On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
Theoria 85 (1):8-17 (2019)
Abstract
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".
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2018-10-27
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55 ( #47,764 of 56,862 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #36,388 of 56,862 )
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