Switch to: References

Citations of:

An objectivist account of probabilities in statistical physics

In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 51 (2011)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Typicality and Notions of Probability in Physics.Sheldon Goldstein - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 59--71.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent?Charlotte Werndl - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (3):232-242.
    The central question of this paper is: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent in the sense that they give the same predictions? I tackle this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I first show that for many measure-theoretic deterministic systems there is a stochastic process which is observationally equivalent to the deterministic system. Conversely, I show that for all stochastic processes there is a measure-theoretic deterministic system which is observationally equivalent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Explaining Thermodynamic-Like Behavior in Terms of Epsilon-Ergodicity.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):628-652.
    Gases reach equilibrium when left to themselves. Why do they behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the systems have to be ergodic. This answer has been criticised on different grounds and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that some of the main arguments against Boltzmann's answer, in particular, arguments based on the KAM-theorem and the Markus-Meyer theorem, are beside the point. We then argue that something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Physics and chance.David Albert - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 17--40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 73--85.
    In this paper, a concept of chance is introduced that is compatible with deterministic physical laws, yet does justice to our use of chance-talk in connection with typical games of chance. We take our cue from what Poincaré called "the method of arbitrary functions," and elaborate upon a suggestion made by Savage in connection with this. Comparison is made between this notion of chance, and David Lewis' conception.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The ergodic hierarchy.Roman Frigg & Joseph Berkovitz - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The so-called ergodic hierarchy (EH) is a central part of ergodic theory. It is a hierarchy of properties that dynamical systems can possess. Its five levels are egrodicity, weak mixing, strong mixing, Kolomogorov, and Bernoulli. Although EH is a mathematical theory, its concepts have been widely used in the foundations of statistical physics, accounts of randomness, and discussions about the nature of chaos. We introduce EH and discuss how its applications in these fields.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • On choosing between deterministic and indeterministic models: underdetermination and indirect evidence.Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2243-2265.
    There are results which show that measure-theoretic deterministic models and stochastic models are observationally equivalent. Thus there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic model and the question arises: Which model is preferable relative to evidence? If the evidence equally supports both models, there is underdetermination. This paper first distinguishes between different kinds of choice and clarifies the possible resulting types of underdetermination. Then a new answer is presented: the focus is on the choice between a Newtonian deterministic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Lev Vaidman - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 299--311.
    It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in the world corresponding to that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Typicality and the role of the Lebesgue measure in statistical mechanics.Itamar Pitowsky - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 41--58.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to Beisbart.Luke Glynn, Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thebault & Mathias Frisch - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 531-542.
    In an illuminating article, Claus Beisbart argues that the recently-popular thesis that the probabilities of statistical mechanics (SM) are Best System chances runs into a serious obstacle: there is no one axiomatization of SM that is robustly best, as judged by the theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength, and fit. Beisbart takes this 'no clear winner' result to imply that the probabilities yielded by the competing axiomatizations simply fail to count as Best System chances. In this reply, we express sympathy for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Bayesian conditioning, the reflection principle, and quantum decoherence.Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 233--247.
    The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence does require the agent's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest.Sean Crawford - 2014 - In Thomas Uebel (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Thomas Uebel (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 105-119.
    In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti's Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics.Joseph Berkovitz - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 249--280.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Measures over initial conditions.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 87--98.
    This paper concerns the meaning of the idea of typicality in classical statistical mechanics and how typicality is related to the notion of probability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Why the Tsirelson bound?Jeffrey Bub - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 167--185.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Locality and Determinism: The Odd Couple.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 149--165.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Four and a Half Axioms for Finite-Dimensional Quantum Probability.Alexander Wilce - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 281--298.
    It is an old idea, lately out of fashion but now experiencing a revival, that quantum mechanics may best be understood, not as a physical theory with a problematic probabilistic interpretation, but as something closer to a probability calculus per se. However, from this angle, the rather special C *-algebraic apparatus of quantum probability theory stands in need of further motivation. One would like to find additional principles, having clear physical and/or probabilistic content, on the basis of which this apparatus (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Probabilities in deBroglie-Bohm Theory: Towards a Stochastic Alternative (Version 0.1 beta).Patrick Dürr & Alexander Ehmann - manuscript
    We critically examine the role and status probabilities, as they enter via the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis, play in the standard, deterministic interpretation of deBroglie’s and Bohm’s Pilot Wave Theory (dBBT), by considering interpretations of probabilities in terms of ignorance, typicality and Humean Best Systems, respectively. We argue that there is an inherent conflict between dBBT and probabilities, thus construed. The conflict originates in dBBT’s deterministic nature, rooted in the Guidance Equation. Inquiring into the latter’s role within dBBT, we find it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revising Statistical Mechanics: Probability, Typicality and Closure Time.Alon Drory - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 115--134.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Three attempts at two axioms for quantum mechanics.Daniel Rohrlich - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 187--200.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Quantumness of States and Unitary Operations.Joanna Luc - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (11):1645-1685.
    This paper investigates various properties that may by possessed by quantum states, which are believed to be specifically “quantum” and their opposites. It also considers their “absolute” counterparts in the following sense: a given state has a given property absolutely if after an arbitrary unitary transformation it still possesses it. The known relations between the listed properties and between their absolute counterparts are summarized. It is proven that the only two-qubit state that has zero quantum discord absolutely is the maximally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Infinitely Challenging: Pitowsky’s Subjective Interpretation and the Physics of Infinite Systems.Laura Ruetsche & John Earman - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 219--232.
    On Itamar Pitowsky’s subjective interpretation of quantum mechanics, “the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics [QM] is just a new kind of probability theory”, one whose probabilities correspond to odds rational agents would accept on the outcomes of gambles concerning quantum event structures. Our aim here is to ask whether Pitowsky’s approach can be extended from its original context, of quantum theories for systems with an finite number of degrees of freedom, to systems with an infinite number of degrees of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Objective and Subjective Probability in Gene Expression.Joel D. Velasco - 2012 - Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 110:5-10.
    In this paper I address the question of whether the probabilities that appear in models of stochastic gene expression are objective or subjective. I argue that while our best models of the phenomena in question are stochastic models, this fact should not lead us to automatically assume that the processes are inherently stochastic. After distinguishing between models and reality, I give a brief introduction to the philosophical problem of the interpretation of probability statements. I argue that the objective vs. subjective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark