The «good European» is a rich and important topic in Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is first related to Nietzsche’s early reflections on European culture. Then, during the 1880’s, it gains philosophical value, being strictly connected with the purposes of Nietzsche’s mature thought. The aim of this paper is to show that only with reference to these purposes has the notion of «good European» a political meaning, being the good Europeans primarily the leaders of the spiritual development that follows the overcoming of (...) Christian morality. To this end, we shall track the genesis and development of the notion of «good European», from Human, all too Human I to Nietzsche’s writings from the years 1885-1887. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s timeliness is patent in the renewed enthusiasm with which scholars in both the continental and analytic traditions have approached his works in recent years. Along with other topics, attention has been particularly directed towards two important issues: Nietzsche’s analysis, critique, and genealogy of culture, and his stance on subjectivity. In this introductory study we shall provide a brief outline of both these topics. As will be shown, they play a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s thought, and the link that connects (...) them is stronger than one would imagine. (shrink)

Introduction - From the Illiad to the Studies on Hysteria: A chronology of the discovery of the unconscious mind - Freud's theories of the unconscious mind - Jung's collective unconscious - Lacan's linguistic paradigm.

Talk is a way of human existence. Through talk we can trace signs of existence. However, existence is not merely limited to the restricted domain of talk. Language serves as a medium of communication between people and is a resort of written signs. The sphere of existence, at the same time, is much deeper than that of language. In this vaster sphere of existence, and especially in aspects such as relations between man and god, man and universe, man and the (...) self, much more space is devoted to communications without words. Throughout history, records in written signs constitute only a small part of existence. The relationship between language and existence is open, as is the relationship between method and substance. However, existence in this relationship is prior to language, which has existence as its main subject. (shrink)

Humans have used arguments for defending or refuting statements long before the creation of logic as a specialized discipline. This can be interpreted as the fact that an intuitive notion of “logical consequence” or a psychic disposition to articulate reasoning according to this pattern is present in common sense, and logic simply aims at describing and codifying the features of this spontaneous capacity of human reason. It is well known, however, that several arguments easily accepted by common sense are actually (...) “logical fallacies”, and this indicates that logic is not just a descriptive, but also a prescriptive or normative enterprise, in which the notion of logical consequence is defined in a precise way and then certain rules are established in order to maintain the discourse in keeping with this notion. Yet in the justification of the correctness and adequacy of these rules commonsense reasoning must necessarily be used, and in such a way its foundational role is recognized. Moreover, it remains also true that several branches and forms of logic have been elaborated precisely in order to reflect the structural features of correct argument used in different fields of human reasoning and yet insufficiently mirrored by the most familiar logical formalisms. (shrink)

Examina-se aqui uma solução de tipo “idealista” para o problema da possibilidade do múltiplo, a qual, assim parece, levaria à exigência da admissão de um espaço e um tempo inatos. Eliminando-se qualquer pretensa concessão inatista por parte de Kant, porém, observa-se que o resultado alcançado, neste caso, favorece a originalidade do idealismo transcendental. Consideration on “multiple” in the first CritiqueIt is examined here a solution, of an idealist kind, to the problem concerning the possibility of the manifold, which, it seems, (...) would lead to the requirement of the admission of an inate space and time. However, by excluding any pretense inatist concession from Kant’s perspective, it is observed that the achieved result, in this case, supply the originality of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate a largely untold chapter in the history of race thinking in Northern Europe and North America: the transition from the form of racism that was used to justify a race-based system of slavery to the medicalising racism which called for segregation, apartheid, eugenics, and, eventually, sterilization and the holocaust. In constructing this history I will employ the notion of biopower introduced by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s account of biopower has received a great deal of attention recently, (...) but because what he actually has to say about race tends to be vague and radically incomplete, many race theorists have been critical of his contribution. However, even if the account of the holocaust in terms of biopower is incomplete, there is still a great deal to be learned from Foucault’s identification of this biologizing, or medicalising racism. (shrink)

