Switch to: References

Citations of:

Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Perception (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Perception.details A preview of my book Perception. Discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Representationalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details Discusses recent work on representationalism, including: the case for a representationalist theory of consciousness, which explains consciousness in terms of content; rivals such as neurobiological type-type identity theory (Papineau, McLaughlin) and naive realism (Allen, Campbell, Brewer); John Campbell and David Papineau's recent objections to representationalism; the problem of the "laws of appearance"; externalist vs internalist versions of representationalism; the relation between representationalism and the mind-body problem. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness provides the most comprehensive overview of current philosophical research on consciousness. Featuring contributions from some of the most prominent experts in the field, it explores the wide range of types of consciousness there may be, the many psychological phenomena with which consciousness interacts, and the various views concerning the ultimate relationship between consciousness and physical reality. It is an essential and authoritative resource for anyone working in philosophy of mind or interested in (...) states of consciousness. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The integration problem for naive realism.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (5):697-716.details This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1