Resumen En este artículo de investigación trataré de repensar, dentro de la intuición marcada por Heidegger en su interpretación de Kant, el papel que juega la noción de imaginación, en su vinculación inexorable, por un lado, con la apercepción trascendental, y con el tiempo, por otro, a fin de alcanzar, al menos, un esbozo temático de tal imaginación en términos de auto-afección radical del sí-mismo. Y todo ello para mostrar la posibilidad de una lectura interpretativa que haga valer la importancia, (...) justamente, de un sí mismo y/o mismidad.In this paper, I will try to rethink Heidegger’s interpretation of the role of transcendental imagination within his understanding of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. My paper focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception on the one hand and the time on the other. In this sense, I will try to develop a thematic outline of such imagination in terms of radical self-affection of Selfhood. And this in order to show the possibility of an interpretative reading that asserts the importance, precisely, of a self and/or selfhood. (shrink)

Whether empirical givenness has the reliability that foundationalists expect is a point about which some philosophers are highly skeptical. Sellars took the doctrine of givenness as a “myth,” denying the existence of immediate perceptual experience. The arguments in contemporary Western epistemology are concentrated on whether sensory experience has conceptual contents, and whether there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. In fact, once the elements of words and conceptions in empirical perception are affirmed, the logical relationship between perceptual experience (...) and empirical belief is also affirmed. This relationship takes place through perceptual experience acting as evidence for beliefs. The real problem lies in how one should distinguish between the different relationships with perception of singular beliefs and of universal beliefs, and in how singular beliefs can provide justification for universal beliefs. (shrink)

Normative research has nearly vanished from the academic ‘mainstream’ in accounting. Due to its prescriptive and value-driven approach, normative accounting research has been stigmatized as being unscientific and largely replaced by positive studies. We put this stigma into perspective. We first conceptualize the ‘positive-normative’ distinction and identify this dichotomy in accounting research history. We then challenge the dogmatic confinement of science to descriptive (positive) approaches. Moreover, we debate the basic conditions for normative accounting research and conclude that methodological and epistemological (...) pluralism in accounting research may help address a wide range of potential research questions. We point out that normative research approaches are essential in an applied science such as accounting, lest practical implications and prescriptions are to be the exclusive domain of accounting practice. (shrink)

Los conceptos y problemas de la filosofía kantiana juegan un papel central en el pensamiento del joven Heidegger. Este trabajo analiza la comprensión del concepto de a priori que Heidegger ofrece principalmente en las lecciones de 1925 y en Kant y el problema de la metafísica. Sin la aspiración a una nueva metafísica, Heidegger extrae todo el rendimiento ontológico de lo a priori/trascendental que contiene la Crítica de la razón pura, una vez que ha quedado desligado de la legitimación del (...) conocimiento objetivo, y lo enlaza con un concepto clave de la fenomenología: la intencionalidad. (shrink)

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from (...) the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc. (shrink)

Resumen: Se sostiene que en la Ciencia de la Lógica Hegel distingue, mediante la categoría de “fin subjetivo”, una dimensión puramente instrumental de la actividad del concepto. Tras delinear una lectura de conjunto de la Doctrina del Concepto se reconstruyen sectores clave del capítulo dedicado a la Teleología con vistas a detectar tanto los rasgos fundamentales como las limitaciones de esta dimensión puramente instrumental del concepto. Se concluye que es posible verificar en el capítulo una “lógica de la actividad instrumental” (...) e interpretar en dicha clave la posición sistemática del capítulo. Además, se subrayan los rasgos críticos del tratamiento hegeliano en vista del problema general de una mecanización y desgaste del mundo y de la vida, lo que proyecta el problema al tránsito desde el capítulo Teleología a la sección Idea.: This paper seeks to show that, in the Science of Logic Hegel, through the category of “subjective end”, distinguishes a purely instrumental dimension of the activity of concept. After delineating a general interpretation of the Doctrine of Concept, key aspects of the chapter dedicated of Teleology are re-constructed with the aim of detecting both the fundamental features and the limitations of this purely instrumental dimension of the concept. It is concluded that, in the chapter, it is possible to verify a ‘logic of the instrumentally activity’ and from this standpoint, to interpret the systematic position of the chapter. In addition, critical features of the Hegelian analysis are emphasized in regard to the general problem of mechanization and wear of the world and life, which projects the problem to the transit from chapter on Teleology to the Idea section. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo examinar uma tensão existente no interior da teoria kantiana do respeito pela lei moral. Originalmente, na Fundamentação, o respeito é concebido por Kant como um mero efeito ou subproduto da imediata determinação da vontade pela lei moral. Na segunda Crítica, contudo, Kant parece conceder um papel mais positivo ao respeito, dando a ele a tarefa de enfraquecer a influência exercida pelas inclinações, o que contaria como uma promoção da influência da lei moral sobre a vontade. (...) Buscaremos mostrar que essa alteração na teoria kantiana do respeito é inteiramente devida a uma concessão a um difundido modelo de determinação da vontade que é de inspiração humiana. Além disso, buscaremos mostrar que esse modelo humiano tem de ser completamente abandonado, porque ele se choca tanto com a concepção refletida de Kant sobre motivação moral quanto com sua concepção refletida sobre a determinação da vontade pelas inclinações. (shrink)