Die Suche nach einem angemessenen Umgang mit Moral und ihrem rhetorisch-strategischen Einsatz in Diskursen führt unweigerlich zu der Frage, welche Perspektiven verschiedene Wissenschaftsdisziplinen aufmachen, wenn sie sich mit Moral und Moralisierung beschäftigen. Mit der Erörterung verschiedener Disziplinenzugänge ist auch das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen einem deskriptiven Erörterungsansatz und Aspekten der Bewertung inklusive der ihr zugrundeliegenden Werte angesprochen. Die Beiträge des Bandes geben auf diese Fragen keine abschließenden Antworten. Sie beginnen allerdings damit, ein multi- und interdisziplinäres Bild von Moralisierung zu zeichnen, das geschichts- (...) und politikwissenschaftliche, linguistische, philosophische und theologische Sichtweisen einbezieht und miteinander ins Gespräch bringt. Das komplementäre Bild ist einerseits gekennzeichnet durch die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Moralisierung als einer rhetorischen Strategie, der ein nicht unbeträchtliches diskursprägendes und sogar -schädigendes Potenzial innewohnt. Andererseits sperrt es sich gegen eine grundsätzliche Moralisierungsskepsis und weist stattdessen darauf hin, dass gesellschaftliche Debatten sich notwendigerweise zwischen Moralisierung und Entmoralisierung bewegen. (shrink)

Das Leben hat sich auf unserem Planeten zu einer unermesslichen Fülle von Formen ausdifferenziert, die in komplexen Weisen interagieren. Durch die Zerstörung unserer natürlichen Umwelt bedrohen wir das Wunder der globalen Biodiversität in seinem Fortbestand. Dabei verdrängen wir, dass auch die Menschheit weiter von der Produktivität jener Ökosysteme abhängig bleibt, zu denen sich das Leben evolutionär organisiert hat. Doch wie lässt sich überzeugend für den Erhalt von Biodiversität argumentieren? Sind Arten und Ökosysteme nur als Voraussetzungen gelingenden menschlichen Lebens schützenswert? Oder (...) haben sie darüber hinaus einen von uns unabhängigen Eigenwert? Andreas Hetzel gibt philosophisch fundierte Antworten auf diese Fragen und diskutiert konkrete Möglichkeiten des Biodiversitätsschutzes. (shrink)

The article has the aim to show that Kant’s “standard” conception of the highest good does not represent his last word about the problem. Kant moves from a conception of the highest good close connected with the metaphysical tradition and with the aim of a new, moral justification of traditional metahysical concepts such as God and immortality of the soul. This view does find many difficulties and oscillations in the Critiques, looking for different formulations of a moral “proof” for the (...) metaphysical concepts, grounded upon the need of justice and of a rational solution to the question of theodicy. The failure of this project is apparent with the essay on theodicy. In the last decade of Kant’s intellectual activity, the expression “highest good” occurs few times and the concept looses its systematic relevance, as shown by the last works up to the Opus postumum. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim at explaining the difference Kant makes between emotion, the beautiful and the sublime. I begin by explaining what an emotion is, showing that it refers to feelings that are related to desire. In contrast, I show that the feeling of beautiful and the sublime give us an inactive delight, that is not related to an interest in the object. The feeling of beautiful is related to the judgment of taste, and it has a universal validity (...) for everyone. I ask then if we can judge art without any emotion at all. According to Kant, not only one can, but one should, since pure judgment of taste is independent from charm and commotion. At the end, I ask if it is possible to enjoy music without emotion. For a lover of music, perhaps the emotion it provokes is the main reason to like it. I show that this is probably the reason why music is considered to have the last place in the beautiful arts for Kant. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients (...) in relation to a disturbance on the level of the “minimal self”. Subsequently, the discussion has highlighted the importance of disorders on the level of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity (Thomas Fuchs) and on the level of “existential feelings” (Matthew Ratcliffe). This paper argues that Max Scheler and Bin Kimura allow us to focus on an aspect which has been neglected so far: that of a “relational self” that relates to the very foundation of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality and that can thus be reborn in the encounter with the other and may position itself differently in the world. In Scheler’s perspective, the world of persons with schizophrenia is the result of an axiological disorder (valueception) that impairs contact with the primordial life impulse (Lebensdrang). As a consequence, they are incapable of attuning emotionally and socially with others: this prevents the singularity from being reborn in the encounter with the other and forces them to position themselves in their own solipsistic universe. Moving in a similar direction, Bin Kimura interprets the world of persons with schizophrenia as the result of a disorder of aida (one of the central concepts of Japanese culture that indicates the space of being in between). The disorder of aida compromises the basic relationship (Grundverhältnis in the sense of Viktor von Weizsäcker) and hinders what Bin Kimura calls festum, i.e. the birth of subjectivity, so that it is experienced by persons with schizophrenia only as ante festum. Starting from these two perspectives, I argue the existence of an axiological and anthropogenetic dimension of psychopathology. I begin with a discussion of Zahavi’s concept of minimal self and the thesis that reveals the disorders on this level of subjectivity as the origin of the world of persons with schizophrenia. I, then, analyze Max Scheler’s position and its historic importance for the emergence of phenomenological psychopathology. Thereafter, I introduce the concepts of “disorder of aida” (Bin Kimura) and “disorder of ordo amoris” (Max Scheler). Finally, I develop the concept of a “psychopathology of ordo amoris” by also comparing it with Ratcliffe’s thesis of “existential feelings”. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets (...) the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil. (shrink)

