- Type‐Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility.Itay Shani & Sungho Choi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):485-502.details
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The myth of reductive extensionalism.Itay Shani - 2007 - Axiomathes 17 (2):155-183.details
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Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1037-1059.details
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Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):507 - 524.details
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Lessons from Causal Exclusion1.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):594-604.details
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Can psychology be a unified science?Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):953-963.details
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Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1111-1131.details
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Against proportionality.Lawrence A. Shapiro & Elliott Sober - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):89-93.details
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Keep making sense.Gabriel Segal - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):275-287.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Social construction as grounding; or: fundamentality for feminists, a reply to Barnes and Mikkola.Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2449-2465.details
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Physicalism and strict implication.Jürgen Schröder - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):537-545.details
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Physicalism and Strict Implication.Jürgen Schröder - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):537 - 545.details
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Of ghostly and mechanical events. [REVIEW]Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):230–244.details
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Overdetermining causes.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):23 - 45.details
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Non‐Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity.Susan Schneider - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):719-728.details
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Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.details
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Mental causation and the supervenience argument.Jürgen Schröder - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):221 - 237.details
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Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.details
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Interlevel Relations and Manipulative Causality.Gero Schwenk - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):99-110.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 10 (1):113-136.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Computational vs. causal complexity.Matthias Scheutz - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):543-566.details
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Computational versus Causal Complexity.Matthias Scheutz - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):543-566.details
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Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.details
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Can determinable properties earn their keep?Robert Schroer - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):229-247.details
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Review: Andreas Hüttemann: what's wrong with microphysicalism? [REVIEW]Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):253-257.details
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Analytic Functionalism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 504–518.details
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Sixteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again).Olivier Sartenaer - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):79-103.details
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Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.details
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How to be responsible for something without causing it.Carolina Sartorio - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.details
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Ontological Emergence: How is That Possible? Towards a New Relational Ontology.Gil C. Santos - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (4):429-446.details
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Integrated-structure emergence and its mechanistic explanation.Gil Santos - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8687-8711.details
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Emergent Truth and a Blind Spot, An Argument against Physicalism.Sami Pihlström - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):79-101.details
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Conservative Reduction of Biology.Christian Sachse - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):33-65.details
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Being without doing.Marcelo H. Sabatés - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):111-125.details
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Two solutions to the neural discernment problem.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2837-2850.details
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Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?Bradford Saad - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):263-279.details
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Interactionism, haecceities, and the pairing argument.Bradford Saad - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):724-741.details
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Kim’s dilemma: why mental causation is not productive.Andrew Russo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2185-2203.details
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Why metaphysical abstinence should prevail in the debate on reductionism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.details
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The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):579 - 612.details
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Physical emergence, diachronic and synchronic.Alexander Rueger - 2000 - Synthese 124 (3):297-322.details
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Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences.Alexander Rueger - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):335 - 346.details
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Hierarchies and levels of reality.Alexander Rueger & Patrick Mcgivern - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):379-397.details
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Two tales of functional explanation.Martin Roth & Robert Cummins - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):773-788.details
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William C. Wimsatt: Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality: Harvard University Press, 2007, 472 pp.Alex Rosenberg - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (2):261-268.details
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Notions of Cause: Russell’s Thesis Revisited.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):45-76.details
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Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.details
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