According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask (...) you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

I defend the cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession, according to which a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice. I argue that the theory is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism, which is independently attractive, and because, unlike other theories of secession, it allows us to give the answers we want to give in cases like secession of the rich or secession that would make things worse for (...) minorities. I defend the view against the objections that it allows for colonialism and annexation, that it is not a distinct theory, and that it is impractical. (shrink)

Can a liberal state exclude illiberal immigrants in order to preserve its liberal status? Hrishikesh Joshi has argued that liberalism cannot require a commitment to open borders because this would entail that liberalism is committed to its own demise in circumstances in which many illiberal immigrants aim to immigrate into a liberal society. I argue that liberalism is committed to its own demise in certain circumstances, but that this is not as bad as it may appear. Liberalism’s commitment to its (...) own demise is merely a reflection of the fact that it must take into account the rights of outsiders, not just the rights of existing citizens, and of the fact that circumstances of injustice can sometimes leave liberal societies with no correct choice. (shrink)

This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job (...) incorporating the importance of relationships. I also defend the epistemic account from three objections: that requests are important because they constitute consent, that requests and wishes must be normatively different, and that some requests do not provide any new information. (shrink)

We should conceive of illegal covert animal rescue as acts of “subrevolution” rather than as civil disobedience. Subrevolutions are revolutions that aim to overthrow some part of the government rather than the entire government. This framework better captures the relevant values than the opposing suggestion that we treat illegal covert animal rescue as civil disobedience. If animals have rights like the right not to be unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, then it does not make sense that an instance of animal rescue (...) will be justifiable only if it meets criteria for justified civil disobedience, e.g., the requirement that the civil disobedient not rescue more animals than would be necessary to communicate their message. Thus, the framework of subrevolution is a more apt way to analyze animal rescue. (shrink)

Piero Moraro argues that people who engage in civil disobedience do not have a pro tanto reason to accept punishment for breaking the law, although they do have a duty to undergo prosecution. This is because they have a duty to answer for their actions, and the state serves as an agent of the people by calling the lawbreaker to answer via prosecution. I argue that Moraro does not go far enough. Someone who engages in civil disobedience does not even (...) have to show up for the trial, provided that they answer for their actions adequately via some other means. This is because sometimes states are not agents of the people who can call lawbreakers to account, and even those states which are agents cannot demand that lawbreakers answer for their crimes in the form of a trial. (shrink)

Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a (...) life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being. (shrink)

Massimo Renzo has recently argued in this journal that Allen Buchanan’s account of the ethics of intervention is too permissive. Renzo claims that a proper understanding of political self-determination shows that it is often impermissible to intervene in order to establish a regime that leads to more self-determination for a group of people if that group was or would be opposed to the intervention. Renzo’s argument rests on an analogy between individual self-determination and group self-determination, and once we see that (...) there are differences between the two kinds of self-determination, his argument against Buchanan fails, and thus there are more cases of permissible intervention than Renzo countenances. However, understanding these differences also reveals that Buchanan’s account is also not permissive enough. There are cases of justified intervention beyond even what Buchanan compasses. (shrink)

Tony Milligan argues that some forms of covert non-human animal rescue, wherein activists anonymously and illegally free non-human animals from confinement, should be understood as acts of civil disobedience. However, most traditional understandings of civil disobedience require that the civil disobedient act publicly rather than covertly. Thus Milligan’s proposal is that we revise our understanding of civil disobedience to allow for covert in addition to public disobedience. I argue we should not. Milligan cannot justify using paradigm cases to expand the (...) scope of civil disobedience without justifying similar reasons to limit the scope, and he does nto give convincing reasons for discarding the communication requirement, according to which an action cannot count as civil disobedience unless it is communicative. The immediate conclusion is that animal rescue is not civil disobedience, while the broader conclusion is one about civil disobedience more broadly: an act must be public to count as civil disobedience. (shrink)

