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Libertarianism

In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 35 - 44 (2007)

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  1. Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    While there is a vast philosophical literature exploring the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold individuals morally responsible for their actions, relatively little attention has been paid to the related question of which kinds of individuals merit these responsibility ascriptions. Under normal circumstances, typical adult human beings are held morally responsible for their behaviour but infants and nonhuman animals are not. In this thesis, I aim to account for this difference. That is, I aim to give an analysis (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility for Self-Deluding Beings.David J. Franz - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1791-1807.
    In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent’s subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. (...)
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  • Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.
    Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or (...)
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  • The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss.Brandon Rdzak - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):201-216.
    Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR and his account of libertarian free will. This is because his libertarianism has it that contingent true propositions reporting free choices are self-explanatory. But I don’t think Pruss can plausibly maintain both his PSR and libertarianism without a rift occurring in one or the other. Similar to the old luck/randomness objection, I contend that Pruss’s libertarianism (...)
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  • Daniel Dennett’s and Sam Harris’ Confrontation on the Problem of Free Will.Zahra Khazaei, Nancey Murphy & Tayyebe Gholami - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 22 (2):27-48.
    This paper seeks to explain and evaluate, by an analytic method, the conflict between determinism and free will from the viewpoint of two physicalist reductionist philosophers, namely, Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris. Dennett is a compatibilist philosopher who tries to show compatibility between determinism and free will, while Sam Harris is a non-compatibilist philosopher who turns to determinism with the thesis that our thoughts and actions have been pre-determined by the neurobiological events associated with them, and thus, considers free will (...)
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  • Self-Forming Acts and Other Miracles.László Bernáth - 2014 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 1 (58):104-116.
    Ferenc Huoranszki argues for two main claims in the ninth chapter of Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis (Huoranszki 2011). First, Huoranszki tries to show that libertarian restrictivism is false because self-determination in the libertarian sense is not necessary for our responsibility, even if motives, reasons or psychological characteristics can influence us relatively strongly to choose one or the other alternative. second, Huoranszki rejects the so-called manipulation argument.1 this is an argument for the conclusion that unless physical indeterminism is (...)
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  • Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.
    Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We argue that (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on moral responsibility.
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  • Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.
    According to “voluntarists,” voluntary control is a necessary precondition on being blameworthy. According to “non-voluntarists,” it isn’t. I argue here that we ought to take seriously a type of voluntary control that both camps have tended to overlook. In addition to “direct” control over our behavior, and “indirect” control over some of the consequences of our behavior, we also possess “constitutive” control: the capacity to govern some of our attitudes and character traits by making choices about what to do that (...)
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  • Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
    Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the (...)
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  • La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas.Martín Montoya - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):245-262.
    The theoretical reliability of determinism. A review from the proposal of Mariano Artigas This article has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the theory of determinism, which claims to be based on the principles of experimental science, cannot be considered as an explanation compatible with such sciences. To do this, we use some ideas of Mariano Artigas on the explanatory power of scientific theories and their reliability from his book The Mind of the Universe. Through this process we (...)
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  • Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
    Every account of moral responsibility has conditions that distinguish between the consequences, actions, or traits that warrant praise or blame and those that do not. One intuitive condition is that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors beyond the agent’s control. Several philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. First, I maintain that considerations (...)
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  • Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
    Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up (...)
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  • A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples.James Cain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):83-93.
    Frankfurt examples are frequently used in arguments designed to show that agents lacking alternatives, or lacking ‘regulative control’ over their actions, can be morally responsible for what they do. I will maintain that Frankfurt examples can be constructed that undermine those very arguments when applied to actions for which the agent bears fundamental responsibility.
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  • Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for (...)
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  • The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.
    Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very (...)
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  • Making Sense of a Free Will that is Incompatible with Determinism: A Fourth Way Forward.Robert Kane - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):5-28.
    For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings (...)
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  • Responsibility and Visioneering—Opening Pandora’s Box.Martin Sand - 2016 - NanoEthics 10 (1):75-86.
    The number of publications that highlight the influence of visions and futuristic narratives on the development of emerging technologies increases. Toolboxes such as “Hermeneutical Technology Assessment” and “Vision Assessment” provide methodological considerations on how to assess techno-futuristic narratives, their proponents, and their impact on technological development. Because of their contributions to the technoscientific discourse, a special responsibility for technological processes is attributed to the “visioneers” of such narratives. While such a claim naturally follows from an agential role in a process, (...)
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  • On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will.Robert Kane - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.
    In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility … [he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its role (...)
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  • Cogs in a Cosmic Machine: A Defense of Free Will Skepticism and its Ethical Implications.Sacha Greer - unknown
    Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions, followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social (...)
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  • The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will.John Lemos - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):137-156.
    This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe and John Lemos has the resources to answer such luck objections while (...)
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  • Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom: A Libertarian Approach.Daniel Shay - unknown
    Philosophers and theologians alike have debated endlessly over the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom. Too often, in these debates, human freedom is either denied altogether or reduced to a compatibilist notion. Many people fear that granting humans too much freedom would destroy God's sovereignty. However, the purpose of granting humans freedom is not to elevate the creature over the Creator; rather to uphold both moral responsibility and God's justice. Any theory that preserves God's sovereignty at the expense of (...)