Russian occupation of Königsberg during the Seven Years’ War had a great impact on the residents of East Prussia capital. That time significantly changed the cultural city life, i.e. there was a release from narrow-mindedness and prejudices of the Protestant city that was influenced by Pietism; social mores were liberalized; in comparison with pre-war time the university started playing a more significant part, and the status of university professors rose. All these changes positively affected Kant’s life and his philosophical formation. (...) Because of the occupation Kant remained in contact with Prussian, Austrian, and Russian officers for many years, and made friends with a number of merchants. This influenced his position regarding the war, history understanding, and his assessment of Frederick the Great’s role and significance. (shrink)

This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...) of heuristic principles. The function of experiments is testing hypotheses in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them into empirical laws of nature. To this end, we must integrate the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments with the a priori principles which are the foundations of natural science. Compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated with theories to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant overstates the dependence of experiments on theories. (shrink)

In this paper we want to show how far the early, pre-critical Kant develops a theory of the constitution of space that not only anticipates insights usually attributed to the phenomenological theory of lived space with its emphasis on the constitutively central role of the human lived-body, but which also establishes the foundation for Kant’s Copernican turn according to which space is understood as ‘form of intuition’, implied in the activity of the transcendental subject. The key to understand this role (...) of the body lies in Kant’s understanding of the asymmetrical nature of a pair of hands, which despite being equal in size and structure, remain incongruent counterparts, and thus evade integration into a homogenous and purely self-referential form of space. (shrink)

Following the guiding thread given by the metaphors used in the title of this paper and which are recurrent in the texts of the philosopher Immanuel Kant himself as well as in most of his commentators’, I selected some themes that the Critique of the Power of Judgment offers us to think about and which remain relevant today: system, critique, reflection, the sublime, and a certain concept of humanity. I have prioritized both Portuguese and Brazilian interpreters without disregarding French authors, (...) everlasting allies, who inspire me since the beginning of my studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Between 1796 and 1814, two of late Enlightenment Germany's most prominent historians offered striking revisions to earlier accounts of European history. The renowned journalist, historian, and Slavicist August Ludwig Schlözer published a critical edition and translation of the Old Slavonic Primary Chronicle alongside a detailed historical commentary. This commentary presented Russia as an important protagonist in Europe's emergence from barbarism to Enlightened modernity. By contrast, his colleague Johann Gottfried Eichhorn published several historical works arguing that France had failed to (...) cultivate a mature bourgeoisie and, consequently, had not become a fully modern polity. Building on the work of J. G. A. Pocock and Michael Printy, this article examines the thought of Eichhorn and Schlözer as political responses to the crises of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. It thereby offers both a fresh assessment of the work of two major Enlightenment intellectuals and an analysis of how notions of European modernity were reconfigured in a period of profound political turmoil. (shrink)

