The indispensability of the ‘postulate of practical reason with regard to Right’ to Kant's property argument in the Rechtslehre is now widely recognized. However, most commentators continue to focus their attention on the relation between the postulate and the deduction of the concept of intelligible possession. The nature of this relation remains a matter of dispute in part because the precise position of the postulate within chapter one of the Rechtslehre remains undecided. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that (...) the related question has been neglected, as to why Kant should characterize the postulate of Right as a postulate of practical reason. Yet the fact that he does so is of some significance – especially if one recalls the definition in the Critique of Practical Reason of postulates of practical reason as practically necessary but theoretically indemonstrable propositions. What is of interest about this definition is not just the fact that it designates postulates as practically necessary and as theoretically indemonstrable at the same time – even more intriguing is the intimated relation between practical necessity and theoretical indemonstrability. Kant does not think the postulates' theoretical indemonstrability morally insignificant. To the contrary, their moral significance for us appears to be a function, in part, of their theoretical indemonstrability. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that hybrid logic is the deductive setting most natural for Kripke semantics. We do so by investigating hybrid axiomatics for a variety of systems, ranging from the basic hybrid language (a decidable system with the same complexity as orthodox propositional modal logic) to the strong Priorean language (which offers full first-order expressivity).We show that hybrid logic offers a genuinely first-order perspective on Kripke semantics: it is possible to define base logics which extend automatically to a (...) wide variety of frame classes and to prove completeness using the Henkin method. In the weaker languages, this requires the use of non-orthodox rules. We discuss these rules in detail and prove non-eliminability and eliminability results. We also show how another type of rule, which reflects the structure of the strong Priorean language, can be employed to give an even wider coverage of frame classes. We show that this deductive apparatus gets progressively simpler as we work our way up the expressivity hierarchy, and conclude the paper by showing that the approach transfers to first-order hybrid logic. (shrink)

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last instance moral norms and values can only (...) be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals' concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last instance moral norms and values can only (...) be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals’ concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not (...) clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of ``European'', or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it. (shrink)

The central claim of Kant's political philosophy is that rational agents sharing a territory can justifiably be forced to live under a state; they have, in Kant's words, a duty of right to leave the state of nature. Perhaps something along these lines is entailed by any theory of state legitimacy, but the point raises special difficulties for Kant. He believes that rational agents have a right to freedom; that is, he believes that a rational agent's external freedom - her (...) ability to set and pursue ends for herself without being subject to the choices of others - can justifiably be restricted only for the sake of external freedom itself. To establish that human beings can be forced to join a civil condition, it will therefore not do to show that the state promotes security, prosperity or any other such value: Kant has to show that human beings living side by side need a state to be free. (shrink)

En este artículo realizo una comparación de las teorías del castigo legal en la filosofía del derecho de Kant y de Hegel. La tesis que busco defender es que, al menos en lo que concierne a este tópico, las posiciones de Kant y de Hegel no deberían leerse en franca oposición, sino como pertenecientes a una familia común de teorías penales retributivistas. El análisis comparativo que presento busca arrojar luz sobre ciertos aspectos estructurales de su filosofía del derecho como un (...) todo y sobre algunas estrategias habituales en ellos en su procedimiento de justificación jurídico-filosófica. La discusión que aquí se presenta mostrará, no obstante, algunas limitaciones de ambas teorías y esbozará a grandes rasgos, a modo de solución a dichas dificultades, una lectura en la cual las concepciones filosóficas de Kant y de Hegel en torno al castigo legal son más bien consideradas como complementarias. (shrink)

