Switch to: References

Citations of:

Naming and Necessity

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666 (1972)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A Tale of Two Envelopes.Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):903-926.
    This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On the logic of demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):81 - 98.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  • Possibly turning out and metaphysical possibility.Janine Jones - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):261-276.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Grünbaum on the metric of space and time.Paul Horwich - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):199-211.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Critical studies/book review. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (2):231-237.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intuition, revelation, and relativism.Steven D. Hales - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):271 – 295.
    This paper defends the view that philosophical propositions are merely relatively true, i.e. true relative to a doxastic perspective defined at least in part by a non-inferential belief-acquiring method. Here is the strategy: first, the primary way that contemporary philosophers defend their views is through the use of rational intuition, and this method delivers non-inferential, basic beliefs which are then systematized and brought into reflective equilibrium. Second, Christian theologians use exactly the same methodology, only replacing intuition with revelation. Third, intuition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Criteria, meaning and justification.Alan H. Goldman - 1981 - Philosophia 9 (3-4):281-297.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The inessential quasi-indexical.Peter Alward - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
    We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Mission impossible and Wittgenstein's standard metre.Yuval Dolev - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):127–137.
    In this paper, I argue that context sensitivity is crucial for a proper exegesis of Wittgenstein's remark that one can say of the standard metre rod neither that it is one metre long nor that it is not one metre long. I discuss cases in which we can meaningfully assert that the rod in question is one metre long and explain why these cases do not conflict with Wittgenstein's insight. I analyse Pollock's recent defence of Wittgenstein's remark, as well as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Historical truth.Guliano Toraldo di Francia - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):407-416.
    The author, dismissing the feasibility of attaining the real facts of history, proposes to define historical truth as the set of all possible worlds that agree with all the sources available to the historian. He remarks that this conception is very close to that necessairly assumed today by cosmologists, when describing the evolution of the phisical universe.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A teleological account of cartesian sensations?Raffaella De Rosa - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):311-336.
    Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.
    This paper raises concern with the use of theories of reference in philosophical discourse and then to consider the possibility of empirically validating this concern by reference to a novel sort of “quantitative” empirical approach suggested recently by Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). The concern is whether the particular theories of reference or reference relations employed in particular philosophical discussions are actually chosen with a view to entailing or accommodating a desired philosophical outcome. I argue that such dependent selections of assumptions about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die phänomenologische bedeutungslehre.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2002 - Husserl Studies 18 (3):185-208.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Geist und welt ist bewußtsein reduktiv erklärbar?Ansgar Beckermann - manuscript
    Was ist das überhaupt – Bewußtsein? Beim Gebrauch des Substantivs „Bewußt- sein“ sollte man eine gewisse Vorsicht walten lassen. Die deutsche Sprache kennt dieses Substantiv nur innerhalb weniger Redewendungen – „Dann verlor er das Bewußtsein“, „Nach vielen Stunden kam er wieder zu Bewußtsein“, „Im Bewußtsein seiner schweren Verantwortung“ usw. Außerhalb dieser Redewen- dungen kommt das Wort dagegen praktisch nicht vor; und deshalb sollte man skeptisch werden, wenn Philosophen Sätze formulieren wie „Menschen haben ein Bewußtsein“. „Bei Bewußtsein sein“ ist gebräuchliches Deutsch, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond rigidity: The unfinished semantic agenda of naming and necessity. [REVIEW]David Braun - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
    This excellent book is aptly titled, for in it Scott Soames systematically discusses and greatly extends the semantic views that Saul Kripke presented in Naming and Necessity . As Soames does this, he touches on a wide variety of semantic topics, all of which he treats with his characteristically high degree of clarity, depth, and precision. Anyone who is interested in the semantic issues raised by..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Supervenience and moral realism.Luc Bovens & Dalia Drai - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):241-245.
    Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Laws and essences.Alexander Bird - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):437–461.
    Those who favour an ontology based on dispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature. In part 1 of this paper I sketch the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account of laws. In part 2, I characterise various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading ‘quidditism’ and which are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional essentialist view. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Critical notice.John Bigelow - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):190 – 202.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The old problem of induction and the new reflective equilibrium.Jared Bates - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • 'Already' and 'still': Beyond duality. [REVIEW]Johan Auwera - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):613 - 653.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Kinds of behaviour.Robert Aunger & Valerie Curtis - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (3):317-345.
