Some of the opponents of desire-based views of normativity seek to undermine them by arguing that even the existence of instrumental normativity (reasons to pursue the means to your ends) entails the existence of a desire-independent rational norm, the instrumental norm. Once we grant the existence of one such norm, there seems to be no principled reason for not allowing others. I clarify this alleged norm, identifying two criteria that any satisfactory candidate must meet: reasonable expectation and possible violation. Some (...) interpretations meet the first criterion and others meet the second, but there are no interpretations that meet both. After surveying the interpretations of Sidgwick, Hampton, and Korsgaard, I suggest that there is no instrumental norm of reason. The final section offers an alternative, desire-based account of instrumental normativity, on which individual normative requirements to pursue means derives from each individual desire for an end. (shrink)

What are the main features that influence our attribution of moral responsibility? It is widely accepted that there are various factors which strongly influence our moral judgments, such as the agent’s intentions, the consequences of the action, the causal involvement of the agent, and the agent’s freedom and ability to do otherwise. In this paper, we argue that this picture is incomplete: We argue that social roles are an additional key factor that is radically underestimated in the extant literature. We (...) will present an experiment to support this claim. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine wichtige Aufgabe empirischer Sozialforschung in der Medizinethik besteht darin, bisher unbekannte ethische Probleme zu identifizieren und zu beschreiben. Die Frage, welche Sachverhalte in den Gegenstandsbereich der Medizinethik fallen, ist jedoch sowohl aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht voraussetzungsreich als auch in der Praxis umstritten. Im Beitrag werden theoretische, methodologische und forschungspraktische Aspekte der Identifikation und Auswahl ethischer Probleme diskutiert und das Vorgehen am Beispiel einer konkreten empirisch-ethischen Studie illustriert. Der Schwerpunkt des Artikels liegt hierbei auf den Vorbedingungen sowie dem konkreten Vorgehen bei (...) der Integration von Laien- und Expertenperspektive. Im ersten Teil wird zunächst vorbereitend die Frage nach der Abgrenzung zwischen ethischen Problemen und anderen praktischen Herausforderungen adressiert. Dies geschieht unter Rückgriff auf die philosophisch-ethische Systematik sowie unter Berücksichtigung des stark praxisorientierten Charakters von Medizinethik. Anschließend wird ein Vorschlag zur Unterscheidung zweier Typen ethischer Probleme gemacht und die Frage nach der Definitionsmacht zur Auszeichnung ethischer Probleme auf den spezifischen Kontext empirisch-ethischer Forschung übertragen. Aufbauend auf diesen theoretischen Überlegungen wird im dritten Abschnitt des Beitrags schließlich ein Vorgehen zur Identifikation ethischer Probleme am Beispiel des ETHICO-Projektes als einer empirisch-ethischen Interventionsstudie im Bereich der Onkologie vorgestellt. Zusammenfassend vertritt der Beitrag die These, dass die Identifikation ethischer Probleme in der Medizin ein theoretisch komplexes und methodisch anspruchsvolles Unterfangen ist, bei dem nicht allein die Perspektive philosophischer Theorie eingenommen werden sollte, sondern vielmehr Formen der Integration von Laien- und Expertenperspektive entwickelt werden müssen. (shrink)

Informed by a search of the literature about the usage of genetic testing information (GTI) by insurance companies, this paper presents a practical ethical analysis of several distinct public policy options that might be used to govern or constrain GTI usage by insurance providers. As medical research advances and the extension to the Human Genome Project (2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/human_genome_project_-_write) moves to its fullness over the next decade, such research efforts will allow the full synthesis of human DNA to be connected to (...) predictive health dispositions. As testing costs fall, there will be ever more pressure for citizens to disclose GTI. Genetic testing information is integral to future medical care because it can be used to better assess individually tailored medical therapies as well as to allow a more informed risk analysis by the insurance industry, which in some countries such as the USA underwrites a majority of citizen medical expenses. As discussed in this examination, the revelation of people’s uniquely personal GTI to insurers has enormous societal implications. The major contribution of the paper is to offer policy makers and concerned citizens a nuanced articulation of the basic options to regulate GTI, with a special consideration for ethical fairness and equity. As genetic-based medicine blossoms and pressures to reduce healthcare costs increase, there will be an ever greater impetus for countries to revisit their genetic testing policies. Organizations and policy makers striving to create GTI oversights perceived to be both “fair and effective” need to be aware of the ethical perspectives discussed in this paper. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with indeterminism: an indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self-conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin (...) by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human-specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world. (shrink)