Bu çalışmanın amacı otonominin bireysel bir düşünüm sorunu olup olmadığını incelemektir. Düşünümün temel önkoşulu eleştirel mesafedir. Ancak düşünüm öznenin sadece tek başına başardığı bir öz-düşünüm ve öz-yeterlik olarak tasarlandığında ideal bir otonomi durumu ortaya çıkar ve eleştirel mesafenin imkanı bir problematik haline gelir. Bu nedenle otonomi tartışmalarında temel mesele alternatif bir düşünüm anlayışına ulaşmaktır. Söz konusu alternatif, düşünümü ve öz-düşünümü kolektif bir etkinlik olarak temellendirmektir; bu durumda eleştirel mesafe iletişimde tesis edilir. Böyle bir eleştirel mesafede otonomi bireysel bir mesele olmaktan (...) çıkar, politik bir mesele haline gelir. Bu aynı zamanda otonominin karşılıklı otonomi olarak kavramsallaştırılması demektir. Felsefe tarihi bu tür bir kavramsallaştırmaya ışık tutabilecek imkanları içinde taşımaktadır. (shrink)

Transcendental conceptions of subjectivity, beginning with Descartes and including Kant, Fichte, and Husserl as well as neo-transcendental accounts of the 20th century, try to explicate a subject’s subjectivity as a necessary condition for all theoretical and practical validity claims. According to this conception, only this subject-theoretical presupposition allows for an adequate foundation of terms of authorship of action and self-determination. However, the conceptual self-explication of this position faces some inherent difficulties, which has repeatedly been pointed out even by representatives of (...) this school of thought themselves. Moreover, it seems as if the constitutional achievements of transcendental philosophy are increasingly being detached from philosophy: due to the development of the modern sciences of man, they are step by step conceived as objects of empirical research. This paper looks critically into this thesis of detachment. (shrink)

Este estudio se define y articula a partir de la pregunta por el significado, sentido y estructura de la noción de “historia del pensamiento”, tal como ésta emerge y actúa desde los últimos pronunciamientos e intervenciones de Foucault, de un modo singularmente claro y revelador a partir de la primera versión del Prefacio a la “Historia de la sexualidad”, texto del que nos ocupamos con atención prioritaria a lo largo de este trabajo.

En este texto planteamos la pregunta por la inscripción de la sorpresa en la fenomenología de las emociones de Husserl. Pero antes de dar por supuesto que Husserl abordó el problema de la sorpresa, nos preguntamos si verdaderamente lo hizo y sí, incluso, se puede hablar de una "fenomenología de las emociones" en su obra. El texto está, así, motivado por dos interrogantes: ¿Es la sorpresa una emoción? ¿Husserl desarrolló verdaderamente una "fenomenología de las emociones"? Esto nos conducirá a 1) (...) plantear una redefinición de sorpresa y 2) avanzar por el camino de una fenomenología un poco reformada por el hecho de la sorpresa. En tres apartados desarrollamos este planteamiento: I. La fenomenología husserliana de las emociones, II. ¿La sorpresa es una emoción? Y III. La sorpresa, un proceso. In this paper we argue about the inscription of surprise in the phenomenology of emotions of E. Husserl. But before assuming that E. Husserl addressed the issue of surprise, we ask if he really did it and even, if it is possible to talk about a "phenomenology of emotions" his work. The paper is thus motivated by two questions: Is surprise an emotion? Did Husserl really develop a "phenomenology of emotions"? This will take us to, 1) outline a redefinition of surprise, and 2) advance through the path of a phenomenology that has been a bit reformed by the fact of surprise. This issue will be developed in three stages: I. the husserlian phenomenology of emotions, II. Is surprise an emotion? III. The surprise, a process. (shrink)

