The view that human law can be analyzed in terms of commands was subjected to devastating criticism by H. L. A. Hart in his 1961 The Concept of Law. Two objections that Hart levels against the command theory of law also make serious trouble for divine command theory. Divine command theorists would do well to jettison command as the central concept of their moral theory and, following Hart’s lead, instead appeal to the concept of a rule. Such a successor view—divine (...) legislation theory—has the attractions of divine command theory without the unacceptable limitations of command theories that Hart identifies. (shrink)

Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and (...) therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection. (shrink)

The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn’t been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God’s role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this (...) response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then suggesting how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally by explaining how all this relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies. (shrink)

I argue that, if God exists, moral facts ontologically depend on him. After distinguishing a variety of ways in which moral facts might ontologically depend on God, I focus my attention on the most prominent and most well-developed account of the relationship between God and morality viz., the account developed by Robert Adams in his Finite and Infinite Goods. Adams’ account consists of two parts—an account of deontic moral properties and an account of axiological moral properties. Adams’ account of deontic (...) moral properties is a version of divine command theory according to which the property of being morally right and the property of being morally wrong are identical to the property of being commanded by God and the property of being forbidden by God, respectively. I argue that although Adams’ divine command theory is not vulnerable to many prominent objections that afflict other versions of divine command theory, his view is, nevertheless, both unmotivated and implausible. Next, I explain Adams’ account of axiological properties, which is a particular version of what I call “theistic valuational particularism.” According to Adams’ theistic valuational particularism, the property of being intrinsically good or excellent is identical to the property of faithfully and holistically resembling God. I argue that because Adams’ conception of excellence is so broad, there are some things that have the property of being excellent but fail to resemble God. I argue that the same problem afflicts other, modified versions of theistic valuational particularism, including one that is defended by Scott Hill and another that is championed by Mark Murphy. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem does not afflict what I call “theistic moral valuational particularism,” the view that moral goodness is identical to the property of resembling God in certain, specified ways. Furthermore, I argue that, if God exists, theistic moral valuational particularism is not only well motivated theologically, but it can withstand the two most prominent objections that have been lodged against it, viz., the arbitrariness objection and the divine ascription problem. (shrink)

The relationship between God and morality has been a topic of philosophical discussion since Socrates engaged Euthyphro in the agora. In recent years, it has received a lot of attention, as theistic philosophers have attempted to show that divine command theory and other theistic meta‐ethical accounts are defensible. Whether metaphysical naturalism is compatible with moral realism is a related (and equally controversial) topic. This essay surveys the main issues in these debates.