The paper aims to follow the hidden traces of Francisco Suárez’ metaphysics in Immanuel Kant’s theory of “being” not intended as a “re...

From the perspective of Cartesian doubt, this article explores the concept of the limitations of reasoning through the use of the Kantian words 'boundary' and 'barrier' in his Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel's critical dialogue with Kant is presented focusing on the limitation that the latter imposed on reason for the acquisition of the true knowledge of philosophical/metaphysical objects. For this purpose, the Hegelian position is presented from its discussion on the second chapter of the first section of the The (...) Doctrine of Being and references are made to conceptual elements of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, j’entreprends de clarifier le projet (frégéen) d’une logique de l’arithmétique -- tel qu’il a été discuté par Natorp et Rickert -- en distinguant trois questions directrices. Le nombre est-il un objet logique? L’arithmétique est-elle réductible à la logique? Est-il possible de déduire les opérations arithmétiques de lois purement logiques? Ma thèse est que la distinction rigoureuse de ces trois questions permet de lever une grande partie des obscurités qui affectent en généralle programme d’une logique de l’arithmétique. (...) La contribution néo-kantienne à ce programme se trouve du même coup éclairée d’une lumière nouvelle.ABSTRACT: In this article, I try to shed light on the (Fregean) project of a logic of arithmelic-as discussed by Natorp and Rickert-by outlining three main questions. Is the number a logical object? Is arithmetic reducible to logic? Is it possible to deduce the arithmetical operations from purely logical laws? I argue that rigorous distinction between these three questions makes it possible to elucidate many problems affecting the program of a logic of arithmetic. The Neo-Kantian contribution to this program is at the same time considered in a new light. (shrink)

