According to the demand of the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method, a theory is confirmed when the prediction-observation (p-o) gap is small and disconfirmed when the gap is large. A major goal of this paper is to introduce a research domain for which this demand does not hold. In contrast to the H-D method's demand, this research, called the Catch model for reconstructing a face previously seen from memory, requires an increase, within limits, in the p-o gap. The Catch model research substantiates (...) theoretically and empirically a new proposed method that I call the "Deductive-Reconstruction" (D-R) method. This method provides essential conditions whose fulfillment guarantees successful reconstruction of past events (a face previously seen) from memory. It is argued that the D-R method fits the area of research of reconstructing past events from memory better than the H-D method. Application of the H-D method to the Catch model's research domain leads to an internal contradiction and failure to reconstruct past events (a face previously seen) from memory. Finally, the nature of the D-R method along with the Catch model is discussed from three points of view: confirmation, explanation, and generality. (shrink)

There have been monumental advances in the study of the social dimensions of knowledge in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But it has been common within a wide variety of fields--including social philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of science--to approach the social dimensions of knowledge as simply another resource to be utilized or controlled. I call this view, in which other people's epistemic significance are only of instrumental value, manipulationism. I identify manipulationism, trace its manifestations in (...) the aforementioned fields, and explain how to move beyond it. The principal strategy that I employ for moving beyond manipulationism consists of synthesizing enactivism and neo-Kuhnian social epistemology. Specifically, I expand the enactivist concept of participatory sense-making by linking it to recent conceptual innovations in social epistemology, such as the concept of immanent cogent argumentation. (shrink)

Many cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of science consider it uncontroversial that the brain processes information. In this work we broadly consider the types of experimental evidence that would support this claim, and find that although physical features of specific brain areas selectively covary with external stimuli or abilities, there is no direct evidence supporting an information processing function of any particular brain area.

This article explores predominant uses of theory in social science research in relation to the approach of phenomenological philosophy. While phenomenology is sometimes interpreted as one theoretical or methodological paradigm amongst others in the field of qualitative research, this article explores key thinkers within the philosophical tradition of phenomenology to argue that this tradition can raise challenges for predominant conceptions of research and theorizing in the social sciences and certain philosophical idea(l)s that can be connected to them. The distinctive nature (...) of phenomenological description is outlined, and new possibilities for qualitative research are sketched. Also considered is the question of whether qualitative research should seek to enshrine the intellectual virtues of the arts, and resist the inclination towards the scientific -- and scientistic -- drive to theorize. (shrink)

This article questions the concept of tacit knowledge as the basis for our conceptual understanding of practice. The first part of the article is a critical introduction to the concept of tacit knowledge. It is emphasized that this concept is situated in various academic practices and not defined and homogeneously but in accordance with issues and intentions significant for these practices. The second part of the article outlines some consequences of conceptualizing practice as basically a matter of tacit knowledge. It (...) is argued that tacit knowledge should be seen in relation to the growth of professions in modern society and to the need to legitimate them. It is further claimed that as a legitimating concept tacit knowledge may bring about various problems leading to a marginalization of specific experiences, to social uniformity, to the reappearance of individualism and to the maintenance of a dualistic view of knowledge. (shrink)

Perhaps there has been no greater opportunity than in this “VOLUME FIFTEEN of our Death And Anti-Death set of anthologies” to write about how might think about life and how to avoid death. There are two reasons to discuss “life”, the first being enhancing our understanding of who we are and why we may be here in the Universe. The second is more practical: how humans meet the physical challenges brought about by the way they have interacted with their environment. (...) Many persons discussing “life” beg the question about what “life” is. Surely, when one discusses how to overcome its opposite, death, they are not referring to another “living” thing such as a plant. There seems to be a commonality, though, and it is this commonality is one needing elaboration. It ostensibly seems to be the boundary condition separating what is completely passive (inert) from what attempts to maintain its integrity, as well as fulfilling other conditions we think “life” has. In our present discussion, there will be a reminder that it by no means has been unequivocally established what life really is by placing quotes around the word, namely, “life”. Consider it a tag representing a bundle of philosophical ideas that will be unpacked in this paper. (shrink)