Obwohl seit einiger Zeit ein verstärktes Forschungsinteresse an Emmanuel Levinas’ Denken des Politischen, verbunden mit einer genaueren Inblicknahme der zentralen Begriffe des Dritten und der Gerechtigkeit aufgekommen ist, blieb bislang unklar, inwiefern aus Levinas’ intrinsisch ‚ethischem‘ Denken in konkreterer Weise normative Konsequenzen zu ziehen sind. Diesem Desiderat versucht der vorliegende Beitrag nachzukommen. Das Levinas’sche Gerechtigkeitsdenken wird dabei so eingeführt, dass es zugleich als alternativer Entwurf und als produktive kritische Provokation für gegenwärtige Gerechtigkeitstheorien lesbar wird. Ausgehend von einer Rekonstruktion des alteritären (...) Verständnisses ethischer Subjektivität, wie es Levinas insbesondere in Jenseits des Seins erarbeitet, wird ausgelotet, wie tragfähig Levinas’ ethische Konzeption plural alteritär durchfurchter Subjektivität für normative Gerechtigkeitsfragen ist. Aus einer Reflexion auf den Begriff des ‚Dritten‘ werden einige konkrete Konsequenzen für das Denken gerechter Institutionen gezogen. (shrink)

I offer a reconstruction of J. Margolis’ article on the question of the meaning and place of religion in our time proposing that one of its main subjects is the question of religious tolerance. I hint at the possible gains of a religiously less attenuated picture of religious belief than that which Margolis paints.

The way we use terminology matters. There are words, ordinary and philosophical, that we should do without because they are ill-defined, ambiguous or confused. If we use them we will at best be saying little. At worst, they will make us ask the wrong questions and leave the right ones unasked. In this paper, I argue that ‘deontology’ is such a word. It is defined negatively as non-teleological or non-consequentialist, and therefore does not designate a distinct class of moral theories, (...) let alone a single one. Moreover, the question whether Kantian ethics is ‘deontological’ is likely to obscure what is distinctive and interesting about it. The word ‘deontology’ should be banished from the classroom. It may be best to abandon it altogether. (shrink)

Is there any distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental rationality”? Recently, Joseph Raz (2005) has argued that instrumental rationality is a “myth”. In this essay, I shall give some qualified support to Raz’s position: as I shall argue, many philosophers have indeed been seduced by certain myths about instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, Raz’s conclusion is too strong. Instrumental rationality is not itself a myth: there really is a distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental (...) rationality”. -/- In the first two sections of this essay, I shall start by giving a rough intuitive description of the phenomenon that seems to me the best candidate for the label “instrumental rationality”. As we shall see, this rough description gives us reason to reject some of the myths that surround instrumental rationality. Then in the rest of this essay, I shall try to give a more precise general specification of this phenomenon. In Sections 3 and 4, I shall consider what has been said about instrumental rationality by several other philosophers. Identifying what is missing in these other philosophers’ accounts will help me to develop my own positive specification, which I shall present in Sections 5 and 6. (shrink)