BackgroundThe concept of evidence-based medicine has strongly influenced the appraisal and application of empirical information in health care decision-making. One principal characteristic of this concept is the distinction between "evidence" in the sense of high-quality empirical information on the one hand and rather low-quality empirical information on the other hand. In the last 5 to 10 years an increasing number of articles published in international journals have made use of the term "evidence-based ethics", making a systematic analysis and explication of (...) the term and its applicability in ethics important.DiscussionIn this article four descriptive and two normative characteristics of the general concept "evidence-based" are presented and explained systematically. These characteristics are to then serve as a framework for assessing the methodological and practical challenges of evidence-based ethics as a developing methodology. The superiority of evidence in contrast to other empirical information has several normative implications such as the legitimization of decisions in medicine and ethics. This implicit normativity poses ethical concerns if there is no formal consent on which sort of empirical information deserves the label "evidence" and which does not. In empirical ethics, which relies primarily on interview research and other methods from the social sciences, we still lack gold standards for assessing the quality of study designs and appraising their findings.ConclusionThe use of the term "evidence-based ethics" should be discouraged, unless there is enough consensus on how to differentiate between high- and low-quality information produced by empirical ethics. In the meantime, whenever empirical information plays a role, the process of ethical decision-making should make use of systematic reviews of empirical studies that involve a critical appraisal and comparative discussion of data. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap’s formative years as a philosopher were his time in Jena where he studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy, among others, with Gottlob Frege, the neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch, and Herman Nohl, a pupil of Wilhelm Dilthey.2 Whereas both the influence of Frege and of the neo-Kantians is quite well known,3 the importance of the Dilthey school for Carnap’s intellectual development was recently highlighted by scholars, such as Gottfried Gabriel and Hans-Joachim Dahms.4 Although Carnap himself was interested mainly in the problems (...) of logic and the philosophy of the natural sciences, the community in which he worked until he went to Vienna in 1926 was neither a community of neo-Kantian philosophers nor of logicians or philosophers of the natural sciences but a community of members of the Dilthey school that were interested in history of philosophy ,5 pedagogic ,6 aesthetics ,7 and sociology .8 Carnap and his friends were all members of the so-called Seracircle, a group of young people that met frequently in Jena and, between 1919 and 1926, also in Carnap’s home in Buchenbach near Freiburg.9 The first version of the Aufbau was written in close connection with this group of young people that were interested in a reform of the whole society, including arts, politics, sciences, and everyday life. In Carnap’s Werkstatt in Buchenbach, the Aufbau and at least two more manifestos of a more or less philosophical nature were written: Franz Roh’s “Nach-Expressionismus” and Wilhelm Flitner’s “Laienbildung.”10 Given these historical facts, we must conclude that the Aufbau is the product of an intellectual enterprise that developed in close connection with the Dilthey school, but in which Frege and the neo-Kantians seem to have played only a small role. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of Kreisel’s notion of informal rigour and Myhill’s notion of absolute proof, Gödel’s analysis of the subject is presented. It is shown how Gödel avoids the notion of informal proof because such a use would contradict one of the senses of “formal” that Gödel wants to preserve. This Gödelian notion of “formal” is directly tied to his notion of absolute proof and to the question of the general applicability of concepts, in a way that overcomes both (...) Kreisel and Myhill’s conceptions. This paper aims to contribute to the present-day debate on informal and epistemic mathematics, focusing on what appears necessary for a better understanding of the issues at stake. (shrink)

The Negative dialectics is one of Theodor W. Adorno's most important works of thought, not only due to the fact that there he exposes the fundamental epistemological assumptions for understanding his constellation – method of analysis and procedures –, but also because in it the idea of philosophical experience is effectively an exercise of thought. The purpose of this text is to deal with the key figure thinking about models, from another model of thought, read, the intricate relationship between theory (...) and practice. (shrink)

Philosophers' reflections on history have been dominated for decades by two themes: representation and memory. On both of these accounts, historical inquiry is divided by a certain gap from what it seeks to find or wants to know, and its activity is seen by philosophers as that of bridging this gap. Against this background, the concept of experience, in spite of its apparent rootedness in the present, can be revived as a means of thinking about our connection to the past. (...) After examining variants on the concept of experience, with special attention to its temporality, I argue in this essay that experience can be said to furnish a connection to the past that underlies both memory and representation. (shrink)

En el presente estudio, tratamos de aplicar las categorías de la reciente fenomenología francesa de la donación a las cuatro posibles figuras de la nada que Kant establece al final de la “Analítica trascendental”. Se examina, de este modo, cada una de tales figuras con el fin de mostrar el particular modo de donación que adoptan a la hora de aparecer y manifestarse. Se aborda, asimismo, la cuestión del “aún-no-ser” implícitamente contenida en la noción de “posibilidad” tomando en consideración la (...) teoría “ontológica” kantiana en la cual el Ser es identificado con la “posición” absoluta de una cosa”. Como conclusión, se muestran las implicaciones antropológicas derivadas de la consideración fenomenológica de las cuatro modalidades kantianas de la nada. (shrink)

For a long time, the transcendental dialectic was not at the center of Kant scholarship but was often treated simply as Kant’s reckoning with contemporary metaphysics. Accordingly, the main interest was in the transcendental analytic, especially the transcendental deduction. It is all the more gratifying that in recent times a rethinking seems to be taking place on this issue. In the following, I shall attempt to show why the transcendental dialectic is something more than an addendum to the core business (...) of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, it forms the culmination of the work, demanding our full attention. Indeed, it provides the key to the entire critical philosophy by exhibiting reason itself as the ultimate founding principle in the form of its Idea. (shrink)

