The paper argues against an intuitive reading of the Stone-von Neumann theorem as a categoricity result, thereby pointing out that this theorem does not entail any model-theoretical difference between the theories that validate it and those that don't.

This paper considers the possible application of quantum theory in political studies, especially in international relations. We introduce our classification based on three logical ways of how to connect areas so remote: through the relation of identity, analogy and metaphor which reflects three basic epistemic positions. Next, we review existing work against this classification before moving on to consider some of the uses and potential gains offered by quantum mind hypothesis, quantum models of reasoning and decisionmaking, and quantum metaphor.

Desde el descubrimiento en 1935 del fenómeno del entrelazamiento cuántico, se han generado interrogantes y postulados que están sin resolver, pero que han desmantelado las bases de la física clásica. Tomando como base el comportamiento recíproco de determinadas partículas, independientemente de su distancia, se asume la existencia de un estado con una competencia de onda única para todo el sistema, lo que obliga a aceptar nuevos conceptos como la no localidad y la no separabilidad. En la actualidad son cada vez (...) más los creadores que desde diferentes soportes y medios se han acercado al análisis del entrelazamiento como una nueva fuente de inspiración e investigación artística. De hecho, se plantea la plataforma artística como un recurso para divulgar este fenómeno, junto con sus teorías y misterios, familiarizando al espectador con una de las manifestaciones más definitorias para el progreso de la humanidad. (shrink)

It is argued that a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible and useful. Current interpretations, from “Copenhagen” to “many worlds” are critically revisited. The difficulties for intuitive models of quantum physics are pointed out and possible solutions proposed. In particular the existence of discrete states, the quantum jumps, the alleged lack of objective properties, measurement theory, the probabilistic character of quantum physics, the wave–particle duality and the Bell inequalities are analyzed. The sketch of a realistic picture of the quantum (...) world is presented. It rests upon the assumption that quantum mechanics is a stochastic theory whose randomness derives from the existence of vacuum fields. They correspond to the vacuum fluctuations of quantum field theory, but taken as real rather than virtual. (shrink)

In a recent article, O. Ulfbeck and A. Bohr [Found. Phys. 31, 757 (2001)] have stressed the genuine fortuitousness of detector clicks, which has also been pointed out, in different terms, by the present author [Am. J. Phys. 68, 728 (2000)]. In spite of this basic agreement, the present article raises objections to the presuppositions and conclusions of Ulfbeck and Bohr, in particular their rejection of the terminology of indefinite variables, their identification of reality with “the world of experience,” their (...) identification of experience with what takes place “on the spacetime scene,” and the claim that their interpretation of quantum mechanics is “entirely liberated” from classical notions. An alternative way of making sense of a world of uncaused clicks is presented. This does not invoke experience but deals with a free-standing reality, is not fettered by classical conceptions of space and time but introduces adequate ways of thinking about the spatiotemporal aspects of the quantum world, and does not reject indefinite variables but clarifies the implications of their existence. (shrink)

The Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on the assumption that the notion of observer-independent state of a physical system is to be rejected. In RQM the primary target of the theory is the analysis of the whole network of relations that may be established among quantum subsystems, and the shift to a relational perspective is supposed to address in a satisfactory way the general problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I discuss two basic issues, that (...) I take to be serious open problems of the interpretation. First, I wish to show—mainly through an analysis of the so-called third person problem—that it is far from clear what a relativization of states to observers exactly achieves and in what sense such an approach really advances our understanding of the peculiar features of quantum phenomena. Second, I argue that the claim, according to which RQM is able to preserve locality, is at best dubious. I conclude that further work needs to be done before RQM may aspire to become a satisfactory interpretational framework for the main foundational issues in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We present a pragmatic analysis of the different meanings assigned to the term “local realism” in the context of the empirical violations of Bell-type inequalities since its inception in the late 1970s. We point out that most of them are inappropriate and arise from a deeply ingrained prejudice that originated in the celebrated 1935 paper by Einstein-Podolski-Rosen. We highlight the correct connotation that arises once we discard unnecessary metaphysics.

Measures and theories of information abound, but there are few formalised methods for treating the contextuality that can manifest in different information systems. Quantum theory provides one possible formalism for treating information in context. This paper introduces a quantum inspired model of the human mental lexicon. This model is currently being experimentally investigated and we present a preliminary set of pilot data suggesting that concept combinations can indeed behave non-separably.

It is shown how all the major conceptual difficulties of standard (textbook) quantum mechanics, including the two measurement problems and the (supposed) nonlocality that conflicts with special relativity, are resolved in the consistent or decoherent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics by using a modified form of quantum logic to discuss quantum properties (subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space), and treating quantum time development as a stochastic process. The histories approach in turn gives rise to some conceptual difficulties, in particular the (...) correct choice of a framework (probabilistic sample space) or family of histories, and these are discussed. The central issue is that the principle of unicity, the idea that there is a unique single true description of the world, is incompatible with our current understanding of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In standard quantum mechanics, a state vector \ may belong to infinitely many different orthogonal bases, as soon as the dimension N of the Hilbert space is at least three. On the other hand, a complete physical observable A is associated with a N-dimensional orthogonal basis of eigenvectors. In an idealized case, measuring A again and again will give repeatedly the same result, with the same eigenvalue. Let us call this repeatable result a modality \, and the corresponding eigenstate \. (...) A question is then: does \ give a complete description of \? The answer is obviously no, since \ does not specify the full observable A that allowed us to obtain \; hence the physical description given by \ is incomplete, as claimed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in their famous article in 1935. Here we want to spell out this provocative statement, and in particular to answer the questions: if \ is an incomplete description of \, what does it describe? is it possible to obtain a complete description, maybe algebraic? Our conclusion is that the incompleteness of standard QM is due to its attempt to describe systems without contexts, whereas both are always required, even if they can be separated outside the measurement periods. (shrink)