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  • The Problem of Induction and the Problem of Free Will.Avijit Lahiri - manuscript
    This essay presents a point of view for looking at `free will', with the purpose of interpreting where exactly the freedom lies. For, freedom is what we mean by it. It compares the exercise of free will with the making of inferences, which usually is predominantly inductive in nature. The making of inference and the exercise of free will, both draw upon psychological resources that define our ‘selves’. I examine the constitution of the self of an individual, especially the involvement (...)
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  • Agency and Virtues.Zahra Khazaei - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 21 (3):119-140.
    In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention? Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the agent and not (...)
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  • Kane, Pereboom, and Event-Causal Libertarianism.John Lemos - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):607-623.
    This paper provides a brief review of some of the central elements of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian theory of free will. It then goes on to consider four of the central criticisms Derk Pereboom has made of Kane’s view and it shows how each of these criticisms can be reasonably answered. These criticisms are the no further power/control objection, the disappearing agent/luck objection, the randomizing manipulator objection, and the problem of responsibility for efforts of will.
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  • Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.
    I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop (...)
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  • Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.
    Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...)
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  • Modality, compatibilism, and Leibniz: a critical defense.Seth Adam Jones - unknown
    In this dissertation, I develop an interpretation of Leibniz on modality and free will. I do so for two reasons: first, I am attempting to revitalize the notion that Leibniz is the predecessor of contemporary modal semantics; second, I am using Leibniz's philosophical system to motivate responses to contemporary philosophical issues in modality and free will. In Chapter One, I argue that Leibniz's basic principles are plausible theoretical tools that ought to be used by contemporary philosophers in developing their philosophical (...)
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  • Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.
    Among challenges to libertarians, the _Mind_ Argument has loomed large. Believing that this challenge cannot be met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently, the _Mind_ Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the _Mind_ Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been clarified, however, another argument (...)
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  • Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.
    In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which (...)
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  • Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane’s Libertarian Theory.Neil Campbell & Jamal Kadkhodapour - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):415-430.
    Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane’s influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose (...)
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  • Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.
    The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This (...)
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  • Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?Brendan Murday - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1313-1330.
    Libertarian theories of freedom and responsibility face a worry about luck: if an action is undetermined, the action cannot be legitimately attributed to the agent; instead the action is a matter of luck, and so the agent is not responsible for the action. Robert Kane defends libertarianism by appealing to self-forming actions. These actions are undetermined because the agent is attempting to act on two conflicting motives, but the agent is responsible for the outcome if she is responsible for having (...)
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  • The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.
    The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed that (...)
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  • Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.
    (2014). Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well. Philosophical Explorations: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 112-125. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.912673.
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  • Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame.Richard L. Archer & Shirley Matile Ogletree - 2011 - Ethics and Behavior 21 (1):35-48.
    A deterministic perspective, believing choices are a function of hereditary and environmental factors, could theoretically impact perceived moral responsibility and lead to decreased blame in judging others. However, little consistent support has been found relating individual differences in deterministic attitudes to blame/tolerance for others. Perhaps, though, providing information regarding past background hardships affecting an individual's current lifestyle could potentially mediate harsh moralistic judgments of that individual. In the two studies reported here, we further explored the relation of free will/determinism scales (...)
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  • Group Agents and Their Responsibility.Raimo Tuomela & Pekka Mäkelä - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):299-316.
    Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if (...)
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  • Rejecting Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent-causation.Jordan Baker - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3085-3100.
    In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent causation fails to undermine the most plausible version of agent-causal libertarianism. This is significant because Pereboom concedes that such libertarianism is conceptually coherent and only falls to empirical considerations. To substantiate these claims I outline Pereboom’s taxonomy of agent-causal views, develop the strongest version of his empirical objections, and then show that this objection fails to undermine what I consider the most plausible view of agent-causal libertarianism, namely, reconciliatory integrationist (...)
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  • Closing Pandora's box: a defence of Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religious belief.Tyler Dalton McNabb - unknown
    I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and that, contrary to the Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for, I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each (...)
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  • Teizm a twardy inkompatybilizm.Dariusz Łukasiewicz - 2017 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (3):191-203.
    Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie stanowiska zwanego twardym inkompatybilzimem i porównanie go z teistyczną, a w szczególności współczesną chrześcijańską koncepcją wolności woli ludzkiej. Twardy inkompatybilizm głosi, że wolność woli ludzkiej, rozumiana zarówno w sposób libertariański,jak i kompatbilistyczny, nie istnieje. W artykule zwraca się uwagę na pewną zbieżność między tezą twardego inkompatybilizmu a opartą na Biblii mądrością chrześcijańską, głoszącą zależność ontyczną i aksjologiczną człowieka od Boga. Zarazemjednak argumentuje się, że jednym z najważniejszych składników teologii i filozofii chrześcijańskiej jest doktryna owol- ności woli (...)
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  • Quantum Indeterminacy, Freedom, and Responsibility.Carlos Patarroyo - 2008 - Ideas Y Valores 57 (136):27-57.
    In the contemporary debate between determinism and indeterminism, quantum mechanics are used by libertarianists, both as a resource to escape the determinism imposed by classical physics, and as a tool to search for a ground to the possibility of free will and moral responsibility. This paper will show that every defense of free will based on quantum mechanics has to overcome at least two objections: on the one hand what I have decided to call the scale principle, and, on the (...)
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  • Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?Scott Sehon - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):363-380.
    In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a (...)
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