Because few would object to evidence-based medicine’s (EBM) principal task of basing medical decisionmaking on the most judicious and up-to-date evidence, the debate over this prolific movement may seem puzzling. Who, one may ask, could be against evidence (Carr-Hill, 2006)? Yet this question belies the sophistication of the evidence-based movement. This chapter presents the evidence-based approach as a socio-medical phenomenon and seeks to explain and negotiate the points of disagreement between supporters and detractors. This is done by casting EBM as (...) more than the simple application of research findings to clinical care and improved health outcomes, but rather an umbrella term that harnesses a specific set of pedagogical objectives (some rather radical) under a name that makes it difficult to argue against. (shrink)

The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.

How can the development of ideas in a scientific field be studied over time? We apply unsupervised topic modeling to the ACL Anthology to analyze historical trends in the field of Computational Linguistics from 1978 to 2006. We induce topic clusters using Latent Dirichlet Allocation, and examine the strength of each topic over time. Our methods find trends in the field including the rise of probabilistic methods starting in 1988, a steady increase in applications, and a sharp decline of research (...) in semantics and understanding between 1978 and 2001, possibly rising again after 2001. We also introduce a model of the diversity of ideas, topic entropy, using it to show that COLING is a more diverse conference than ACL, but that both conferences as well as EMNLP are becoming broader over time. Finally, we apply Jensen-Shannon divergence of topic distributions to show that all three conferences are converging in the topics they cover. (shrink)

Part I Introduction The specific problem adressed in this thesis is: what is the rational use of theory and experiment in the process of scientific discovery, in theory and in the practice of drug research for Parkinson’s disease? The thesis aims to answer the following specific questions: what is: 1) the structure of a theory?; 2) the process of scientific reasoning?; 3) the route between theory and experiment? In the first part I further discuss issues about rationality in science as (...) introduction to part II, and I present an overview of my case-study of neuropharmacology, for which I interviewed researchers from the Groningen Pharmacy Department, as an introduction to part III. Part II Discovery In this part I discuss three theoretical models of scientific discovery according to studies in the fields of Logic, Cognition, and Computation. In those fields the structure of a theory is respectively explicated as: a set of sentences; a set of associated memory chunks; and as a computer program that can generate the observed data. Rationality in discovery is characterized by: finding axioms that imply observation sentences; heuristic search for a hypothesis, as part of problem solving, by applying memory chunks and production rules that represent skill; and finding the shortest program that generates the data, respectively. I further argue that reasoning in discovery includes logical fallacies, which are neccesary to introduce new hypotheses. I also argue that, while human subjects often make errors in hypothesis evaluation tasks from a logical perspective, these evaluations are rational given a probabilistic interpretation. Part III Neuropharmacology In this last part I discusses my case-study and a model of discovery in a practice of drug research for Parkinson’s disease. I discuss the dopamine theory of Parkinson’s disease and model its structure as a qualitative differential equation. Then I discuss the use and reasons for particular experiments to both test a drug and explore the function of the brain. I describe different kinds of problems in drug research leading to a discovery. Based on that description I distinguish three kinds of reasoning tasks in discovery, inference to: the best explanation, the best prediction and the best intervention. I further demonstrate how a part of reasoning in neuropharmacology can be computationally modeled as qualitative reasoning, and aided by a computer supported discovery system. (shrink)

Traditional attempts to delineate the distinctive rationality of modern science have taken it for granted that the purpose of empirical research is to test judgments. The choice of concepts to use in those judgments is therefore seen either a matter of indifference (Popper) or as important choice which must be made, so to speak, in advance of all empirical research (Carnap). I argue that scientific method aims precisely at empirical testing of concepts, and that even the simplest scientific ex- periment (...) or observation results in conceptual change. (shrink)