Die analytische Philosophie ist nicht dafür bekannt, dass ihre Vertreter*innen sich in ihrer Rolle als Philosoph*innen an radikaler Politik beteiligen . Progressive Politik links des Liberalismus bezieht ihr philosophisches Verständnis hauptsächlich aus der marxistischen und post-strukturalistischen Tradition. Nach einem kurzen Überblick über die Geschichte der analytischen Philosophie, zeige ich, warum sie bisher keine Grundlage für radikale Politik liefern konnte. Alternativ schlage ich eine Form des liberalen Naturalismus als Basis für einen kritischen, interdisziplinären Materialismus vor. Analytic philosophers are not known for (...) taking part in radical politics. Radical left-wing politics takes its philosophical inspiration mainly from Marxist and post-structuralist traditions. After giving a short overview of Analytic philosophy’s history, I will show why this approach could not deliver a foundation for radical politics. Alternatively, I outline a form of liberal naturalism, which could serve as a basis for a critical, interdisciplinary materialism. (shrink)

There are many phenomena where politicians try to perpetuate their power through political dynasties, especially in local government. This is worrying, considering that the abuse of power will be easier with the political elite consisting of their own families. This research will then look at how political dynasties can occur in the Indonesian government system. This research will be carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. The data used in this research was obtained through the literature study method. The results (...) of this research then found that several factors cause political dynasties to occur in Indonesia. The first factor is Indonesian society which is plural, so individual political behavior is strongly influenced by social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. Another factor is that candidates who have charisma and popularity will provide great opportunities and make it easier for other family members to run for office in society. (shrink)

Melis Erdur has argued that there is something morally wrong with moral realism. Moral realism promotes morally objectionable lethargy by recommending that we accept moral knowledge that could be acquired effortlessly. This is morally objectionable, because morality requires us to be reflective about moral truths. I argue that the moral realist need not be worried, because if reflection about morality is a genuine value, the realist can accept this: moral realism entails no prescriptions about how one morally ought to acquire (...) moral knowledge. It is merely a metaphysical thesis about the ontological status of moral truthmakers. If we ought to be reflective, moral realism can accept this. Moreover, Erdur’s argument generalizes to moral anti-realism, so the moral realist in particular has nothing to worry about. (shrink)

We approach the notion of general (global) human intelligence as a prominently multifaceted concept which can be tested in at least seventy specific scenarios. We say that an agent has Artificial Global Intelligence (AGLI), if it is able to perform in an intelligent manner for at least the collection of tasks defining the former scenarios. In particular, based on Gartner's multiple intelligences theory, we describe the design of a concrete test for AGLI made in such a way that an ‘average’ (...) young human being should, per diffinitionem, pass it. We compare our holistic test with several highly representative human and artificial intelligence tests for deducing that our AGLI test is the one with the broader scope of the whole range of intelligence. However, we claim as a plausible hypothesis and based on the wide thematic spectrum of the test that the most outstanding inventions of AI currently available are far from getting a high score on it. Finally, we open a discussion about the fact that, although there are artificial agents being able to simulate intelligent behaviour at a perfect level for several local tasks, this seems not to be the case for AGLI. This would imply, in particular, a kind of practical implausibility of the notion of intelligence explosion coming from philosophy of AI. (shrink)

We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a perspective that blends both, a third-person approach of coming close to, observing, and understanding the other; and a first-person assessment of how the experience of the other feels like. For this, we will need to explain how the line between the third-person and first-person approaches is blurred in some methodological approaches. We rest our position largely on the back of some seminal conclusions of the (...) meditations of Ren\'e Descartes and other theories concerning consciousness like Chalmers' naturalistic dualism and, to some secondary extent on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Additionally, we describe fundamental contextual principles already developed in the literature and the arts (like Stanivlaski's Acting System), and then we use them for setting a suitable methodology that we feel can be used to validate the presence of others' conscious experiences in one's consciousness (at suitable periods of spacetime). Finally, we give general methodological guidelines for the construction of the concrete experiment and we explore very briefly the potential implications of this kind of research in other academic and non-academic settings. (shrink)

We present a multidisciplinary, universal a pragmatic theory of causation based explicitly on five methodological causal seminal dimensions. The first one is called formal-mathematical-idealist theory and emerges as a meta-conceptual fusion of several existing causal theories. The second one is essentially based on a global, scientific and technical perspective. In fact, this can be considered as a meta-dimension encompassing a huge number of academic disciplines. The third dimension arises once more as combination of former approaches having the mind and its (...) laws as the central paradigm. The fourth one is structurally related with our subjective phenomenological world and its objective impact on the external universe. And, finally, the fifth dimension is closely related with the first one, but more oriented toward the global implicit purpose of the universe and what this implies causally on the events in nature. We give several concrete examples elucidating the explanatory range of our theory. (shrink)