Summary In opposition to the traditional empiricist understanding of phantasy as a copy of perception and therefore as a weakened form of experience, this paper interprets phantasy as an independent and creative modus of consciousness that is responsible for the individuation of the subject. The article reconstructs Husserl’s approach to phantasy as a specific kind of intentional operation as well as its relationship with mood-intentionality, bodily-kinesthetic expressivity and with hyletic anticipation as a structure of sensibility. In this way, the bi-valence (...) of human experiential orders is claimed and the concept of bodily phantasy is pointed out. This leads the phenomenological analysis closer to the psychoanalytical approach to fantasy. The latter is investigated with reference to Freud’s concept of primary processual thinking and Gaddini’s understanding of bodily phantasy as a specific individuation factor within the personal history of bonding. (shrink)

L'informatique se définissant comme le traitement rationnel de l'information par machine automatique et l'intelligence se caractérisant par une même capacité de traitement rationnel, il était inévitable que l'on songe à associer l'intelligence au traitement automatique de l'information. C'est ce qu'a fait John McCarthy en forgeant le terme d'intelligence artificielle. Par «intelligence artificielle» on peut vouloir exprimer l'ambition de1. Recréer, transformer ou développer l'intelligence artificiellement2. Simuler l'intelligence en la reconstituant dans des modéles imitant certains aspects de notre intelligence dite naturelle.

This article provides somephilosophical ``groundwork'' for contemporary debatesabout the status of the idea(l) of critical thinking.The major part of the article consists of a discussionof three conceptions of ``criticality,'' viz., criticaldogmatism, transcendental critique (Karl-Otto Apel),and deconstruction (Jacques Derrida). It is shown thatthese conceptions not only differ in their answer tothe question what it is ``to be critical.'' They alsoprovide different justifications for critique andhence different answers to the question what giveseach of them the ``right'' to be critical. It is arguedthat (...) while transcendental critique is able to solvesome of the problems of the dogmatic approach tocriticality, deconstruction provides the most coherentand self-reflexive conception of critique. A crucialcharacteristic of the deconstructive style of critiqueis that this style is not motivated by the truth ofthe criterion (as in critical dogmatism) or by acertain conception of rationality (as intranscendental critique), but rather by a concern forjustice. It is suggested that this concern should becentral to any redescription of the idea(l) ofcritical thinking. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se abordan algunos de los conceptos y principios más importantes de la obra de Cornelio Fabro, con el fin de ponderar el alcance, originalidad y consistencia de su posición especulativa respecto de la noción de libertad. En la primera parte, se presenta el itinerario intelectual y científico de Cornelio Fabro. En la segunda, se examina el fundamento metafísico y existencial de la libertad y se hace un recorrido filosófico por los autores más representativos de la modernidad (...) que intervienen en su pensamiento. En la tercera, se realizan algunas consideraciones finales que delimitan los puntos centrales desarrollados en el trabajo. (shrink)

According to the received view, Charles S. Peirce's theory of diagrammatic reasoning is derived from Kant's philosophy of mathematics. For Kant, only mathematics is constructive/synthetic, logic being instead discursive/analytic, while for Peirce, the entire domain of necessary reasoning, comprising mathematics and deductive logic, is diagrammatic, i.e. constructive in the Kantian sense. This shift was stimulated, as Peirce himself acknowledged, by the doctrines contained in Friedrich Albert Lange's Logische Studien (1877). The present paper reconstructs Peirce's reading of Lange's book, and illustrates (...) what, according to Peirce, was right and what was problematic in Lange's account of reasoning. It further seeks to explain how Peirce's theory of deductive reasoning was a combination of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and Lange's philosophy of logic. (shrink)