Pollitt and Bouckaert and their neo-Weberian state (NWS) have been chosen as the subject for this essay because the book has become a standard work in the public management movement. It is frequently cited and has been re-published in multiple editions (most recently in 2017). The authors also refer explicitly to Max Weber.This contribution seeks to draw attention to three important aspects, which inevitably overlap with one another:1. There is no Weber in the neo-Weberian State (introduction, 1; section II). Pollitt (...) and Bouckaert fail to grasp that Weber’s understanding of the state [the state as an “institution” (Anstalt); and the state as an “idea of validity” (Geltungsvorstellung)] is not identical to his ideal type of modern bureaucracy; it is the features of the latter on which they draw. The ideal type is a standard measure constructed in order to establish how close any concrete, given instance of bureaucracy comes to it (introduction, 3). Meanwhile, the “neutral official” insisted upon by Weber has “taken their leave” in Germany from important positions (section III, 3). Furthermore, Weber did not address those structures and processes internal to the administration which are precisely the object of interest for the new public management reformers. Weber’s lack of interest arises from the fact the members of anAnstalt, whether it is the state or the Church (WuG, § 15, no. 2), are subject to imposed orders (oktroyierte Ordnungen) and, as such, do not enjoy the “right to have a say”. Scharpf (1973a) was the first to pay particular attention to the problems brought about by specialisation and by the division of labour within the administration that are responsible for an incremental form of politics (section III, 3); even if he later ascribes advantages to the combination of “negative” and “positive coordination” (Scharpf 1991: 18ff.).2. The “legalistic culture” that characterises Germany will be considered in a more differentiated way, drawing on empirical studies which provide information, for example, on how laws (i.e. programmes)actuallyoriginate inside the ministerial apparatus (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3) or how use is made of the power of authority (Weisungsrecht) in practice (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3), even when, formally, it claims to have validity (section III). In this way, only empirical studies (Benz 1994; Bohne 1981; Dose 1997; Dose/Voigt 1995; Treiber 2007a) prove that the administration that implements laws has often, in practice, become a “negotiative administration” (introduction, 2). Such a phenomenon as a “co-operative administration”, which negotiates rather than rules, is a “foreign concept” in Weber’s discussion of the state and modern bureaucracy. Scharpf’s (1970) comparison between constitutional governance in Germany and legal relief in America is enlightening when it comes to the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) (introduction, 2; section III); the same applies to his discussion of the failed federalist reforms, which sought, among other things, to mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, the opportunities for blockades provided by political entanglement (Politikverflechtung) (section III). Neither was it possible to realise long overdue proposals to reform administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht) (section III, 1), which involved weakening or removing altogether three important assumptions in the dominant administrative doctrine (the “dogmatic normality”) and which also included the ambitious intention for the law to achieve tangible impact (Hoffmann-Riem 1994). Nonetheless, while no-one would dispute that reform of the federal government and administration remained “on the agenda” (Scharpf 1991, Mayntz/ Scharpf 1973), the priorities of such a reform were, and still are, different to those of new public management reform [the key terms here arePlanung(“planning”) and the term that replaced it,Steuerung(“management”)]1.3. Pollitt and Bouckaert ascribe to the neo-Weberian state extremely varied functions without providing any (theoretical) basis for them. In this way, the notion of public management reform that they present acquires the status of a “reformist philosophy” (introduction, 3; section IV). See Scharpf (1991) for a theoretically well-founded argumentation on the State’s ability to act in our days. Scharpf’s essay will be discussed briefly (section IV).ConclusionThere is no Weber in the neo-Weberian state. According to the discussion presented here, the neo-Weberian state can only mean: how would a modern state constituted by Weber look today? (shrink)

The increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to help facilitate neuroscience adds a new level of complexity to the question of how ethical issues of such research can be identified and addressed. Current research ethics practice, based on ethics reviews by institutional review boards (IRB) and underpinned by ethical principalism, has been widely criticised and even called ‘imperialist’. In this paper, we develop an alternative way of approaching ethics in neuro-ICT research, based on discourse ethics, which implements responsible (...) research and innovation through dialogues. We draw on our work in Ethics Support, using the Human Brain Project as empirical evidence of the viability of this approach. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉNous proposons une théorie compatibiliste du libre arbitre, dans la tradition de la philosophie naturalisée, qui tente : 1) de fournir une synthèse de théories bien connues, capable de résoudre certains problèmes de ces dernières; 2) de tenir compte du fait que le libre arbitre a des degrés; 3) d’établir des liens avec la neurobiologie. Nous arguons que le libre arbitre d'un agent varie par degrés en fonction de la capacité de l'agent à faire des hypothèses et à utiliser des (...) théories. Notre modèle met en évidence que des actions «libres» sont consciemment surveillées par l'agent, à travers des croyances, des hypothèses et finalement des théories — d'où l'expression «modèle CMT» (pour Conscious-through-Monitoring-through-Theories). (shrink)

Autonomy and valuing are two significant practical phenomena that have been analysed in terms of higher-order wanting. I argue that reference to higher-order capacities is indeed required to make sense of both concepts, but also that such analyses need a more differentiated understanding of "wanting to want" than has hitherto been proposed. Central for autonomy is the instantiation of four types of optative relationship by an accountable agent under conditions of rationality. Valuing requires the disposition to instantiate only one of (...) the relevant structures. Clarity on this allows an analysis of the precise relationships between the two phenomena. (shrink)

