- Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Elucidating open theism.Joshua R. Sijuwade - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2):151-175.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Psychotherapy – at the interface between psychological mechanisms and free will.Dariusz Kuncewicz - 2023 - Diametros 20 (77):1-16.details
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Libertarian Control and Ultimate Responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):132-148.details
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Quantum Indeterminism, Free Will, and Self-Causation.Marco Masi - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (5-6):32–56.details
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The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.details
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The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will.John Lemos - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):137-156.details
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Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
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Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
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(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.details
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Real Free Will.von Wachter Daniel - manuscriptdetails
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Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2023 - Dissertation, Syracuse Universitydetails
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Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane’s Libertarian Theory.Neil Campbell & Jamal Kadkhodapour - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):415-430.details
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(1 other version)Free Will, Values, and Narrative Selfhood.Alessandro Fiorello - 2020 - Philosophia 44 (1):1-20.details
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Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.details
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Kane and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection: A Reply to Moore.John Lemos - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2597-2615.details
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Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?Brendan Murday - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1313-1330.details
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(1 other version)Free Will, Values, and Narrative Selfhood.Alessandro Fiorello - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):115-132.details
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Quausation and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection: a Reply to Moore.Neil Campbell - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1129-1142.details
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