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Wronging by Requesting

In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 11 (2022)

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  1. How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account.Daniel Weltman - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):397-403.
    I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of (...)
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  • What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended.Daniel Weltman - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (64):1715-43.
    This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job (...)
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  • The Paper Chase Case and Epistemic Accounts of Request Normativity.Danny Weltman - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask (...)
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  • Bad Question!Sam Berstler - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 51 (4):413-449.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 4, Page 413-449, Fall 2023.
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  • Standing to Praise.Daniel Telech - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues that praise is governed by a norm of standing, namely the evaluative commitment condition. Even when the target of praise is praiseworthy and known to be so by the praiser, praise can be inappropriate owing to the praiser’s lacking the relevant evaluative commitment. I propose that uncommitted praisers lack the standing to praise in that, owing to their lack of commitment to the relevant value, they have not earned the right to host the co-valuing that is the (...)
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