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Would "direct realism" resolve the classical problem of induction?

Noûs 38 (2):197–232 (2004)

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The no-free-lunch theorems of supervised learning.Tom F. Sterkenburg & Peter D. Grünwald - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9979-10015.details The no-free-lunch theorems promote a skeptical conclusion that all possible machine learning algorithms equally lack justification. But how could this leave room for a learning theory, that shows that some algorithms are better than others? Drawing parallels to the philosophy of induction, we point out that the no-free-lunch results presuppose a conception of learning algorithms as purely data-driven. On this conception, every algorithm must have an inherent inductive bias, that wants justification. We argue that many standard learning algorithms should rather (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
How to solve Hume's problem of induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.details This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):253-272.details Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the opposite (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume’s Problem.Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.details This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient for logical (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Varieties of naturalized epistemology: Criticisms and alternatives.Benjamin Bayer - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Illinoisdetails “Naturalized epistemology” is a recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science. Traditional epistemologists object to this proposal on the grounds that it eliminates the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this thesis, I argue that traditional philosophers are justified in their reluctance to accept naturalism, but that their ongoing inability to refute it points to deeper problems inherent in traditional epistemology. I establish my thesis first by critiquing three versions of naturalism, showing that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
A Tale of Two Vectors.Marc Lange - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (4):397-431.details Why do forces compose according to the parallelogram of forces? This question has been controversial; it is one episode in a longstanding, fundamental dispute regarding which facts are not to be explained dynamically. If the parallelogram law is explained statically, then the laws of statics are separate from and “transcend” the laws of dynamics. Alternatively, if the parallelogram law is explained dynamically, then statical laws become mere corollaries to the dynamical laws. I shall attempt to trace the history of this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 17 citations

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