    Sciences able to identify appropriate analytical units for their domain, their natural kinds, have tended to be more progressive. In the biological sciences, evolutionary natural kinds are adaptations that can be identified by their common history of selection for some function. Human brains are the product of an evolutionary history of selection for component systems which produced behaviours that gave adaptive advantage to their hosts. These structures, behaviour production systems, are the natural kinds that psychology seeks. We argue these can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Strongde re belief.Torin Alter - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):223-232.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts.Torin Alter - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):235 - 253.
    Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
    One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Is conceptual atomism a plausible theory of concepts?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
    Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A centralreason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view toachieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On the objects of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 1996 - In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.
    When I talk about the objects of belief I do not mean, e.g., the sun to which my thought that the sun will rise tomorrow refers; I do not mean the objects we think about. I take objects rather in a general philosophical sense; they simply are the bearers of properties and the relata of relations. I am thus concerned with the objects that are related by the belief relation „_a_ believes that _p_“. In this scheme „ _a _“ represents (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Gaussian revolution in logic?J. Almog - 1982 - Erkenntnis 17 (1):47 - 84.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental states as mental.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):223-245.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap.Nick Zangwill - 1996 - Synthese 106 (1):67-101.
    I defend the view that strong psychophysical superveniences is necessary and sufficient to explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. I employ factual and counterfactual conditionals as defeasible criteria of causal efficacy. And I also deal with certain problems arising from disjunctive and conjunctive properties.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Searle on the Brink.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents.Ronald C. Hoy - 1980 - Synthese 44 (2):207-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The cogito and the metaphysics of mind.Nick Treanor - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71.
    That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The indeterminacy of color vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color and similarity.Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.
    Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Ontology and perception.Jeffrey S. Galko - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-18.
    The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface.David Macarthur - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):167-181.
    In his Dewey Lectures,1 Hilary Putnam argues that contemporary philosophy cannot solve nor see its way past the traditional problem of how language or thought hooks on to.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The duality of content.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation.Melinda Hogan - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):307-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Russellianism and psychological generalizations.David Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Fodor's epistemic intuitions of analyticity.Wayne Wright - 2002 - Sorites 14 (October):110-116.
    Semantic holism has it that the semantic properties of an individual expression are determined by that expression.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naturalism and intentionality.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Semantics, psychological attitudes, and conceptual roles.James E. Tomberlin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):205-226.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Swampman meets swampcow.Karen Neander - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):118-29.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • A-intensions and communication.Frederick Kroon - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):279-298.
    In his 'Why We Need A-Intensions', Frank Jackson argues that "representational content [is] how things are represented to be by a sentence in the communicative role it possesses in virtue of what it means," a type of content Jackson takes to be broadly descriptive. I think Jackson overstates his case. Even if we agree that such representational properties play a crucial reference-fixing role, it is much harder to argue the case for a crucial communicative role. I articulate my doubts about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms.Christian Nimtz - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):125-48.
    Kripke and Putnam have convinced most philosophers that we cannot do metaphysics of nature by analysing the senses of natural kind terms -- simply because natural kind terms do not have senses. Neo-descriptivists, especially Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, believe that this view is mistaken. Merging classical descriptivism with a Kaplan-inspired two-dimensional framework, neo-descriptivists devise a semantics for natural kind terms that assigns natural kind terms so-called 'primary intensions'. Since primary intensions are senses by other names, Jackson and Chalmers conclude (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The nature of narrow content.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Putnam, Searle, and externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
    To sum up, then, both kinds of Putnam's arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searle's discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searle's own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Thoughts and their ascription.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Inverting intentional content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If the argument is sound, not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation