The paper outlines ongoing research on logic-based tools for the analysis and representation of legal contracts, of the kind frequently encountered in large-scale engineering projects and complex, long-term trading agreements. We consider both contract formation and contract performance, in each case identifying the representational issues and the prospects for providing automated support tools.

This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negative liberties, something that (...) capability theorists deny. On the other hand, to say that all capability rights are substantive in the sense that they themselves are capabilities (rights as capabilities) will in a significant number of cases fail to match well with our intuitions. This article presents an account of the relationship between rights and capabilities that avoids these problems of underspecification and of plausibility, respectively. First, it is argued that to take the idea of capability rights seriously, three new ‘list issues’ need to be addressed. Second, developing a point made by Nussbaum, it is argued that capability rights are to be defined as being purely instrumental. Whereas the resulting analysis of capability rights solves the problems of underspecification and plausibility, it raises doubts about the claim that the capability approach gives more importance to rights than do traditional forms of consequentialism. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, Arthur N. (...) Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

The condition of liberty which Sen used in his famous theorem on the impossibility of the Paretian liberal was defined in terms of individual preferences. The preference-based approach has been the subject of much criticism, which led to the evolution of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. In this approach no references to individual preferences are made. Two questions are examined in this paper: how can different types of right be distinguished within a game-theoretic setting, and how do rights come into (...) existence? These questions are addressed on the basis of ideas originating from legal theory The discussion shows that an analysis of rights should take account of the whole legal system of which a legal norm forms part. Furthermore, it reveals that preferences should be re-introduced into the formal study of individual rights. (shrink)

This short essay attempts to challenge some of widely held philosophical assumptions on the nature of the relationship between logic, language and reality. In Section 1 the hegemony of theoretical logic is being questioned; Section 2 proposes a hypothesis on socially mediated semantics; Section 3 addresses the problem of ontology of logical sentential moods.

In the paper we examine the problem of logical systems that are extensions of Classical Propositional Logic with new, intensional connectives of agency: monadic and dyadic _bringing it about that_. These systems are usually studied within the neighbourhood semantics. Here we propose a different strategy. We study all of the accepted laws and rules of logic of agency and define a translation of the agency operators into connectives interpreted in relating semantics. After this translation we can make a reduction to (...) more basic semantic properties that are required by the particular groups of laws and axioms. Finally, we define proper semantic structures and prove that they are complete with respect to all possible logical systems determined by the combinations of the axioms and rules. (shrink)

A history of the logic of action is outlined, beginning with St Anselm. Five modern authors are discussed in some detail: von Wright, Fitch, Kanger, Chellas and Pratt.

We propose a new formalization of legal competences, and in particular for the Hohfeldian categories of power and immunity, through a deontic reinterpretation of dynamic epistemic logic. We argue that this logic explicitly captures the norm-changing character of legal competences while providing a sophisticated reduction of the latter to static normative positions. The logic is completely axiomatizable, and we apply it to a concrete case in German contract law to illustrate that it can capture the distinction between legal ability and (...) legal permissibility. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary investigation into the application of the formal-logical theory of normative positions to the characterisation of normative-informational positions, pertaining to rules that are meant to regulate the supply of information. First, we present the proposed framework. Next, we identify the kinds of nuances and distinctions that can be articulated in such a logical framework. Finally, we show how such nuances can arise in specific regulations. Reference is made to Data Protection Law and Contract Law, among others. (...) The proposed approach is articulated around two essential steps. The first involves identifying the set of possible interpretations that can be given to a particular norm. This is done by using formal methods. The second involves picking out one of these interpretations as the most likely one. This second step can be resolved only by using further information (e.g., the context or other parts of the regulation). (shrink)

Basin-Matthews-Viganò approach to construction of labelled deduction systems for normal modal logics is adapted to „Fitch proof-format“, and it is applied to the language of deontic-praxeological logic. Segerberg's suggestion on how to asses the adequacy of a logic for Kanger's theory of rights is being formally explicated and it is proved that herewith proposed system of labelled deduction satisfies Segerberg's criteria of adequacy. For the purpose of building the proof a semantics is given, which connects „the simplest semantics of action“ (...) with standard semantics of deontic logic. Soundness and completeness of the proposed labelled deduction with respect to aforementioned semantics is proved. (shrink)

Two areas of importance for agents and multiagent systems are investigated: design of agent programming languages, and design of agent communication languages. The paper contributes in the above mentioned areas by demonstrating improved or novel applications for deontic logic and normative reasoning. Examples are taken from computer-supported cooperative work, and electronic commerce.

The programmatic statement put forward in von Wright's last works on deontic logic introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics, which has been formally explicated here and extended so to include the role of norm-recipient as well as the role of norm-giver. Using the translation function from the language of deontic logic to the language of set-theoretical approach, the connection has been established between the deontic postulates, on one side, and the perfection properties of the norm-set and the counter-set, on the (...) other side. In the study of conditions of rational norm-related activities it has been shown that diverse dynamic second-order norms related to the concept of the consistency norm-system hold: -- the norm-giver ought to restore ``classical'' consistency by revising an inconsistent system, -- the norm-recipient ought to preserve an inconsistent system by revision of its logic so that inconsistency does not imply destruction of the system. Dialetheic deontic logic of Priest is a suitable logic for the purpose since it preserves other perfection properties of the system. (shrink)

I present a variant of with time, called, interpreted in standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, is nothing but the extension of atemporal individual by: the future tense and past tense operators, and the operator of group agency for the grand coalition. A sound and complete axiomatisation for is given. Moreover, it is shown that supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts of achievement obligation and commitment.

