At the bottom level of the hierarchical structure (Stufenbau) of the legal system, the transition from “ought” to “is” has not been given its due. I argue that an additional level, that of fully concretized norms, belongs in the hierarchy. This sheds light on precisely where and how the transition from “ought” to “is” takes place. Whereas the fully concretized norm marks the bottom level in the hierarchy of norms, the coercive act or sanction qua fact is not found in (...) the hierarchy, contrary to what Adolf Julius Merkl and Hans Kelsen would have us believe. (shrink)

This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty (...) as socially differentiated and divided between specific subsystems. The EU's differentiated constitutional domain and the paradox of divided sovereignty are used as examples of profound structural and semantic changes in contemporary national and transnational societies. While the sovereign nation-state institutions have become marginalized in political structures of European societies, the self-constitutionalization of the functionally differentiated EU legal system proceeds by internalizing the concept of divided sovereignty and using it semantically as its mode of self-reference. (shrink)

The French and Dutch referenda on the adoption of a European Constitutional Treaty highlight a remarkable ambiguity in the self‐constitution of a polity, which can be viewed as both constitution by and of a collective self. This ambiguity is a fundamental feature of polities in general, and the European Union in particular. Rather than suppressing this ambiguity, democracy—and a fortiori a European democracy worth its name—institutionalises it as the guiding principle of political action. As will transpire, the conceptual and normative (...) problems raised by political self‐constitution are linked to self‐attribution, i.e., the conditions under which a collective ascribes legislation to itself. (shrink)

Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any (...) question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading. (shrink)

Book reviewed:Adolf Julius Merkl, Gesammelte Schriften.