The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices in scientific inquiry and their (...) beneficial effects in the context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations. (shrink)

At the turn of twentieth century, in France, psychical research wasn’t fully separated from psychology. The Institut général psychologique (IGP) was created in 1900 as an attempt to integrate the scientific study of anomalous phenomena in modern science. One forgotten actor of this society was “psychologist” Louis Favre, a polymath researcher with a passion for scientific methodology and the “scientific mind.” He developed a pioneer experiment on the influence of magnetic passes on plants and microbes, with a control group. He (...) also participated to IGP’s 3-years study of physical medium Eusapia Palladino, from which he suggested several general ideas on the study of anomalous phenomena. Later in his life, he offered to classify this study at the forefront of scientific dynamics, under the name of “Anomalialogy of the phenomena.” According to him, this field is highly compatible with scientific method, and may even be the best place to train our “scientific mind.”. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the structure of epistemic vice-charging, the critical practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice. Several desiderata for a robust vice-charge are offered and two deep obstacles to the practice of epistemic vice-charging are then identified and discussed. The problem of responsibility is that few of us enjoy conditions that are required for effective socialisation as responsible epistemic agents. The problem of consensus is that the efficacy of a vice-charge is contingent upon a degree (...) of consensus between critic and target that is unlikely or impossible where vice-charging is most likely to be provoked. It emerges that a robust critical practice of vice-charging is possible in principle, but very difficult in practice. (shrink)

It's probably no secret to readers of this Journal that working in areas of frontier science can very easily test one's character and bring out the best and worst of human behavior. I mention this now because a few months ago the journal Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences published a significant new issue (Volume 48, Part A). It contains a lengthy special section on psychical research, guest-edited by Andreas Sommer. I'll probably comment again about (...) this journal issue in later Editorials, but this time I want to focus on the first paper to catch my attention. Not surprisingly, I suppose, it was written by a philosopher, Ian James Kidd from Durham University, and it boasted the intriguing title, "Was Sir William Crookes epistemically virtuous?" (Kidd 2014). (shrink)