- The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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Consciousness, Certainty, and Epistemic Operators.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2005 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 38 (1):1-15.details
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(1 other version)Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Rohit Parikh - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.details
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A solution to the discursive dilemma.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):181 - 188.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.details
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Divisive conditioning: Further results on dilation.Timothy Herron, Teddy Seidenfeld & Larry Wasserman - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (3):411-444.details
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Iterative probability kinematics.Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond Thomason - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.details
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(1 other version)No justification for lottery losers.Christoph Kelp - unknowndetails
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On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens.Gregory R. Wheeler - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):287-304.details
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Justification and Argumentation.Krzysztof Szymanek - 2014 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36 (1):231-239.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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What Verities May Be.Igor Douven & Lieven Decock - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):386-428.details
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Epistemology and artificial intelligence.Gregory R. Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2004 - Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):469-493.details
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Safe Contraction Revisited.Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Springer. pp. 35–70.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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(1 other version)AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.details
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Rational acceptance and conjunctive/disjunctive absorption.Gregory Wheeler - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):49-63.details
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Induction, reason and consistency.Keith Lehrer - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):103-114.details
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(1 other version)On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief.Jakob Koscholke - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188.details
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A Bayesian Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness and Precision in Direct Inference.Christian Wallmann - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):485-500.details
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Formal Epistemology.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):651-662.details
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Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
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Jon Williamson. Bayesian nets and causality: Philosophical and computational foundations.Kevin B. Korb - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):389-396.details
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Acceptance and Certainty, Doxastic Modals, and Indicative Conditionals.Kurt Norlin - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):951-971.details
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Minimalism and the generalisation problem: on Horwich’s second solution.Cezary Cieśliński - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1077-1101.details
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(1 other version)Multi-agent Logics for Reasoning About Higher-Order Upper and Lower Probabilities.Dragan Doder, Nenad Savić & Zoran Ognjanović - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (1):77-107.details
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On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox.Rory Smead - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169.details
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Concerning Peter Vickers’s Recent Treatment of ‘Paraconsistencitis’.Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (3):325-340.details
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(1 other version)Game Theory and the History of Ideas about Rationality: An Introductory Survey.Ann E. Cudd - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):101-133.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.details
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Objectivism without objective probabilities.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Theoria 56 (1-2):23-41.details
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Marxism on dialectical and logical contradiction.D. Goldstick - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):102 – 113.details
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A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.details
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A Review of the Lottery Paradox.Gregory Wheeler - 2007 - In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.details
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Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation.Chenwei Shi, Sonja Smets & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1207-1243.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values.Horacio Arló Costa - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7-48.details
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Plausible reasoning: a first-order approach.Silvana Badaloni & Alberto Zanardo - 1996 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 6 (3):215-261.details
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When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
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Probabilist antirealism.Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.details
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Are theories of rationality empirically testable?Howard Smokler - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):297 - 306.details
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(1 other version)Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.details
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Contextualism about Belief Ascriptions.Clarke Roger - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 400-410.details
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A two-level system of knowledge representation based on evidential probability.Henry E. Kyburg - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (1):105 - 114.details
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(1 other version)Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):605-636.details
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