The article discusses the concepts of communicative practical philosophy as a component of hermeneutic-linguistic-pragmatic-semiotic turn in philosophy, associated with the transition from the paradigm of subjectivity to the paradigm of intersubjectivity. In particular, the concept of “I” is considered as a factor in the internalization of intersubjectivity, because it is from the very beginning woven into the context of speech practice with the pronoun “I”, which is marked by the reflective “I am I”. The transcendental “I” is the internalization of (...) the transcendental communicative community; the classic concept of “adulthood”, associated with “the courage to be guided by one’s own mind”, is an internal manifestation of communicative competence, which in an internalized form is part of the structure of identity. The mind appears in such definitions as “discourse”, “argumentation”, “consensus”. In turn, discourse differs from other speech practices, such as conversation, talk, debate, dialogue, which also have their own internalizations, forming a complex identity structure. The article deals with the internal “maintenance of discourse” both in the process of substantiation of human knowledge and in the process of justification (legitimation) of the correctness of moral duty. In particular, this is manifested in the formulation of the categorical imperative of moral practice, which is considered in the light of the transition from the monologue dimension to the transcendental-pragmatic one. The article also shows the need to move from a monologue concept of responsibility to a communicative concept of shared responsibility. It is emphasized that such a transition is an urgent need of modern times, a sign of which is the desire to overcome the crisis civilization of “risks and threats” and the formation of a civilization of dialogue based on the argumentative understanding, for which the guiding idea is the “transcendental consensus”. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAm Beispiel der ethischen Hirntoddiskussion wird die Notwendigkeit einer philosophischen Reflexion und Kritik der Medizin und der Medizinethik aufgezeigt, wodurch die anthropologischen Bedingungen medizinischen Handelns und ethischer Theorie expliziert werden. Ohne eine solche kritische Reflexion bleiben sowohl naturwissenschaftliche Aussagen als auch ethische Prinzipien zu abstrakt und realitätsfern, die ethischen Probleme bleiben so unlösbar. Nur im personalen Sinnhorizont menschlicher Lebenspraxis, so die These, lassen sich physiologische Befunde wie die Hirntodfeststellung und ethische Prinzipien wie Autonomie und Würde angemessen verstehen und anwenden. Für (...) die Situation des Todes und des Hirntodes bedeutet das, dass auch hirntote wie tote Menschen als Person mit dem Anspruch auf Achtung ihrer Autonomie und Würde zu betrachten sind. (shrink)

Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German‐speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo‐Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative‐holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, belongs (...) more to a fundamentally different, critical camp of philosophy. Although Radbruch has incorporated Kantian Elements into his theory, he is rather a member of the affirmative‐holistic camp. In the end the question will be raised as to what ought to be preserved of his philosophy. (shrink)

À primeira vista, o que parece razoavelmente defensável na posição kantiana, com base na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, é que as ações imorais são insondáveis, mas não o são como as ações morais. Estas são sempre insondáveis, aquelas quando vestem a conformidade ao dever, pois quando são contrárias ao dever são sondáveis. Mas na Crítica da Razão Pura (1980b, p.279, n.; B 579, n.80) Kant afirma que “a moralidade própria das ações (mérito e culpa), mesmo a de nosso próprio (...) comportamento, permanece-nos totalmente oculta”, pois não sabemos o quanto devemos imputar ao efeito puro da liberdade ou à simples natureza. Assim, ao que parece Kant defende duas posições. Uma, apregoando a insondabilidade parcial das ações imorais, outra uma opacidade total da qualidade moral das ações. Julgo, contudo, que, no fundo, Kant pode sustentar, sem cair em contradição, tanto a posição de que (a) as ações contrárias ao dever sinalizam a maldade de uma máxima como a tese de que (b) o mérito ou demérito moral jamais pode ser observado. A primeira alternativa é a que verificamos, por exemplo, na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e que também na Religião desempenha um importante papel, uma vez que Kant tem de assumir, de algum modo, a experiência de ações más. Já a segunda tese parece ter um fundo eminentemente especulativo. Ela visa a mostrar a indecidibilidade metafísica acerca da qualidade moral de uma máxima. (shrink)