Since the Enlightenment, critique has played an overarching role in how Western society understands itself and its basic institutions. However, opinions differ widely concerning the understanding and evaluation of critique. To understand such differences and clarify a viable understanding of critique, the article turns to Kant’s critical philosophy, inaugurating the “age of criticism”. While generalizing and making critique unavoidable, Kant coins an unambiguously positive understanding of critique as an affirmative, immanent activity. Not only does this positive conception prevail in the (...) critique of pure and practical reason and the critique of judgment; these modalities of critique set the agenda for three major strands of critique in contemporary thought, culminating in among others Husserl, Popper, Habermas, Honneth, and Foucault. Critique affirms and challenges cognition and its rationality, formulates ethical ideals that regulate social interaction, and further articulates normative guidelines underway in the ongoing experimentations of a post-natural history of human nature. In contradistinction to esoteric Platonic theory, philosophy at the threshold of modernity becomes closely linked to an outward-looking critique that examines and pictures what human forms of life are in the process of making of themselves and challenges them, by reflecting upon what they can and what they should make of themselves. As a very widely diffused practice, however, critique may also become a self-affirming overarching end in itself. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latter’s student, Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach. Indeed, Kant’s engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis, especially in light of Kant’s famous analogy in the first Critique, posed crucial (...) questions regarding the ‘looseness of fit’ between the constitutive and the regulative in Kant’s theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kant’s struggle with epigenesis between 1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kant’s philosophy of science is clear from the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception. (shrink)

El debate de la reciente filosofía de la imagen está estructurado en la oposición entre enfoques semióticos y perceptualistas. Entre estos últimos, los especialistas suelen incluir a la fenomenología. Ahora bien, ¿es correcto caracterizar a la fenomenología como una posición perceptualista acerca de la imagen? Defenderé la tesis de que la fenomenología representa un perceptualismo indirecto o débil. Con todo, el lugar que pueda ocupar la fenomenología en el debate no se restringe a su cercanía con el perceptualismo. Intentaré mostrar (...) que la fenomenología plantea temáticas puntuales, tales como la relación entre sentido y presencia, las cuales puede conducir hacia un análisis crítico de los supuestos en los que se apoya el encuadre actual de la discusión. The debate of the recent philosophy of the image is organized in the opposition between semiotic and perceptualistic approaches. Scholars often include the phenomenology into the perceptualistic view. Yet, ¿is it right to characterize the phenomenology as a kind of perceptualism about the image? The first goal of the paper is to demonstrate that phenomenology represents an indirect or weak perceptualism. Anyway, the place of the phenomenology in the debate does not consist only in being a kind of perceptualism. The second goal of the paper is to show that phenomenology raises certain questions, like the relationship between sense and presence, which can lead us to criticize the assumptions the current articulation of the debate is based on. (shrink)

Diante do lema “sapere aude”, com o qual Kant apresenta sua caracterização de esclarecimento, colocaseimediatamente a questão: o que signifi ca pensar por si mesmo? Apesar de Kant procurar respondera isso ao longo do texto, muitas difi culdades permanecem enquanto as teses ali defendidas não foremintegradas no horizonte da fi losofi a crítico-transcendental. Em primeiro lugar, mostra-se como o esclarecimentoé uma noção ambivalente, por um lado se refere ao indivíduo, por outro, se refere a uma época.Em segundo lugar, o esclarecimento (...) implica essencialmente uma mudança no método e não necessariamenteno conteúdo do pensamento, nesse sentido, o esclarecimento exige um determinado modo depensar , que se caracteriza pela disposição de se fazer um uso público da razão, ou seja, adisponibilidade pública de pedir e oferecer razões para justifi car determinada posição. Em terceiro lugar,defende-se que na expressão “fazer uso de teu próprio entendimento”, o termo entendimento deve serinterpretado em um sentido lato, isto é, de forma a abarcar tanto a razão no seu uso teórico quanto noseu uso prático. Mais do que isso, defende-se que o principal objetivo do Esclarecimento, segundo Kant,é o estabelecimento de um modo de pensar autônomo em sentido moral. Perpassando todos esses trêspontos, evidencia-se a importância desempenhada pela fi losofi a, seja enquanto aquela que deve zelarpelos princípios do uso público da sã razão, seja enquanto doutrina da sabedoria.Facing the dilemma “sapere aude”, with which Kant introduces his enlightenment characterization, immediately appears the question: what means to think by oneself? Despite Kant tries to answer to that along the text, many dif culties will remain while the thesis defended there are not integrated in the horizon of critical-transcendental philosophy. First, it is showed how the enlightenment is an ambivalent notion, on one side it refers to the individual, on the other, it refers to an epoch. Second, the enlightenment implies essentially a change in the method and not necessarily in the thought content, in this sense, the enlightenment demands a certain way of thinking , that is characterized by the disposition to make a public use of reason, in other words, the public availability to request and offer reasons to justify determined position. Third, it is defended that in the expression “make use of your own understanding”, the term “understanding” should be interpreted in a lato sensu, that is, in order to taking into account the reason in its theoretical as well as in its practical use. Furthermore it is defended that the main goal of Enlightenment, according to Kant, is to establish an autonomous way of thinking in a moral sense. Passing by all of these three points, it stays evident the importance performed by philosophy, both as the one that should look after the principles of the public use of the sane reason, and as wisdom doctrine. (shrink)

