We discuss dividing lines (in model theory) and some test questions, mainly the universality spectrum. So there is much on conjectures, problems and old results, mainly of the author and also on some recent results.

We investigate club guessing sequences and filters. We prove that assuming V=L, there exists a strong club guessing sequence on μ if and only if μ is not ineffable for every uncountable regular cardinal μ. We also prove that for every uncountable regular cardinal μ, relative to the existence of a Woodin cardinal above μ, it is consistent that every tail club guessing ideal on μ is precipitous.

We outline the proof of the consistency that there exists a saturated tail club guessing ideal on ω₁ which is not a restriction of the nonstationary ideal. A new class of forcing notions and the forcing axiom for the class are introduced for this purpose.

We explore Shelah's model‐theoretic dividing line methodology. In particular, we discuss how problems in model theory motivated new techniques in model theory, for example classifying theories by their potential (consistently with Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC)) spectrum of cardinals in which there is a universal model. Two other examples are the study (with Malliaris) of the Keisler order leading to a new ZFC result on cardinal invariants and attempts to clarify the “main gap” by reducing the (...) dependence of certain versions on (highly independent) cardinal arithmetic. (shrink)

We introduce the oak property of first order theories, which is a syntactical condition that we show to be sufficient for a theory not to have universal models in cardinality λ when certain cardinal arithmetic assumptions about λ implying the failure of GCH hold. We give two examples of theories that have the oak property and show that none of these examples satisfy SOP4, not even SOP3. This is related to the question of the connection of the property SOP4 to (...) non-universality, as was raised by the earlier work of Shelah. One of our examples is the theory for which non-universality results similar to the ones we obtain are already known; hence we may view our results as an abstraction of the known results from a concrete theory to a class of theories. We show that no theory with the oak property is simple. (shrink)

We survey the use of club guessing and other PCF constructs in the context of showing that a given partially ordered class of objects does not have a largest, or a universal, element.

This paper investigates a connection between the semantic notion provided by the ordering * among theories in model theory and the syntactic SOPn hierarchy of Shelah. It introduces two properties which are natural extensions of this hierarchy, called SOP2 and SOP1. It is shown here that SOP3 implies SOP2 implies SOP1. In Shelah's article 229) it was shown that SOP3 implies *-maximality and we prove here that *-maximality in a model of GCH implies a property called SOP2″. It has been (...) subsequently shown by Shelah and Usvyatsov that SOP2″ and SOP2 are equivalent, so obtaining an implication between *-maximality and SOP2. It is not known if SOP2 and SOP3 are equivalent. Together with the known results about the connection between the SOPn hierarchy and the existence of universal models in the absence of GCH, the paper provides a step toward the classification of unstable theories without the strict order property. (shrink)