Dialektik ist eine Modevokabel geworden. In seinem Aufsatz geht Becker ihren philosophiegeschichtlichen Quellen nach. Er zeigt, daß die begrifflichen Konstruktionselemente der dialektischen Methode von Hegel und Marx dem Selbstbewußtseinstheorem der klassischen Transzendentalphilosophie entstammen. Die Wurzeln dieses Theorems reichen bis zu Descartes zurück. Die konsequenteste Ausbildung hat es jedoch erst in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus erhalten. B. macht klar, unter welchen Bedingungen es zu Marxens 'materialistischer Umstülpung' der dialektischen Methode kommen konnte. In einer Kurzanalyse der Warentheorie von Marx wird deutlich (...) gemacht, wie Dialektik als Methode im Rahmen einer ökonomischen Theorie fungiert und welche - irrationalen - Konsequenzen sie in diesem ökonomischen und geschichtsphilosophischen Rahmen bewirkt. (shrink)

A Crítica da faculdade de julgar foi recebida com entusiasmo pelos filósofos do idealismo alemão. No caso de Friedrich Schelling, as duas partes da obra foram influentes, de modo que não só a estética kantiana, mas também a teleologia foi marcante em sua trajetória filosófica. Observaremos como o filósofo de Leonberg acolhe, na Introdução às Ideias para uma filosofia da natureza, a noção kantiana de organismo como dotado de autocausalidade, mas pensa-a nos quadros de uma filosofia pós-kantiana, buscando prescindir das (...) noções de juízo reflexionante e também da ideia de “natureza como arte” para se pensar o organismo. Como Schelling vincula essa noção com a proposta de se pensar a unidade entre natureza e espírito a partir do próprio sujeito, e não de algo exterior a ele? Como Kant reagiria a tal proposta? The Critique of Judgment was enthusiastically received by the German Idealists. In the case of Friedrich Schelling, both divisions of the work were influent, thus resulting that not only Kantian aesthetics, but also the teleology was a landmark in his philosophical itinerary. We attempt to observe how the philosopher of Leonberg receives, in the Introduction to the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, the Kantian conception of organism as endowed with self-causality, but at the same time thinks it within the frame of a post-Kantian philosophy, leaving aside the reflective judgment and also the idea of nature as a product of art in order to think the organism. How does Schelling connect this notion with the proposal to think the unity between nature and spirit based on the own subject, and not on something external to it? How would Kant react to such a proposal? (shrink)

Dialogo filosofijos mąstytojų Rosenzweig‘o ir Levino darbų esmė – mirties bedugnės ir asmens tapatumo santykis. Rosenzweig‘as niekį laiko galutiniu kantiškojo mąstymo tašku. Mirtis, kaip egzistencinis niekio patyrimas, buvo laikoma kiekvieno žmogaus realybe sudėtingu amžių sandūros laikotarpiu. Rosenzweig‘ui niekis buvo atspirties taškas, permąstant ir siekiant išsaugoti asmens tapatumą. Asmens tapatumas apsaugo nuo niekio, tačiau jis taip pat yra atviras pokyčiams. Savo ankstyvuosiuose tekstuose Levinas daro panašias prielaidas, laikydamas Buvimą asmens tapatumo pradžia. Levinas plėtojo dialektinę fenomenologiją pradėdamas nuo mirties. Asmens tapatumas traktuojamas (...) kaip hipostazė, tačiau Levino darbe „Totalité et Infini“ įvyksta svarbus lūžis – jame asmens tapatumo šaltiniu laikomas troškimas. Buvimas tampa dėmesio centru kaip antroji elementale pusė, o asmens tapatumas suvokiamas kaip atsiskyrimas. (shrink)

Modern epistemology is in the peculiar position of retaining its trust in man’s ability to acquire knowledge without being capable of specifying the reasons for our gnosis success. Popper was the first to state that any conclusion concerning the possibility or impossibility of knowing is a transcendental statement and he states, also, that man reaches knowledge while trying to guess. In my opinion, we know things because we assume to have always been aware of them, in the sense that some (...) form of immediate awareness has promptly enabled us to perceive them, identify them, use them. But one needs to ascertain whether the reason is the most suitable faculty to ensure the positive development of knowledge. At last, Kuhn claims the impossibility of comparing different theories. But if we establish a comparison between theories in terms of their complexity, then we must admit that there occurs some progress. (shrink)