This paper investigates the issue whether metaphors have a metaphorical or secondary meaning and how this question is related to the borderline between philosophy and linguistics. On examples by V. Woolf and H. W. Auden, it will be shown that metaphor accomplishes something more than its literal meaning expresses and this “more” cannot be captured by any secondary meaning. What is essential in the metaphor is not a secondary meaning but an internal relation between a metaphorical proposition and a description (...) of its effects. In order to understand metaphors, we have to share an ability to construe metaphorical meanings at once. The aim of this ability is to uncover an internal relation, which lies behind a particular metaphor. (shrink)

The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...) realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge. (shrink)

Nada más habitual que el hábito. Y, sin embargo, de seguir a Aristóteles, no existirían virtudes entre nosotros, o sea: aptitudes y habilidades que acaban por configurar la existencia humana. En este ensayo se examina el desarrollo dialéctico del hábito en Hegel, desde la Antropología hasta la Eticidad : en el plano individual, desde el estado fetal y el desvarío en el alma sentiente hasta el autosentimiento de sí y el nacimiento del Yo; en el plano colectivo, se atiende más (...) bien a la génesis del hábito y sus fautores: las corporaciones, las instituciones estatales y la opinión pública, hasta desembocar en el extraño estadio del hábito como deshabituación de todo hábito, en el fenómeno de la guerra. Se pone así de relieve el modo en que el hábito es el modo crucial de ser entre la individualidad animal y el cuerpo sociopolítico como aparato mecánico que promete vida y amenaza muerte. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo principal de este artículo es mostrar las importantes consecuencias antropológicas que tiene el análisis kantiano de lo sublime. A partir de la idea de lo sublime de Kant, primero, se desprende una alta estimación de la humanidad y, segundo, se deduce un concepto de ser humano como finitud infinita. Dado que lo sublime es además respeto por la naturaleza, también se infiere una concepción de la naturaleza opuesta a la que representa la modernidad científica, una naturaleza humanizada (...) digna de admiración y respeto.: The main goal of this paper is to show the important anthropological consequences of the Kantian analysis of the sublime. From Kant’s idea of the sublime, first, a high estimation of humanity is inferred and, second, a concept of human being as infinite finitude is deduced. Since the sublime is also respect for nature, it also infers a conception of nature opposite to that represented by scientific modernity, a humanized nature worthy of admiration and respect. (shrink)

