The article analyzes the main aspects of the interpretation of philosophical thinking by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowskі. He is more known as a brilliant disputant on the history of Marxism and the prospects for the further development of Marxist theory, but his thoughts on the nature and functions of philosophical thinking in the broadest sense are of no less importance, since they address the painful issue of the autonomy of thinking. The purpose of the article is to reconstruct the (...) principles that, according to the philosopher, would allow thinking to maintain its autonomy under the pressure of ideas and ideologies. Utopia and nihilism in the interpretation of L. Kolakowskі appear as temptations of the modern world. It is in the quest for defending from these “monsters” that the philosopher comes to the conclusion that the basis of utopia and nihilism are certain ideas about the truth. Through the prism of this theoretical discovery, he reveals the importance of consensus, tolerance, compromise, and non-consistency as epistemological tools of support or undermining of ideologies. The basic epistemological model the philosopher used has been reproduced by means of theoretical reconstruction. This is the attitude of the subject to the truth, which is realized in two ways: to either master the truth on the basis of certain beliefs or neglect the truth on the basis of other beliefs. With the help of this model, the philosopher comes to understanding that dogmatism and unification are not only utopian diseases but also nihilists. The reason for this is loyalty to one’s own truth, that is, thinking without gaps based on unchanging principles and aimed at reproducing certain institutional and social constants. Instead, inconsistency as a principle forms a completely different setting, the advantage of which is that it extends to itself and frees a thinker from the need to be or not to be consistent, but does not relieve the search of truth and meaning, without which human existence is impossible, according to L. Kolakowskі. The reconstruction was carried out on the basis of analysis of articles and essays of various years, combined with the development of concepts of utopia and nihilism as alternative projects of human existence, rooted in the epistemological directions of the subject. (shrink)

In the first two sections of this reply article, I provide a brief introduction to the topic of ineffability and a summary of Ineffability and Religious Experience. This is followed, in section 3, by some reflections in reply to the response articles by Professors Metz and Cooper. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks on the future of philosophy of religion in the light of the most recent philosophical work on ineffability.

Though largely neglected by philosophers, the concept of ineffability is integral to the Christian mystical tradition, and has been part of almost every philosophical discussion of religious experience since the early twentieth century. After a brief introduction, this article surveys the most important discussions of divine ineffability, observing that the literature presents two mutually reinforcing obstacles to a coherent account of the concept, creating the impression that philosophical reflection on the subject had reached an impasse. The article goes on to (...) survey some more recent work, which draws on the conceptual resources of existential phenomenology, pragmatism, and the later Wittgenstein. It shows that this work has made possible a new philosophical account of divine ineffability that surmounts the obstacles, overcomes the impasse and makes divine ineffability, once again, a live option in philosophy of religion. The article concludes with some brief remarks on how this alternative approach reflects recent trends in the discipline as a whole and has the potential to make a valuable contribution to live research questions in epistemology of religion. (shrink)

The present article develops a new approach to intellectual history and sociology of knowledge. Its point of departure is to investigate the conditions under which social thinkers assume the iconic reputation. What does it take to become ‘a founding father’ of a humanistic discipline? How do social thinkers achieve the status of a trans-disciplinary star? Why some intellectuals attract tremendous attention and ‘go down in history’ despite personal and professional failures, while others enjoy only limited recognition or simply sink into (...) oblivion, even if they have met all the standards of their day? Quite a few sociologists have tackled this elusive issue. Pierre Bourdieu, Michele Lamont and Randall Collins are among those who fleshed out strong explanatory frameworks. This project adds to this body of knowledge by emphasizing cultural factors that these authors downplayed in their seminal accounts, despite being aware of their significance. By showing why these underdeveloped aspects of their works need to be incorporated into the debate and how this can be achieved, this article introduces a new theorization of the iconic, lasting intellectual reputation substantiated by evidence from the lifeworks of Bronisław Malinowski and Michel Foucault. As such, it aims, minimally, to make sociology of knowledge decisively ‘cultural’. Maximally, it seeks to demonstrate that the iconic success of intellectual intervention in social theory depends on carefully performed and contingently mediated engagement with the binary systems of symbolic classification. (shrink)

Theories of intergenerational justice are a very common and popular way to conceptualise the obligations currently living people may have to future generations. After briefly pointing out that these theories presuppose certain views about the existence, number and identity of future people, I argue that the presuppositions must themselves be ethically investigated, and that theories of intergenerational justice lack the theoretical resources to be able to do this. On that basis, I claim it is necessary to do the ‘ethics of (...) metaphysics’ in order to fully comprehend what, if anything, we may owe future generations. I defend these claims against some important objections. (shrink)

J. M. Coetzee's trilogy of novels with Jesus in their titles, published between 2013 and 2019, has bewildered many reviewers. This essay review proposes that that bewilderment stems from a misconception of the novels’ allegorical dimension and of the possible meanings evoked by their titles. The trilogy is the consummation of Coetzee's meditations on analogy and linguistic skepticism; on the ontological status of fictions; on the eschatological impulsion of writing; and on memory's capacity for true recognitions that have no empirical (...) basis. The trilogy presents us with a world that affirms a purely immanent life. Coetzee tests this world dialogically by subjecting its self-identical “here” to the nonidentical repetitions of analogical thought, through which an “elsewhere” impinges on the “here.” The trilogy's deepest questions turn on the metaphysical scope of this “elsewhere”: that is, on whether the vertiginous depths of analogy participate in an underlying substrate of meaning, recognizable as “the Word of God.”. (shrink)

Proceeding from a philosophical interpretation of negative theology as performatively undermining our seeming understanding of the absolute and thereby evoking a transformative experience, this paper emphasises the philosophical significance of negative theology by linking it to Karl Jaspers’ notion of the universal limit situation of existence. Against this background, an analysis of mystical and psychotic experiences shows how certain similarities between the two can be understood as constituting a particular mental state in which the universal limit situation is experienced personally. (...) Moreover, experiencing the limit situation, be it through this mental state or through certain moods or feelings, can be transformative and may lead to an attitude of groundless trust that acknowledges the incomprehensibility of the human condition. The paper argues that this reading of negative theology provides a better understanding of the parallels between mysticism and psychosis and may be fruitfully applied in therapy. (shrink)

Hegel and Heidegger are leading figures of modern philosophy, but their interpretation of being, metaphysics, truth, ontology, epistemology, dialectic, alienation and art, among other central questions of philosophy, are radically different. Taking these aspects into account, my paper tries to dismiss Heidegger’s critiques towards Hegel arguing that, from the point of view of 20th century phenomenology, and although using a dissimilar philosophical vocabulary, Hegel was rather a phenomenologist than a metaphysician. Not only that: in many respects, Heidegger’s Dasein toys with (...) metaphysic to an extent that Hegel’s spirit never did. (shrink)

In the article the author describes theoretical reasons that stood behind Kołakowski's transition from being an orthodox Marxist to become an actual leader of the polish revisionist movement. His intention is to concentrate on those aspects of Kołakowski's thought that have not changed, apart from any biographical and psychological reasons. (1) First of those features is Kołakowski's inability of completability, the anti-code disposition. (2) The second trait is the moral attitude, an intention to influence on people's morality by convincing them (...) that social and internal (necessarily bound with social) changes are desirable; that an existential calm demolishes morality. (3) Third feature concerns the fact that Kołakowski did not attempt to create his own philosophy, he was rather a historian of ideas, a skeptic, and a critic. (shrink)

The original publication is available at JAIST Press http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/jaist-press/index.html.