Concept maps are found to be useful in eliciting knowledge, meaningful learning, evaluation of understanding and in studying the nature of changes taking place during cognitive development, particularly in the classroom. Several experts have claimed the effectiveness of this tool for learning science. We agree with the claim, but the effectiveness will improve only if we gradually introduce a certain amount of discipline in constructing the maps. The discipline is warranted, we argue, because science thrives to be an unambiguous and (...) rigorously structured body of knowledge. Since learning science may be seen as a process where a novice is expected to be transformed into an expert, we use the context of learning science for making the proposal. Further, we identify certain anomalies in the evaluation of concept maps, and suggest that the evaluation should be based on semantics of the linking words (relation types) and not on graphical criteria alone. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of the traditional computational metaphor in our thinking as computer scientists, its influence on epistemological styles, and its implications for our understanding of cognition. It proposes to replace the conventional metaphor--a sequence of steps--with the notion of a community of interacting entities, and examines the ramifications of such a shift on these various ways in which we think.

Having agreed to review Tucson 2004, I am embarrassed to admit that I fell asleep eight times during the conference. This cannot have been entirely due to jet lag as I only fell asleep once in 1998, twice in 2000, and four times in 2002. It seems to be a geometric progression correlating with elapsed time. As this was the tenth anniversary conference several speakers indulged in nostalgic reminiscences, but I thought that readers of JCS might prefer a less rose-tinted (...) account which, among other things, might elucidate the dynamics of falling asleep at conferences. (shrink)

The reemergence of connectionism² has profoundly altered the philosophy of mind. Paul Churchland has argued that it should equally transform the philosophy of science. He proposes that connectionism offers radical and useful new ways of understanding theories and explanations.

Humans are animals; humans are machines. The current academic and popular dialogue on extending the personhood boundary to certain non-human animal species and at the same time to machines/robots reflects a dialectic about how “being human” is defined; about how we perceive our species and ourselves in relation to the environment. While both paths have the potential to improve lives; these improvements differ in substance and in consequence. One route has the potential to broaden the anthropocentric focus within the West (...) and honor interdependence with life systems; while the other affords greater currency to a human-purpose-driven worldview–furthering an unchecked Anthropocene. The broadening of legal personhood rights to life systems is underway with a ruling for dolphins in India; for a river in New Zealand and with Laws of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia. Many philosophers; ethicists; and ethologists define personhood within the confines of the dominant anthropocentric paradigm; yet alternate eco-centric paradigms offer an inclusive model that may help dismantle the artificial wall between humans and nature. In this paper; I explore these eco-centric paradigms and the implications of an associated worldview for human perceptions; self-awareness; communication; narrative; and research. (shrink)

Purpose: One of my goals in the paper is to investigate why realists reject radical constructivism (RC) as well as social constructivism (SC) out of hand. I shall do this by means of commenting on Peter Slezak’s critical paper, Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite. My other goal is to explore why realists condemn the use of RC and SC in science and mathematics education for no stated reason, again by means of commenting on Slezak’s paper. Method: I restrict my (...) comments to Slezak’s paper and leave it to the reader to judge which, if any, of the reasons that I advance for these two states of affairs are not specific to Slezak’s paper. Other readers might not agree with my interpretations of Slezak’s paper, including Slezak himself, but I offer them after having worked with von Glasersfeld in interdisciplinary research in mathematics education for over 25 years. Findings: My findings are that Slezak: (1) rejects RC and SC on the basis of unjustified criticisms, (2) does not explore basic tenets of RC nor of SC beyond the unjustified criticisms, (3) rejects how SC and RC have been used in science and mathematics education, based at least in part on the unjustified criticisms, (3) dislikes how SC has been used in science and mathematics education, a dislike that fuels his rejection of any constructivism, and (4) doesn’t explore how RC has been used in scientific investigations in mathematics education. On the basis of these findings, I conclude that how epistemological models of knowing might be used in science or mathematics education would be better left to the educators who use them in interdisciplinary work. (shrink)

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...) do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

Current fears of a “reproducibility crisis” have led researchers, sources of scientific funding, and the public to question both the efficacy and trustworthiness of science. Suggested policy changes have been focused on statistical problems, such as p-hacking, and issues of experimental design and execution. However, “reproducibility” is a broad concept that includes a number of issues. Furthermore, reproducibility failures occur even in fields such as mathematics or computer science that do not have statistical problems or issues with experimental design. Most (...) importantly, these proposed policy changes ignore a core feature of the process of scientific inquiry that occurs after reproducibility failures: the integration of conflicting observations and ideas into a coherent theory. (shrink)

This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa-greements, force-five standoffs, philosophical controversies, etc. My approach is to reconstruct their views and critiques of them as meta-arguments, and to elaborate the meta-argumentative aspects of radical disa-greements. It turns out that deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought, but only by using special principles and practices, such as meta-argumentation, ad hominem argumentation, Ramsey’s principle, etc.