This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on political judgment by proposing that the faculty of judgment is essential for responsibly coping with the undeniable fact of distant suffering and the controversial duty of humanitarian intervention. To achieve this end, Mahmood Mamdani’s text ‘The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’ will be mobilized for a constructive dialogue about which specific conception of political judgment is at stake when we debate a situation like Darfur today. The main claim is (...) that political judgment in times of acute crisis requires the members of the public sphere to strike a precarious balance between two contradictory impulses: the deliberative impulse to enlarge the pool of particular standpoints, and the decisionist impulse to finally bring the conversation to a halt and adopt a normative stance. The theoretical framework for this balanced view of the faculty of judgment will be articulated through a hybridization of Hannah Arendt’s notion of an ‘enlarged mentality’ and Jacques Derrida’s concept of an ‘aporetic decision’. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Zuge des „empirical turn“ der Medizin- und Bioethik ist von verschiedenen Autoren in den vergangenen Jahren die Idee einer „evidenzbasierten Ethik“ diskutiert worden. Die Analogie zwischen evidenzbasierter Medizin und „evidenzbasierter Ethik“ soll in diesem Beitrag kritisch diskutiert und dabei gezeigt werden, dass der Ausdruck „evidenzbasierte Ethik“ irreführend ist. Zentraler Ausgangspunkt der Kritik ist die unterschiedliche Bedeutung, die empirische Informationen für das medizinisch-klinische Urteil zum einen und das ethische Urteil in der Medizin zum anderen haben. Im medizinisch-klinischen Urteil können mit (...) Hilfe empirischer Informationen hypothetische Handlungsnormen generiert werden, welche auf den der Medizin inhärenten Zwecksetzungen basieren. Bei Fragen der Ethik in der Medizin hingegen sind die Handlungsziele selbst Gegenstand des Urteils; diese aber können allein aus empirischem Wissen heraus nicht zureichend bestimmt werden. Die Diskussion um die Möglichkeit einer „evidenzbasierten Ethik“ eröffnet weiterhin aufschlussreiche Perspektiven in Bezug auf empirische Forschung und den Umgang mit empirischen Informationen in der Angewandten Ethik und das Aufgabenfeld der Medizinethik. (shrink)

The societal dynamism of modernity results in the theoretical upgrading and the actual development of personal reflective capacities, for example abstract reasoning, Kantian morality, and the development of the idiocentered perspective. These capacities are created in the disembedding of prereflective capacities, for example context-sensitive intelligence, care-morality, and mundocenteredness. The reflective capacities become the prerequisite of further modernization. The development-potential offered by the demands of modernity is accompanied by a risk of assimilative stress, for example pseudological reasoning, varieties of postmodernism, making (...) a fetish of the medium, and the forfeit of the morality of care. (shrink)

The paper pleads for compatibilism by distinguishing the first-person’s normative and the observer’s empirical perspective. In the normative perspective one’s own actions are uncaused and free, in the empirical perspective they are caused and may be predetermined. Still, there is only one notion of causation that is able to account for the relation between the causal conceptions within the two perspectives. The other main idea for explicating free will by explaining free actions or intentions as appropriately caused in a specified (...) way is acknowledged, but not discussed. The paper finally argues that the normative and the empirical perspective are on a par; none is prior; even from within the empirical perspective the normative perspective is ineliminable. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Zuge des „empirical turn“ der Medizin- und Bioethik ist von verschiedenen Autoren in den vergangenen Jahren die Idee einer „evidenzbasierten Ethik“ diskutiert worden. Die Analogie zwischen evidenzbasierter Medizin und „evidenzbasierter Ethik“ soll in diesem Beitrag kritisch diskutiert und dabei gezeigt werden, dass der Ausdruck „evidenzbasierte Ethik“ irreführend ist. Zentraler Ausgangspunkt der Kritik ist die unterschiedliche Bedeutung, die empirische Informationen für das medizinisch-klinische Urteil zum einen und das ethische Urteil in der Medizin zum anderen haben. Im medizinisch-klinischen Urteil können mit (...) Hilfe empirischer Informationen hypothetische Handlungsnormen generiert werden, welche auf den der Medizin inhärenten Zwecksetzungen basieren. Bei Fragen der Ethik in der Medizin hingegen sind die Handlungsziele selbst Gegenstand des Urteils; diese aber können allein aus empirischem Wissen heraus nicht zureichend bestimmt werden. Die Diskussion um die Möglichkeit einer „evidenzbasierten Ethik“ eröffnet weiterhin aufschlussreiche Perspektiven in Bezug auf empirische Forschung und den Umgang mit empirischen Informationen in der Angewandten Ethik und das Aufgabenfeld der Medizinethik. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether or not ethical conflicts can be identified, analysed and solved using ethical principles. The relation between the physician and the patient with ischemic heart disease (IHD) as life style changes are recommended in a secondary prevention program is used as an example. The principal persons affected (the patient and his or her spouse) and the ethical principles (respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice) are combined in a two dimensional model. The (...) most important person affected by the recommendations is the patient. His or her autonomy is challenged by the suggested life style changes, the purpose of which is to promote the future wellbeing and health of the patient. The spouse is indirectly involved in and affected by the process. He or she often feels neglected by caregivers. Ethical conflicts can both be identified and analysed using ethical principles, but often no solution is implied. Most (if not all) physicians would strongly encourage life style changes, but surprisingly there is no uncontroversial justification for this conclusion using principles. (shrink)