We describe (essential features and an axiomatization of) a new metamathematical (cognitive) ability, i.e., functional conceptual substratum, used implicitly in the generation of several mathematical proofs and definitions, and playing a fundamental role in Artificial Mathematical Intelligence (or Cognitive-computational metamathematics). Furthermore, we present an initial (first-order) formalization of this mechanism together with its characterizing relation with classic notions like primitive positive definability and Diophantiveness. Additionally, we analyze the semantic variability of functional conceptual substratum when small syntactic modifications are done. Finally, (...) we describe cognitively natural inference rules for (mathematical) definitions inspired by functional conceptual substratum and we show that they are sound and complete w.r.t.\ standard calculi. (shrink)

The boundless nature of the natural numbers imposes paradoxically a high formal bound to the use of standard artificial computer programs for solving conceptually challenged problems in number theory. In the context of the new cognitive foundations for mathematics' and physics' program immersed in the setting of artificial mathematical intelligence, we proposed a refined numerical system, called the physical numbers, preserving most of the essential intuitions of the natural numbers. Even more, this new numerical structure additionally possesses the property of (...) being a bounded object allowing us to work with quite similar axioms like the classic Peano axioms, but in a finite environment and with an enriched physical dimension. Finally, we present several enlightening examples and we conclude that the physical numbers provide a natural formal setting for approaching classic problems in number theory from a more hybrid perspective, i.e. with a potential participation in the generation of solutions, not only of working mathematicians but also of more sophisticated artificial interactive (mathematical) intelligent agents (within the context of cognitive-computational metamathematics or artificial mathematical intelligence) and more controlled by physically-inspired principles. Finally, this paper addresses a highly new, bottom-up and paradigm-shifting approach to the foundations of physics: One should refine and improve the conceptual formal setting of the language that we use for understanding physical phenomena (e.g. the mathematical grounding concepts and theories) for being able to understand better more subtle and complex physical phenomena. (shrink)

In Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester sets out a conception of liberty as absence of imposed cost which, he says, advances no moral claim and does not premise an assignm..

In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate (...) weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising. (shrink)

As the world grapples with the urgent need for sustainable development, the transition towards green energy stands as a critical imperative. Financing this transition poses significant challenges, requiring innovative approaches that align financial objectives with environmental sustainability goals. This review presents a conceptual framework for leveraging data-driven techniques in sustainable finance to facilitate the transition towards green energy. The proposed framework integrates principles of sustainable finance with advanced data analytics to enhance decision-making processes across the financial ecosystem. At its core, (...) the framework emphasizes the importance of harnessing vast datasets related to energy production, consumption, environmental impact, and financial performance. By leveraging machine learning algorithms and predictive modeling techniques, financial stakeholders can gain deeper insights into the risks and opportunities associated with green energy investments. Key components of the framework include data collection and aggregation, risk assessment, impact measurement, and investment optimization. Data sources range from traditional financial indicators to environmental metrics, social impact assessments, and geopolitical factors. Through comprehensive data analysis, financial institutions can assess the long-term viability and sustainability of green energy projects, while also evaluating potential social and environmental impacts. Risk assessment methodologies within the framework consider both financial risks, such as market volatility and regulatory uncertainty, and non-financial risks, such as climate change impacts and community resilience. By integrating these factors into risk models, investors can make more informed decisions that mitigate potential losses and maximize returns. Furthermore, impact measurement tools enable stakeholders to quantify the environmental and social benefits of green energy investments. By tracking metrics such as carbon emissions reduction, energy efficiency improvements, and job creation, investors can assess the contribution of their portfolios towards broader sustainability objectives. Finally, the framework incorporates investment optimization strategies that align financial goals with environmental objectives. Through portfolio diversification, asset allocation, and innovative financial instruments such as green bonds and impact investing funds, financial institutions can allocate capital more efficiently towards green energy projects. The conceptual framework presented herein offers a systematic approach to integrating data-driven methodologies into sustainable finance practices. By leveraging advanced analytics and comprehensive datasets, financial stakeholders can drive the transition towards green energy while simultaneously achieving financial returns and positive environmental outcomes. (shrink)