What is data? That question is the fundamental investigation of this dissertation. I have developed a methodology from social-scientific processes to explore how different people understand the concept of data, rather than to rely on my own philosophical intuitions or thought experiments about the “nature” of data. The evidence I have gathered as to different individuals' constructions of data can be used to inform further inquiry of data and the design of information systems. My research demonstrates that people have different (...) constructions of data. The methodology of the SDFN, created for this dissertation, has proven able to probe those understandings. The SDFN, loosely based on a DFD and combined with ideas from SNA, provides a way of discovering practical definitions of hard-to-operationalize terms like data. The process of repeatedly categorizing various items as data allows the methodology to explore how participants actually use the term, rather than relying on theoretical dictionary-based definitions. Analysis of the interviews found three different constructions of data: data as communications, a container for meaning; data as subjective observations, sense-impressions filtered by knowledge; and data as objective facts, measurements revealing the relationships of reality. (shrink)

This conference presentation discusses two ways of understanding the term "empirical" in cognitive linguistics. The presentation was delivered on Sep 24, 2015 at Polish Cognitive Linguistics Association Conference in Lublin, Poland.

An extended version of the presentation delivered on Jun 22, 2016 during IACS 2016 conference in Lublin.

The ubiquitousness of failures in new information systems designs and implementations indicates that the design methodologies that the field has developed are inadequate or faulty. This paper points to the body of knowledge developed from design research as a potential source of expertise for developing design methods that are more successful. The paper describes a meta-theoretical method for classifying theories in the Information Systems field, and identifying areas that need farther development.

Within the last ten to fifteen years, models emerged for describing and developing undergraduate research and inquiry. This article discusses four examples of modelling didactical issues around undergraduate research and inquiry. The aim of the first part of this article is to scrutinize the epistemological and the didactical purpose of these models. As essential dimensions of undergraduate research and inquiry are neglected, two new models are developed. The first puts the coordination of theory and evidence in the centre and determines (...) three different horizons of significance in the field of science. In relation to these horizons, the second model highlights the broader societal context of scientific practices. The role of research and science in society is recognized here on the one hand as an affirmative process of institutionalization of approved knowledge, and on the other, as practices of criticizing and breaking away from established forms of knowing, testing, evaluating, and approving. Concomitantly, the education of students through and within scientific practices of research and inquiry is interpreted against the backdrop of two opposite trajectories influencing students’ ambitions to engage with problems of science. Didactics of higher education therefore need to distinguish between long-term and short-term goals. It is argued that the latter concretizes the former. This understanding of teaching is corroborated against the backdrop of the concept of learning as ‘enculturation’ in science. The argumentation refers back to insights by Lev S. Vygotsky, Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi. (shrink)

Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, (...) serve different functions and fail for different reasons. This means that measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance (and, in some cases, may actually damage) model reproducibility. We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is not a solution. Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include all and only relevant bits of code. (shrink)

There is supposed to be deep agreement among the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell in regard to normativity. As a result, according to Robert Brandom (2008), and echoed by Chauncey Maher (2012), “normative functionalism” (NF) may refer to a position held by Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell, i.e., “The Pittsburgh School” of philosophy. The standard criticism of the various forms of this normative functionalist position points out the inconsistency in the commitment of normative functionalists to both metaphysical (...) realism and psychological nominalism. Yet, the inconsistency between metaphysical realism and psychological nominalism may be difficult to see until the relation between normativity and perception is clarified. To this end, in this article I discuss the role of habit in perception. Normative functionalists aspire for a sort of pragmatism between the horns of psychologism and pan-logicism. However, once a discussion of habit in perception reveals a kind of relation between an agent and its environment that exceeds the inferential capacity of normativity, the normative functionalist position seems tautological. Put more specifically, the NF thesis may merely be claiming that the inferential sort of normativity which governs rational synthetic processing of experience is an inferential sort of normativity governing rational synthetic processing. The revelation of such a tautological grounding should be sufficient evidence for the Pittsburgh School to consider re-working its understanding of the functionality of normativity; for example, regarding claims such as: “In an important sense there is no such boundary [between the discursive and non-discursive], and so nothing outside the realm of the conceptual” (Brandom 2000, 357). This discussion should be, at least, valuable as a supplement to the standard criticism of NF or in regard to the Pittsburgh School’s avowed relation to G.W.F. Hegel. (shrink)