Purpose of the paper is to establish the emergence and evolution of a gender problematics from the foundations of classical philosophy, namely, from the phenomenon of will-to-truth as the spontaneous desire of man to understand the life. To achieve this purpose, the following tasks are solved: 1) to investigate the way in which philosophy constitutes itself; 2) to establish how the category of "sex" manifests, both in the natural and in the social contexts; 3) to determine the correlation of gender (...) studies and philosophy. Theoretical basis. If for the methodology of gender studies it is inherent to proceed from the contextuality and value foundations of knowledge, then in this paper gender is considered directly from the being-in-world, human presence. Originality. The distinction between will-to-truth and will-to-knowledge, conducted for the first time by Michel Foucault, is used as a method by which the ontological demand of sex is revealed. Conclusions. As a result of the study, it was found that scientific developments in the field of gender issues in their subject matter are not mainly descended from subject sphere of classical philosophy. Sex is not substantiated metaphysically, and it is ontical, not ontological attribute of the human kind; its presentation as the determining factor of the cultural history in context of femininity/masculinity dichotomy is biased. This quality is similar to Nietzsche’s will to power, i.e., determination of definite knowledge that is later used in legal, socio-political discourse, corrects language practice, determines scientific researches making them dependant on axiological component of culture. As the social justice problem is solved, gender as the subject of social study loses its actuality. (shrink)

The paper asks the question whether Kant’s ethical theory can be applied to issues in assisted reproductive technology. It argues against three objections to applying Kant’s ethics to ART: the non-identity objection, the gen-ethics objection, and the care-ethics objection. After showing that neither of the three objections is sufficiently persuasive the paper proposes a reading of Kant’s ‘formula of humanity,’ and especially its negative clause, that can be of some guidance in ART. The paper conclude that although Kant’s ‘formula of (...) humanity’ cannot be used as a simple litmus test for determining whether an ART practice is morally permissible or not, it nonetheless can supply us with some guidance in our moral deliberation. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary field of emotion studies disregarded historical perspectives on translation and left out a substantial body of scientific research on feelings and emotions that was not published in English. Yet these texts were foundational in forging the scientific concept of emotion in experimental psychology in the 19th century. The current approach to emotion science overlooks that translation issues occurred between three languages, German, French, and English, as physiological psychologists at the time were reading each other in these languages all (...) the while writing about the same topics in their respective language. Historical perspectives are important to clarify the ambiguities of emotion terms and include non-Anglophone frameworks into current transdisciplinary debates. (shrink)

This article explores various scenes of shame, raising the questions of what shame discloses about the self and how this self-disclosure takes place. Thereby, the common idea that shame discloses the self’s debasement will be challenged. The dramatic dialectics of showing and hiding display a much more ambiguous, dynamic self-image as result of an interactive evaluation of oneself by oneself and others. Seeing oneself seen contributes to the sense of who one becomes. From being absorbed in what one does, one (...) might suddenly become self-aware, shift viewpoints and feel pressed to put on masks. In putting on a mask, one relates to oneself in distancing oneself from oneself. In being at once a moral agent and a performing actor with an audience and norms in mind, one embodies and transcends the social roles one takes. In addition to the feeling of shame, in which the self finds itself passively reflected, the self’s active reflections on its shame are to be taken into account. As examples from Milan Kundera, Shakespeare’s King Lear, a line from Kingsley Amis, a speech by Vaclav Havel and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments indicate, self-presentation in the public and the private sphere is a complex hermeneutical process with surprising twists. (shrink)

Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant’s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant’s conception of subject, or of the ‘I’, can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not (...) comprehensive enough compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understands the part of being ‘I’ which can be known via self-knowledge but he fails to appreciate the second part of being ‘I’, namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson’s conception with Kant’s conception of being ‘I’ reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson’s purpose, Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity. (shrink)

