This paper discusses the possibility of an ethics of difference. It begins with an introduction to current poststructural and critical theories in order to show their significance for transcultural politics and ethics. Its theme is formulated in terms of the debate between the affirmation of ethical cognitivism cast in the form of universalism and the advocacy of moral skepticism in the mode of communitarianism. Distancing itself from the idea of universal morality, this paper attempts to respond to the challenge of (...) both communitarians and deconstructionists in contemporary French poststructuralism. In the end, it argues for transversality in place of universality. (shrink)

Argues that out of the confrontation between Rorty and Habermas may be found a new way to answer the question of what kind of politics do we need today.

The purpose of this article is to present the critical approaches made by Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor to the priority of the right over the good on Habermas’ dicourse ethics, criticisms that depart from the consideration that the moral agent, historical and socially conditioned, acts for reasons other than (only) the impartial consideration of all individuals. Claiming that the priority of the right over the good would disconnect individuals of their motivations, abstracting them from their cultural background and contingencies (...) often determinants of their ethical life, the objections also claim that the choice of a particular set of conditions to be fulfilled for the validity of moral norms bind discourse ethics to a particular ethos, permeated of values shaped historically by a kind of society whose practices are not universals. (shrink)

Central to the discourse ethics advanced by Jürgen Habermas is a principle of universalization (U) amounting to a dialogical equivalent of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Habermas has proposed that ?U? follows by material implication from two premises: (1) what it means to discuss whether a moral norm ought to be . adopted and (2) what those involved in argumentation must suppose of themselves if they are to consider a consensus they reach as rationally motivated. To date, no satisfactory derivation of ?U? (...) from these two premises has been presented. Thus the present study attempts to show how one can, without begging the question, arrive at ?U? by assuming a suitable explication of these two premises, supplemented with a fairly innocuous assumption about the context of discourse. If the argument is sound, then ?U? brings both deontological and consequentialist intuitions together with a notion of solidarity that requires an intersubjective account of insight. (shrink)

This paper studies the theory and practice of Minna in Manabi, as the Japanese concept of learning from the perspective of moral education. The Japanese word Minna, which means “all” or “everyone,” plays an important role in Manabi. The word “Minna” is often found in textbooks used in moral education classes, and great value is placed on “thinking about everyone.” Minna, a component of Manabi, not only makes the self (the learner) nothing and selfless, but also makes it possible to (...) enter all, everyone, and the world. This may create possibilities for inclusiveness, reciprocal harmony, hospitality, solidarity, and cooperativeness. This Manabi of “thinking about everyone” can be found in moral classes and in all aspects of learning (educational) activities in Japanese schools. Among them, in addition to being a traditional Buddhist practice dealing with Nothingness and Selflessness, Souji (cleaning time) is also very important in schools as a Japanese moral practice of “thinking about everyone.” The moral concepts developed in the West, such as democracy, community, solidarity, engagement, and citizenship, are not only realized through the establishment of the individual, self-realization, and perfection of personality, but by “thinking about everyone,” as expressed in Nothingness, Selflessness, and Minna. (shrink)

Rawls''s recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity (...) that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls''s comments on the division of a cake. (shrink)