Debates regarding theory and practice in social work have often avoided detailed discussion regarding the nature of knowledge itself and the various ways this can be created. As a result, positivistic conceptions of knowledge are still assumed by many to be axiomatic, such that context-dependent and practitioner-oriented approaches to knowledge creation and use are assumed to lack epistemological rigor and credibility. By drawing on epistemology, this theoretical paper outlines the case for a renewed approach to knowledge definition, creation and use (...) within social work by reference to pragmatism. Pragmatism has the potential to act as an organizing theoretical framework, taking account of the role of both ontology and epistemology, acting as a functional methodology for the further enhancement of practice-based knowledge. (shrink)

1. A Historical Look at Unity 2. Field Guide to Modern Concepts of Reduction and Unity 3. Kitcher's Revisionist Account of Unification 4. Critics of Unity 5. Integration Instead of Unity 6. Reduction via Mechanisms 7. Case Studies in Reduction and Unification across the Disciplines.

Astrology, a pseudoscience, is highly popular in Turkey. Astrologers, who are its practitioners, produce discourses in the scientific field at the media and at their own platforms. Furthermore, it is possible to find some instances of astrology related activities in Turkish universities. In this article, demarcation of science from pseudoscience and the pseudoscientific status of astrology were discussed in a first place. Next, threats of astrological discourse within economic, educational and medical fields and their threats to society were expressed with (...) some examples. Instances of the astrological activities within higher education institutions, such as an astrology-based master degree thesis, the astrology certificate programs, and an astrology column in an official medical school magazine were evaluated, and it was put forward that they contributed to increase the level of threat and it was also claimed that the existence of astrological activities in the universities contradicts the main purpose and principles of the higher education. In conclusion, some regulatory actions like the implementation of the scientific literacy and demarcation problem to each level of educational curriculum, a general policy for excluding the pseudoscience from higher education institutions and a recommended health warning at the top of the astrology were suggested. (shrink)

Broad consensus exists in development studies that development involves achieving and sustaining a so-called “good life.” Considerably less agreement exists, however, as to what the goal of such a life consists in and what the best practices are for bringing such a life about. The varying and competing types of approaches to development currently on offer, including cultural-economic approaches, capabilities approaches, and happiness approaches, are the conceptual by-products of this discord. The impasse between these approaches owes in part to the (...) vagueness and seeming incommensurability of value judgments. It owes in equal part to three common and interwoven tendencies when it comes to how values are approached in development theory and practice. These include: the tendency to view values as fixed and final; the tendency to formulate and evaluate means distinctly from ends; and the tendency to equate the individual character of value experience with value subjectivism, though it is wholly compatible with value objectivism. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze these value tendencies while offering a theoretical reconstruction of each utilizing conceptual resources from philosophical pragmatism, especially John Dewey’s version it. It is argued that, by adopting a more pragmatic approach to values, development theorists and practitioners can constructively move past the present impasse in development studies. (shrink)

