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Inferentialism and the Transcendental Deduction

David Landy

Kantian Review 14 (1):1-30 (2009)

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Kant and Abstractionism about Concept Formation.Alberto Vanzo - 2017 - In Stefano Di Bella & Tad M. Schmaltz (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 305-323.details This chapter outlines Kant’s account of empirical concept formation and discusses two objections that have been advanced against it. Kant holds that we form empirical concepts, such as colour concepts, by comparing sensory representations of individuals, identifying shared features, and abstracting from the differences between them. According to the first objection, we cannot acquire colour concepts in this way because there is no feature that all and only the instances of a given colour share and the boundary between colours is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant.Gary Banham, Nigel Hems & Dennis Schulting (eds.) - 2015 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details A comprehensive and practical study tool, introducing Kant's thought and key works and exploring his continuing influence. Download Export citation Bookmark
Kant e la formazione dei concetti.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - Trento (Italy): Verifiche.details How do we form concepts like those of three, bicycle and red? According to Kant, we form them by carrying out acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction on information provided by the senses. Kant's answer raised numerous objections from philosophers and psychologists alike. "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" argues that Kant is able to rebut those objections. The book shows that, for Kant, it is possible to perceive objects without employing concepts; it explains how, given those perceptions, we can (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
A Rebuttal to a Classic Objection to Kant's Argument in the First Analogy.David Landy - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (4):331-345.details Kant’s argument in the First Analogy for the permanence of substance has been cast as consisting of a simple quantifierscope mistake. Kant is portrayed as illicitly moving from a premise such as (1) at all times, there must exist some substance, to a conclusion such as (2) some particular substance must exist at all times. Examples meant to show that Kant makes this mistake feature substances coming into and out of existence, but doing so at overlapping times. I argue that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
What Incongruent Counterparts Show.David Landy - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):507-524.details In a recent paper, Robert Hanna argues that Kant's incongruent counterparts example can be mobilized to show that some mental representations, which represent complex states of affairs as complex, do so entirely non-conceptually. I will argue that Hanna is right to see that Kant uses incongruent counterparts to show that there must be a non-conceptual component to cognition, but goes too far in concluding that there must be entirely non-conceptual representations that represent objects as existing in space and time. Kant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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