The inherent difficulty in talking about quantum decoherence in the context of quantum cosmology is that decoherence requires subsystems, and cosmology is the study of the whole Universe. Consistent histories gave a possible answer to this conundrum, by phrasing decoherence as loss of interference between alternative histories of closed systems. When one can apply Boolean logic to a set of histories, it is deemed ‘consistent’. However, the vast majority of the sets of histories that are merely consistent are blatantly nonclassical (...) in other respects, and further constraints than just consistency need to be invoked. In this paper, I attempt to give an alternative answer to the issues faced by consistent histories, by exploring a timeless interpretation of quantum mechanics of closed systems. This is done solely in terms of path integrals in non-relativistic, timeless, configuration space. What prompts a fresh look at such foundational problems in this context is the advent of multiple gravitational models in which Lorentz symmetry is not fundamental, but only emergent. And what allows this approach to overcome previous barriers to a timeless, conditional probabilities interpretation of quantum mechanics is the new notion of records—made possible by an inherent asymmetry of configuration space. I outline and explore consequences of this approach for foundational issues of quantum mechanics, such as the natural emergence of the Born rule, conservation of probabilities, and the Sleeping Beauty paradox. (shrink)

It has been traditionally considered that Quantum Mechanics has two conceptual kinds of problems, namely, those related with local-realism and the so-called measurement problem. That is, the uniqueness of the result when we make a measurement. With the development of what is called generically Quantum Information Theory, a new form of the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism has taken shape.(1) In this paper, we will analyse if this information interpretation is able to clarify these old problems. Although this interpretation seems (...) to be the most promising approach we have, we have reached the conclusion that the answer cannot be given in a positive and clear way yet. (shrink)

After reminding the main issues at stake in the famous Einstein–Bohr debate initiated in 1935, we tentatively propose a way to get them closer, thus shedding a new light on this historical discussion.

In this paper I contend that standard quantum theory has a minimal interpretation, on which all physicists agree. That interpretation is sufficient for every application of quantum theory and it has been confirmed by a countless number of experiments. However, it provides neither an overall picture of the quantum world nor an intended ontology for quantum theory. For those reasons, several full interpretations have been proposed in order to complete the minimal interpretation. I then argue that those interpretations –which are (...) empirically equivalent, but mutually incompatible- are metaphysical ventures that cannot be confirmed by any conceivable experience. Moreover, I claim that the program of finding the ontology for quantum theory rests on the false assumption that there is a unique ontology compatible with each physical theory. I conclude that there is no direct path either from the formalism of quantum theory to its intended ontology, or from determinate metaphysical assumptions to the quantum formalism. (shrink)

In this article we present a possible way to make usual quantum mechanics fully compatible with physical realism, defined as the statement that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently from any particular observer’s perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules. Rather than elaborating on the quantum formalism itself, we propose a new quantum ontology, where physical properties are attributed jointly to the system, and to the context in which it is embedded. In (...) combination with a quantization principle, this non-classical definition of physical reality sheds new light on counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics such as the origin of probabilities, non-locality, and the quantum-classical boundary. (shrink)

In previous articles we presented a simple set of axioms named “Contexts, Systems and Modalities”, where the structure of quantum mechanics appears as a result of the interplay between the quantized number of modalities accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum of contexts that are required to define these modalities. In the present article we discuss further how to obtain Born’s rule within this framework. Our approach is compared with other former and recent derivations, and its strong links with (...) Gleason’s theorem are particularly emphasized. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of studies by Romanian philosophers, addressing foundational issues currently debated in contemporary philosophy of science. It offers a historical survey of the tradition of scientific philosophy in Romania. It examines some problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, linguistics, the natural and social sciences. Among the more specific topics, it discusses scientific explanation, models, and mechanisms, as well as memory, artifacts, and rules of research. The book is useful to those interested in the philosophy of (...) real science, but also to those interested in Romanian philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues against the view that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.

Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases utilised in everyday language. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive science and philosophy. (...) Additionally, the principle of semantic compositionality is underspecifi ed, which means that notions of both "strong" and "weak" compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction between these is contextually sensitive. Compositionality is equated with a joint probability distribution modeling how the constituent concepts in the combination are interpreted. Marginal selectivity is introduced as a pivotal probabilistic constraint for the application of the Bell/CH and CHSH systems of inequalities. Non-compositionality is equated with a failure of marginal selectivity, or violation of either system of inequalities in the presence of marginal selectivity. This means that the conceptual combination cannot be modeled in a joint probability distribution, the variables of which correspond to how the constituent concepts are being interpreted. The formal analysis methods are demonstrated by applying them to an empirical illustration of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations. (shrink)

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of semantics, and it offers a critical analysis of rival explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence of rules. New results include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a reinterpretation of Bohr's (...) principle of correspondence, grounded in the principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic, which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM, inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic. (shrink)

The belief that quantum mechanics does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism. If these kinds (...) of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM. Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided. (shrink)