The first step that I took in preparing myself to undertake what is in essence a piece of epistemological research was to divide the psychological therapies into two: the potentiality paradigm and the pathology paradigm. The former is based upon the potentiality model articulated by person-centred theorists like Dave Mearns and Brian Thorne, which is essentially a growth model, whilst the latter reflects a form of therapy that recognises people according to what may be considered ‘wrong with’ or ‘deficient about’ (...) them, such as operates in the disciplines of medicine and clinical psychology. The main focus of this piece of research was to determine the epistemology that is at work with what actually goes on in the practice of potentiality paradigm therapy. In order to achieve this, I set about identifying, reading, analysing and eventually coding the most epistemologically rich writings that I could find from mainstream authors on potentiality paradigm therapy from the professional and the academic literature. It became clear from this analysis that the heart of what was actually going on in the practice of potentiality paradigm therapy as articulated in these theoretical writings could be coded into three main discourses: an experiential discourse, a relational discourse and a hermeneutic discourse, each of which I have considered to represent an epistemological discourse for the purposes of this piece of research. My next question was to ask myself how these discourses set about articulating the potentiality paradigm with respect to the practice of the psychological therapies, and the answer came back that they articulated the potentiality paradigm best when they worked concertedly rather than discretely. Indeed, it soon became apparent that the human brain integrates and synthesises the data that it receives by way of these three central discourses, and so it seemed only appropriate that I should work towards expressing these findings by creating a qualitative meta-synthesis of these three discourses: the experiential, the relational and the hermeneutic, which is exactly what I did. The epistemological mechanism by which these three discourses are integrated and synthesised needs to reflect the way in which the human brain integrates and synthesises the data that it receives, and the name given to this epistemological mechanism is dialectical constructivism. This is included along with the three epistemological discourses – the experiential, the relational and the hermeneutic – in the creative and interpretive synthesis in which this piece of research culminates, and is followed by an illustrative worked example showing how these discourses articulate the potentiality paradigm – concertedly – with respect to the practice of the psychological therapies. One of the advantages of applying this meta-model to the way in which we look at potentiality paradigm therapy is that it may be used to free us up to practice in the more dialogical ways which have been becoming increasingly favoured by practitioners in recent times. With our view of potentiality paradigm therapy mediated by this meta-model, we may find it easier to traverse across what many practitioners have tended to view as theoretical boundaries. It could also be viewed as a move towards a more functional and less structural form of governance or regulation, as expressed by Mearns and Thorne. (shrink)

The concept of warrant reflects Toulmin's general insights that validity in reasoning comes in many forms, and that reasoning in most fields cannot possess the necessity and certainty characteristic of the 'Rationalist' paradigm. However, there is a scarcity of concepts in one part of Toulmin's theory of argument. While the pedagogical applications of Toulmin's model offer a fine-grained system of warrant types for propositions, they have only one category of warrant for practical claims – the 'motivational' warrant. Fortunately, ancient rhetorical (...) thinking can help us correct this insufficiency. For example, the author of the rhetorical textbook used by Alexander the Great proposed a typology of practical warrants. His approach highlights what I propose to call the 'multidimensionality', and hence what modern moral philosophers call the 'incommensurability' of warrants – the absence of a common measure allowing for a 'rational' balancing of conflicting warrants. The widespread occurrence of multidimensionality in practical argument lends support to Toulmin's general anti-rationalist view of reasoning. Moreover, while multidimensionality prevents 'rational' balancing, it legitimizes and even necessitates the use of rhetoric in practical reasoning. (shrink)

In mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, the relation between cognition and community has been defined primarily in terms of the generalization of the mathematical function, especially as a model for the nature of rules, which thus come to be under-stood as algorithms. This leads to the elimination of both the reflexive, synthesizing subject, and the intrinsic communal-historical nature of argumentation and belief-formation. Against this approach, I follow R.G. Collingwood’s hitherto unrecognized strategy in his Essay on Metaphysics and argue that the relation of (...) cognition and community is better understood by way of the ancient and forgotten model of creedal rules of faith or trust. These will be shown to have the logical form of first person performative rules of faith or trust that generate third person declaratives or proposi-tions, and so constitute the possibility conditions for an argumentational logic of question and answer. They restore the synthetic subject, for they are not algorithms but reflexive and interpretive formulae; they are communally constituted and so historically saturated; and they reinstate an ontological theory of truth as disclosure, with coherence and comprehensiveness as its criteria. In these respects, as Collingwood saw, the creedal model provides a fresh interpretation of the historicality of argumentation and redefines the relation of cognition and community in terms of the interdependence of faith and reason. (shrink)