Brought to you by: Crop X editors: Jonathan Alexander Perez, Harmony Smith, Corinne Tendorf, David Turturo, and Derek Rahn Williams. Faculty Advisor: David Turturo; Crop X team included: Chaimae Alehyane, Zachary S. Casey, Suzanna Brinez, Jacob Brown, Elizabeth George, Francisco Javier Muniz Ituarte, Brodey Myers. -/- Credits: Huckabee College of Architecture; Graphic Designers: Studio BLDG (Blossom Liu + Danny Gray); English Editor: Luke Studebaker; Spanish Translator: Jessie Forbes; Printer: Die Keure. Cover Photo: Derek Williams. -/- Generously supported by the (...) Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts and the Huckabee College of Architecture, Texas Tech University. (shrink)

Frederick 2013 (the critique) offers criticisms of the Escape from Leviathan (EfL) theory of libertarian liberty and also of its compatibility with preference-utilitarian welfare and private-property anarchy. This reply to the critique first explains the underlying philosophical problem with libertarian liberty and EfL’s proposed solution. It then goes through the critique in detail showing that it does not grasp the problem or the solution and offers only misrepresentations and unsound criticisms.

Deep decarbonization – slashing global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero – now dominates global climate policy. Two recent books assess feasible routes to achieve deep decarbonization. Bill Gates’ How to Avoid a Climate Disaster explains in depth why deep decarbonization requires significant innovations in tech, and Danny Cullenward and David Victor’s Making Climate Policy Work emphasizes the importance of policy innovation (beyond carbon pricing) for driving clean tech breakthroughs. In this critical review essay, I summarize and assess both books. (...) In the final section, I raise several normative questions, which the pair of books might lead us to. (shrink)

Comincio con alcuni commenti famosi del filosofo (psicologo) Ludwig Wittgenstein perché Pinker condivide con la maggior parte delle persone (a causa delle impostazioni predefinite della nostra psicologia innata evoluta) certi pregiudizi sul funzionamento della mente, e perché Wittgenstein offre approfondimenti unici e profondi sul funzionamento del linguaggio, del pensiero e della realtà (che ha visto come più o meno coetantana) non trovati altrove. Ilre è solo riferimento a Wittgenstein in questo volume, che è più sfortunato considerando che era il più (...) brillante e originale analista del linguaggio. Nell'ultimo capitolo, utilizzando la famosa metafora della grotta di Platone, riassume splendidamente il libro con una panoramica di come la mente (linguaggio, pensiero, psicologia intenzionale) – un prodotto di egoismo cieco, moderato solo leggermente da altruismo automatizzato per parenti stretti che trasportano copie dei nostri geni (Inclusive Fitness)- funziona automaticamente, ma cerca di finire in una nota ottimista dandoci la speranza che possiamo comunque impiegare le sue vaste capacità di cooperare e rendere il mondo un posto dignitoso. Pinker è certamente a conoscenza, ma dice poco sul fatto che molto di più sulla nostra psicologia è lasciato fuori di quanto incluso. Tra le finestre della natura umana che vengono lasciate fuori o che richiedono un'attenzione minima ci sono la matematica e la geometria, la musica e i suoni, le immagini, gli eventi e la causalità, l'ontologia (classi di cose o ciò che sappiamo), la maggior parte dell'epistemologia (come lo conosciamo), disposizioni (credenti, pensare, giudicare, intendere ecc.) e il resto della psicologia intenzionale dell'azione, neurotrasmettitori ed espiogeni, stati spirituali (ad esempio, satori e illuminazione, stimolazione e registrazione cerebrale, danni cerebrali e disturbi comportamentali, giochi e sport, teoria delle decisioni (inclusi la teoria dei giochi e l'economia comportamentale), il comportamento animale (molto poco linguaggio ma un miliardo di anni di errori genetici condivisi). Molti libri sono stati scritti su ognuna di queste aree della psicologia intenzionale. I dati di questo libro sono descrizioni, non spiegazioni che mostrano perché i nostri cervelli lo fanno in questo modo o come viene fatto. Come facciamo a sapere di usare le frasi nel loro modo diverso (cioè, conoscere tutti i loro significati)? Questa è la psicologia evolutiva che opera a un livello più elementare – il livello in cui Wittgenstein è più attivo. E c'è una particolare attenzione al contesto in cui vengono usate le parole, un'arena che Wittgenstein ha aperto la strada. Tuttavia, questo è un lavoro classico e con queste precauzioni è ancora ben vale la pena leggere. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)