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  1. On reviewing machine dreams : Zoomed-in versus zoomed-out.Lawrence A. Boland - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4):480-495.
    continues to receive many reviews. Judging by recent reviews, this is a very controversial book. The question considered here is, how can one fairly review a controversial book—particularly when the book is widely popular and, for a history of economic thought book, a best seller? This essay uses Mirowski’s book as a case study to propose one answer for this question. In the process, it will examine how others seem to have answered this question. Key Words: methodology • reviews • (...)
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  • The PPE enterprise: Common Hobbesian roots and perspectives.Hartmut Kliemt - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (4):398-410.
    Conceptualizing behavior decision theoretically as being ‘pulled’ (by an expected future) is fundamentally different from conceptualizing it as ‘pushed’ (or determined by past conditions according to causal laws). However, the fundamental distinction between teleological and non-teleological explanations not withstanding, decision-theoretic and evolutionary ‘ways of world making’ lead to strikingly similar forms of political, philosophical, and economic models. Common Hobbesian roots can account historically for the emergence of such a common ‘PPE’ outlook, while a game-theoretic framework of indirect evolution can accommodate (...)
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  • Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality.Richard Reiner - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):373-89.
    Many different arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality have appeared in the literature, and these target several different conceptions of perfect rationality. It is not clear how these different conceptions of perfect rationality are related, nor is it clear how the arguments showing their impossibility are related, and it is especially unclear what the impossibility results show when taken together. This paper gives an exposition of the different conceptions of perfect rationality, an the various sorts of argument against them; (...)
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  • Randomness, game theory and free will.J. Moreh - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):49 - 64.
    Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make (...)
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  • Common reasoning in games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
    We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalize common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann, arguing that the former avoids (...)
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  • Robust program equilibrium.Caspar Oesterheld - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (1):143-159.
    One approach to achieving cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is Tennenholtz’s (Games Econ Behav 49(2):363–373, 2004) program equilibrium, in which the players of a game submit programs instead of strategies. These programs are then allowed to read each other’s source code to decide which action to take. As shown by Tennenholtz, cooperation is played in an equilibrium of this alternative game. In particular, he proposes that the two players submit the same version of the following program: cooperate if the (...)
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  • Optimization-Based Explanations.Graciela Kuechle & Diego Rios - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):481-496.
    This article argues that evolutionary models based on selection validate, under appropriate conditions, the relevance of optimality as an explanatory mechanism in rational choice theory. The reason is that these frameworks share the mechanism that drives the results, namely, optimization, even if they situate it at different levels. The consequences of our argument are twofold. First, it resolves the tension between those predictions of rational choice theory that are accurate and the evidence showing that individuals seldom optimize. Second, it relativizes (...)
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  • The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information.Giacomo Bonanno - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):37-65.
    For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.
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  • Rational choice and trust.Keith Dowding - 2001 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):207-220.
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  • The epistemic structure of a theory of a game.Michael Bacharach - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):7-48.
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  • Modeling Bounded Rationality.Ariel Rubinstein - 1998 - MIT Press.
    p. cm. — (Zeuthen lecture book series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-262-18187-8 (hardcover : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-262-68100-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Decision-making. 2. Economic man. 3. Game theory. 4. Rational expectations (Economic theory) I. Title. II. Series.
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