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  1. Freedom as Independence.Christian List & Laura Valentini - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1043–1074.
    Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We show that freedom as (...)
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  • Republicanism and moralised freedom.Lars J. K. Moen - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (4):423-440.
    A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I show how republican freedom as non-domination is moralised, and why analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior to, this more basic (...)
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  • The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy.Christopher Mcmahon - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (1):67-93.
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  • Freedom as Non‐Domination and Widespread Prejudice.M. Victoria Costa - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):441-458.
    This paper offers an answer to an objection to Phillip Pettit’s neo‐republican account of freedom as non‐domination raised by Sharon Krause. The objection is that widespread prejudice, such as systemic racism or sexism, generates significant obstacles to individuals’ free agency but that neo‐republicanism fails to explain why these obstacles reduce freedom. This is because neo‐republicanism defines domination in terms of the capacity for arbitrary interference, but many prejudiced actions do not involve physical coercion, threats, or any other behavior typically described (...)
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  • Should Relational Autonomy Theorists Embrace Republican Freedom Instead? A Commentary on "Nondomination and the Limits of Relational Autonomy" by Danielle M. Wenner.Greg Scherkoske - 2020 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 13 (2):56-59.
    There is much to learn from and admire in Danielle Wenner's "Nondomination and the Limits of Relational Autonomy." The core claim Wenner advances is that the very concerns that have motivated feminist relational autonomy theorists would be better pursued by foregoing their concern with autonomy and pursuing instead the political aim of promoting a neorepublican conception of freedom as nondomination. While leaving open the possibility that "autonomy speak may remain valuable in some contexts", Wenner nevertheless claims that "for the purposes (...)
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