According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...) completers as uses of circumstances of utterance by the speaker; and I show how these uses together with the utterance of indexical sentences express thoughts. The starting point of the paper is a criticism of Kripke’s and Künne’s alternative treatment of indexicals in Frege’s framework. (shrink)

Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...) Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties. (shrink)

In his paper on ‘Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference’ Saul Kripke remarks: “Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . .”. On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I (...) shall insist on the need for distinguishing Fregean sense from linguistic (lexico-grammatical) meaning, I shall resist Kripke's function-theoretic account of ‘hybrid’ thought-expressions, and I shall deplore his transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressell. As regards this transformation, I shall argue that some of the main points Kripke wants to drive home do not depend on it. (shrink)

In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate of the position Davis named after him because (...) Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of mental events. (shrink)

The goal of this article is a general inspection of indexicals as a specific phenomenon of natural language on the one side, and a consideration of "semantization" of indexicals on the other side. The term "semantization" represents a criterion on the basis of which various approaches to relevant solutions are valuated: if, according to Frege´s view, all language expressions should express their senses, what kind of senses could be expressed in the case of indexicals? First, indexicals are explicated as a (...) specific sort of language expressions. Second, how some contemporary philosophers deal with indexical puzzles is briefly propounded. It takes for granted that a comparison of various philosophers´ approaches makes their pro et contra clear. By that way the article can acquire a parameter of basic synopsis. In certain passages of the text, summaries of the issues dealt with are included. The article is divided into three parts, dividing idexicals into temporal, individual and spatial, and demonstratives. In the first part of this article temporal indexicals, , as well as grammatical tensed sentences are put to test. Different approaches of Tichý, Quine, Russell, Reichenbach, and Wittgenstein are interpreted and evaluated from the "semantization" point of view. In the case of temporal indexicals, knowledge of possible referents plays an important part, and ontology of time is approximated in connection with McTaggart´s argument. Pavel Materna´s analysis of "now" is a special subject of brief comment. (shrink)