Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica:nkaa041.
    We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Home | Topics | About PhilArchive | OAI-PMH | Contact us

This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation

Page generated Thu Aug 5 03:36:58 2021 on philpapers-web-65948fd446-qrpbq
Debug information

cache stats: hit=18173, miss=13881, save=
autohandler : 86 ms
called component : 80 ms
prepCit : 0 ms
init renderer : 0 ms
addfields : 0 ms
setup : 0 ms
applytpl : 0 ms
auth : 0 ms
menu : 0 ms
quotes : 0 ms


pid: 24951