Background Randomized controlled trials are central to generating knowledge about effectiveness of interventions as well as risk, protective and prognostic factors related to diseases in emergency newborn care. Whether prospective participants understand the purpose of research, and what they perceive as the influence of the context on their understanding of the informed consent process for RCTs in emergency obstetric and newborn care are not well documented. Methods Conceptual review. Discussion Research is necessary to identify how the illnesses may be prevented, (...) to explore the causes, and to investigate what medications could be used to manage such illness. Voluntary informed consent requires that prospective participants understand the disclose information about the research, and use this to make autonomous informed decision about participation, in line with their preferences and values. Yet the emergency context affects how information may be disclosed to prospective research participants, how much participants may comprehend, and how participants may express their voluntary decision to participate, all of which pose a threat to the validity of the informed consent. I challenge the claim that the ‘understanding’ of research is always necessary for ethical informed consent for research during emergency care. I argue for reconceptualization of the value of understanding, through recognition of other values that may be equally important. I then present a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection about autonomy, beneficence and justice in research in emergency research. Conclusion While participant ‘understanding’ of research is important, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid informed consent, and may compete with other values with which it needs to be considered. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, eu apresento a teoria kantiana do mal. Mostrarei que Kant divide o mal em três níveis: fraqueza, impureza e perversidade, relacionando-os com afetos e paixões. Eu defendo que Kant apresenta várias formas de curar o mal nos diversos textos, tais como Doutrina da Virtude, Antropologia, Ideia para uma história universal do ponto de vista cosmopolita e Religião nos limites da simples razão. Eu tentarei mostrar que a virtude é impotente para curar o mal e que Kant apresenta uma (...) comunidade ética para esse fim. Por fim, eu compararei a construção de comunidade ética com o estabelecimento de uma sociedade civil jurídica. (shrink)

Moral purism is a commonly held view on moral worthiness and how to identify it in concrete cases. Moral purists long for a moral world in which (business) people—at least sometimes—act morally worthy, but in concrete cases they systematically discount good deeds as grounded in self-interest. Moral purism evokes moral cynicism. Moral cynicism is a problem, both in society at large and the business world. Moral cynicism can be fought by refuting moral purism. This article takes issue with moral purism. (...) The common strategy to tackle moral purism is to reject the exclusion thesis which states that self-interest and the ‘pure’ moral motive (and thus moral worthiness) exclude each other. We develop a different strategy. We argue that moral purists are mistaken in the way they judge moral worthiness in concrete cases. They employ the wrongprocedureand the wrongcriteria.We develop a proper procedure and proper criteria. We build on Kant, who we argue is unfairly regarded as the champion of moral purism. In order to see how Kant can develop a consistent (non-purist) philosophy, the exclusion thesis must be embedded in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Properly embedded, Kant turns out to be both anti-purist and anti-cynical. (shrink)

This paper aims at analyzing the status of epistemic discontinuity in the realm of Foucauldian archeology. The problem that I focus on is that of “fractured subjectivity” represented, in The Order of Things, by literary figures such as Don Quixote or Justine and Juliette. I move on to discuss the Foucauldian interpretation of Kantian anthropology in order to explore the epistemic function of what I previously called fractured subjectivity. These considerations lead us finally to a Fichtean radicalization of Kantian critical (...) philosophy and its specific position in the Foucauldian archeology of human sciences. (shrink)

In recent years, neuroscience has been a particularly prolific discipline stimulating many innovative treatment approaches in medicine. However, when it comes to the brain, new techniques of intervention do not always meet with a positive public response, in spite of promising therapeutic benefits. The reason for this caution clearly is the brain’s special importance as “organ of the mind”. As such it is widely held to be the origin of mankind’s unique position among living beings. Likewise, on the level of (...) the individual human being, the brain is considered the material substrate of those traits that in combination render each person unique. In view of this preeminent significance of the brain, it is understandable that, in general, interventions into the brain are considered a delicate issue and that new techniques of intervention are scrutinised with particular care. However, in doing so it is important not to go to the opposite extreme and shy away from promising new therapeutic approaches for debilitating disorders of the brain. With respect to the new techniques of brain intervention a broad interdisciplinary perspective is required to discern irrational fear from justified concern. Hence, the Europäische Akademie established a project group consisting, on the one hand, of experts from different fields of medicine who have got first-hand experience of applying the techniques at issue and, on the other hand, of philosophers and a legal expert. The task of this team was to review the state of the art with respect to each single technique of intervening in the brain, to indicate future developments, and to address the ethical and legal issues common to all of them. The project’s outcome is the book at hand. (shrink)