For much economics research, ethics committee approval is not required. This is seen by some as indicating that there are no ethical issues in economics research. However, ethical research requires more than simply meeting regulatory requirements. If economics research has an impact on perceptions and resulting decisions, then there may be concerns about the nature of the research and its impact. There are a number of arguments that could be raised as to why economics does not describe the real world. (...) What we see is shaped by how we see, so it is important to consider context. This paper considers the simplification that is an inevitable aspect of research. Implications for economic approaches are described, recognising that criticisms can apply to heterodox as well as mainstream approaches. Subjectivity is then discussed, questioning the traditional positive-normative distinction. An additional section relates to the application of economics. It focuses on the significance of rhetoric and the differing roles played by economists, each of which may have their own obligations and expectations. A theme throughout the paper is that of groups and group membership shaping perceptions and behaviour. The paper concludes that there are ethical issues in relation to both how and why economists undertake their work. Read the Open Peer Discussion on this paper » Read the discussion of this paper on the WEA's Ethics conference ». (shrink)

This paper traces missing links in the history of economic thought. In outlining Hume's concept of 'the reflexive mind' it shows that this opened frontiers between philosophy and psychology which Bertrand Russell denied and which logical positivism in philosophy and positive economics displaced. It relates this to Hume's influence not only on Smith, but also on Schopenhauer and the later Wittgenstein, with parallels in Gestalt psychology and recent findings from neural research and cognitive psychology. It critiques Kant's reaction to Hume's (...) claim that one may assume but cannot prove cause and effect and how Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis has been Kantian but wrong in claims for axioms that are universal truths. It illustrates how Samuelson's presumption that language and mathematics are 'identical' was as mistaken as the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein, relates this to Kleinian splitting, denial and projective identification and suggests that recovery of greater realism in economics needs to regain links with such philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

The main thrust of the argument of this thesis is to show the possibility of articulating a method of construction or of synthesis--as against the most common method of analysis or division--which has always been (so we shall argue) a necessary component of scientific theorization. This method will be shown to be based on a fundamental synthetic logical relation of thought, that we shall call inversion--to be understood as a species of logical opposition, and as one of the basic monadic (...) logical operators. Thus the major objective of this thesis is to This thesis can be viewed as a response to Larry Laudan's challenge, which is based on the claim that ``the case has yet to be made that the rules governing the techniques whereby theories are invented (if any such rules there be) are the sorts of things that philosophers should claim any interest in or competence at.'' The challenge itself would be to show that the logic of discovery (if at all formulatable) performs the epistemological role of the justification of scientific theories. We propose to meet this challenge head on: a) by suggesting precisely how such a logic would be formulated; b) by demonstrating its epistemological relevance (in the context of justification) and c) by showing that a) and b) can be carried out without sacrificing the fallibilist view of scientific knowledge. OBJECTIVES: We have set three successive objectives: one general, one specific, and one sub-specific, each one related to the other in that very order. (A) The general objective is to indicate the clear possibility of renovating the traditional analytico-synthetic epistemology. By realizing this objective, we attempt to widen the scope of scientific reason or rationality, which for some time now has perniciously been dominated by pure analytic reason alone. In order to achieve this end we need to show specifically that there exists the possibility of articulating a synthetic (constructive) logic/reason, which has been considered by most mainstream thinkers either as not articulatable, or simply non-existent. (B) The second (specific) task is to respond to the challenge of Larry Laudan by demonstrating the possibility of an epistemologically significant generativism. In this context we will argue that this generativism, which is our suggested alternative, and the simplified structuralist and semantic view of scientific theories, mutually reinforce each other to form a single coherent foundation for the renovated analytico-synthetic methodological framework. (C) The third (sub-specific) objective, accordingly, is to show the possibility of articulating a synthetic logic that could guide us in understanding the process of theorization. This is realized by proposing the foundations for developing a logic of inversion, which represents the pattern of synthetic reason in the process of constructing scientific definitions. (shrink)

The initiation of bipedal gait is a willed action that causes a body at rest to move. Newton's first principle of motion is applied to experimental footprint data. leading to the premise that the big toe is the source of the body action force that initiates and controls bipedal gait.