic Reasons.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. pp. 286-303.
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  14. Descartes' Cogito-Argument.Thomas Grundmann - 2005 - In Thomas Grundmann, Catrin Misselhorn, Frank Hofmann & Veronique Zanetti (eds.), Anatomie der Subejktivität. suhrkamp. pp. 255-276.
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  15. Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens.Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):305-321.
    In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast (...)
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  16. Die Wahrnehmung kausaler Prozesse.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung. ontos. pp. 211-228.
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  17. Die Unhintergehbarkeit der Intuition.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Thinkling. Talking. Acting (Ed. By J. Brandl, D. Messelken, S. Wedmann).
    In diesem Aufsatz räume ich mit einigen tiefsitzenden Vorurteilen gegen die methodologische Rolle von Intuitionen in der Philosophie auf. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass Intuitionen eine zentrale Rolle als epistemische Gründe in Gedankenexperimenten spielen. Aber auch völlig andere Methoden des Philosophierens (wie etwa die Transzendentalpragmatik) kommen ohne Rekurs auf Intuitionen als Gründe letztlich nicht aus. Außerdem kläre ich über die Natur von Intuitionen und deren epistemologischen Status genauer auf. Intuitionen sind fundamentale Gründe, aber sie sind fehlbar, anfechtbar und lassen sich methodisch (...)
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  18. Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - In Marcel van Ackeren (ed.), Philosophy and the Historical Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-68.
    What is the epistemic significance of reflecting on a discipline’s past for making progress in that discipline? I assume that the answer to this question negatively correlates with that discipline’s degree of progress over time. If and only if a science is progressive, then what people think or argue in that discipline ceases to be up-to-date. In this paper, I will distinguish different dimensions of disciplinary progress and consequently argue that veritic progress, i.e. collective convergence to truth, is the most (...)
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  19. Should one care about the intuitions of others: Trying out intuition solipsism.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
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  20. Was ist eigentlich ein transzendentales Argument?Thomas Grundmann - 2003 - In Dietmar Hermann Heidemann & Kristina Engelhard (eds.), Warum Kant heute? Bedeutung und Relevanz seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. New York: De Gruyter. pp. 44-75.
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  21. New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.
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  22. Warum ich weiß, dass ich kein Zombie bin.Thomas Grundmann - 2005 - In Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Den eigenen Geist kennen. mentis. pp. 135-149.
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  23. Theorie oder Therapie. Perspektiven der pyrrhonischen Skepsis bei Sextus Empiricus.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
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  24. (1 other version)Conceptual Construction: Why the Content of Our Folk Terms Has Only Limited Significance.Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - In Masaharu Mizumoto & Jonardon Ganeri (eds.), Ethno-Epistemology: New Directions for Global Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...)
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