Deontic logic as a way of formally reasoning about norms, an important area in AI and law, has traditionally concerned itself about formalising provisions of general statutes. Despite the long history of deontic logic, given the wide scope of the logic, it is difficult, if not impossible, to formalise all these notions in a single formalism, and there are still ongoing debates on appropriate semantics for deontic modalities in different contexts. In this paper, we restrict our attention to contracts between (...) interactive parties, which are both general enough to be an interesting object of study but specific enough so as to narrow down the debates regarding the meaning of modalities, and present a formalism for reasoning about them. (shrink)

Czy eutanazja gwałci prawo do życia ("the right to life")? Odpowiedź na to pytanie zależy od rozumienia terminu "prawo do życia". Autor, odwołując się do pojęcia uprawnienia i typologii uprawnień, zaproponowanej przez Stiga oraz Helle Kanger, wyróżnia i analizuje w kategoriach formalnologicznych cztery rozumienia tego terminu. Każdemu z nich odpowiada odmienne stanowisko w sprawie dopuszczalności eutanazji. Pierwszym z tych stanowisk jest "mocna doktryna świętości życia", według której prawu do życia towarzyszy obowiązek przedłużania życia za pomocą wszelkich możliwych środków. Eutanazja zatem, (...) według zwolenników tego stanowiska, jest niedopuszczalna pod żadną postacią. Takie zdecydowane odrzucenie eutanazji stoi w sprzeczności z zasadą szacunku dla autonomii pacjenta oraz zasadą niezadawania zbędnego cierpienia (the principle of nonmaleficence). Uwzględnienie tych dwóch zasad prowadzi do modyfikacji powyższego stanowiska, w wyniku czego otrzymujemy "słabą doktrynę świętości życia". Według tego stanowiska dopuszczalna jest pod pewnymi warunkami eutanazja bierna, czyli zaniechanie leczenia czy też podtrzymywania życia pacjenta. Odmienne stanowisko od zwolenników doktryny świętości życia w obu jej odmianach zajmują zwolennicy liberalnego podejścia do eutanazji. Tutaj także możemy wyróżnić dwa stanowiska. Według słabego stanowiska liberalnego, w pewnych warunkach dopuszczalne moralnie jest popełnienie samobójstwa, niemniej jednak ściśle zakazana jest pomoc osób trzecich w samobójstwie, jak też pozbawienie z rozmysłem życia drugiej osoby na jej własną prośbę. Mocne liberalne stanowisko uznaje za moralnie dopuszczalną pomoc w samobójstwie czy też pozbawienie z rozmysłem życia drugiej osoby na jej własną prośbę. Innymi słowy, za moralnie dopuszczalną uznaje eutanazję czynną. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of some of the most important philosophical papers by Peter Gärdenfors. Spanning a period of more than 20 years of his research, they cover a wide ground of topics, from early works on decision theory, belief revision and nonmonotonic logic to more recent work on conceptual spaces, inductive reasoning, semantics and the evolutions of thinking. Many of the papers have only been published in places that are difficult to access. The common theme of all the (...) papers is the dynamics of thought. Several of the papers have become minor classics and the volume bears witness of the wide scope of Gärdenfors’ research and of his crisp and often witty style of writing. The volume will be of interest to researchers in philosophy and other cognitive sciences. (shrink)

This paper arose out of the 2017 international conference on AI and law doctoral consortium. There were five students who presented their Ph.D. work, and each of them has contributed a section to this paper. The paper offers a view of what topics are currently engaging students, and shows the diversity of their interests and influences.

The paper intends to show, that W. N. Hohfeld's theory of fundamental jural relations is relevant to economic theory, and that Hohfeld's system can be reconstructed by the concepts of 'liberty space' and 'ability space', understood as an agent's Spielraum for action. The first half of the paper is devoted to an exposition of Hohfeld's system and to the question of its relation to the economic analysis of property rights. The second half concerns Spielraum theory and the reformulation of Hohfeldian (...) distinctions in terms of liberty spaces and ability spaces. It is argued that the reformulation is useful, inter alia, for describing exchange of property rights by contract. El artículo intenta mostrar: que la teoría de las relaciones jurídicas fundamentales de W. N. Hohfeld es relevante para la teoría económica y que el sistema de Hohfeld puede ser reconstruido mediante los conceptos de "espacio de libertad" y "espacio de capacidad", entendidos como el Spielraum para la acción del agente. La primera mitad del artículo está dedicada a la exposición del sistema de Hohfeld y al problema de su relación con el análisis económico de los derechos reales. La segunda mitad se refiere a la teoría del Spielraum y a la reformulación de las distinciones hohfeldianas en términos de espacio de libertad y espacio de capacidad. Se argumenta que esta reformulación es útil, inter alia, para describir el cambio de los derechos reales mediante contratos. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of (...) competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice. (shrink)