In the following essay, I attempt to reactualize some of Kant’s most fundamental conceptions of a state’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan order. To this end, I provide what appears as a viable solution to Kant’s “sovereignty dilemma”; that is, the reconciliation between state sovereignty and the international enforceability of laws. I consider that a key component of the overall Kantian cosmopolitan project is the role played by the transcendental notion of an “originally united will” in its validation (...) of constituencies. I emphasize the view that for Kant state-citizens are also, as he says, “citizens of the world” or “citizens of the earth”. I argue, furthermore, that a state’s sovereignty must comply with a number of different constitutional wholes. I then proceed by confronting the Kantian notion of a general united will with the Habermasian conception of “double sovereignty.” I conclude by suggesting a fusion/synthesis between the two views, one which would require endorsing the idea of cosmopolitan constitutionalism as a meta-framework for interpreting the legitimacy of member states’ compliance with policy indications of transnational constituencies. (shrink)

Apoiando-se na fenomenologia filosófica e numa ciência factual , o artigo começa formulando dois problemas relativos à tolerância: 1) poder suportar os diferentes sentidos de realidade ou, respectivamente, os diferentes modos de dizer o real, e 2) poder estabelecer relacionamentos objetificantes e não-objetificantes com o mundo. Depois de mostrar que esses problemas foram sistematicamente negligenciados não somente pela literatura teológica, mas também pela filosófica , o artigo prossegue salientando que a linguagem apropriada para descrever a realidade objetificável pode ser invasiva (...) e mesmo aniquiladora - e, neste sentido, intolerante - se usada para falar da realidade não-objetificável, e que atitudes objetificantes podem destruir os modos não-objetificáveis de relacionamento com o mundo e outros seres humanos, sendo, portanto, ameaçadoras da própria essência do humano.Based on philosophical phenomenology and a positive science , this paper starts by formulating two problems of tolerance: the one being that of coming to terms with different senses of the real and different modes of talking about it, and the other that of reconciling our objectifying with our non-objectifying relationships to the world. After showing at some length that both problems have been generally neglected not only in the theological but also in the philosophical literature, the post-modern as well as the enlightened one, it will be shown that a language appropriate for describing the objectifiable reality can be intrusive and even destructive - and thus intolerant -, if used to talk about the non-objectifiable reality, and that objectifying attitudes can destroy the non-objetifying ways of relating to the world and to other persons, being, in this respect, a threat to the very essence of our humanity. (shrink)

Los fundamentos teológicos y teleológicos ofrecidos por Francisco de Vitoria y John Locke respectivamente para justificar el colonialismo son refutados por Kant en sus escritos tardíos. Esa refutación abre el camino a una comprensión más ambiciosa del cosmopolitismo kantiano. Este no se limita a la hospitalidad con el extranjero sino que exige respetar la igualdad de derechos, la diversidad cultural y a la autonomía política de los pueblos de la tierra como es necesario para preservar la paz mundial. Una lectura (...) sistemática de las tesis de Kant sobre el colonialismo permiten afirmar que el suyo es un cosmopolitismo republicano y no uno de mínimos, lo que abre nuevas perspectivas a la investigación de la filosofía política, moral y jurídica kantiana. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas points out an ambiguity in the Kantian concept of autonomy that would lead to an antagonism between human rights and popular sovereignty. He charges Kant of introducing this concept from the private point of view of the individual subject who judges morally and of elucidating it from the point of view of the discursive and democratic political formation of the will. Against this reading, Ingeborg Maus argues that Kant develops human rights and popular (...) sovereignty in the closest reciprocal complementarity. Nonetheless, she agrees with Habermas’s critique of the monological character of the Kantian principle of morality and reaffirms the ambiguity of the concept of autonomy. The aim of this article is to to shed light on Kant’s conceptions of Enlightenment and “public use of reason” developed in his political writings, in order to suggest that far from devaluating the political formation of the will, Kant establishes it as a fundamental step towards the realization of morality and, therefore, of the autonomy of the will. First, I will argue that in explaining the principle of autonomy with the idea of self-legislation of the will, Kant does not introduce ambiguity in this concept. On the contrary, it establishes a common normative structure between the domains of moral and right. Finally, I will return to the Doctrine of Right to argue that for Kant, interaction and communication between citizens is not lateral to the legitimation of right, since the members of the political community must consent and be convinced by reason. (shrink)