Citations of:
What is a Logical Diagram?
In SunJoo Shin & Amirouche Moktefi (eds.), Visual Reasoning with Diagrams. Springer. pp. 118 (2013)
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Inspired by Bermúdez’s notion of protologic, I would like to fathom what the true protologic could be like. But this will be approached only in a negative way of figuring out what it could not be. I shall argue that it could not be purely deductive by exploiting the recent researches in logic of maps. This will allow us to reorient the search for protologic, starting with animal abduction. I will also suggest that protologic won’t get off the ground without (...) 

Logicians commonly speak in a relatively undifferentiated way about preeuler diagrams. The thesis of this paper, however, is that there were three periods in the early modern era in which eulertype diagrams (line diagrams as well as circle diagrams) were expansively used. Expansive periods are characterized by continuity, and regressive periods by discontinuity: While on the one hand an ongoing awareness of the use of eulertype diagrams occurred within an expansive period, after a subsequent phase of regression the entire knowledge (...) 

The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no wellconfirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are languagelike. (...) 

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular signaction (like coded language) subsumes actual signaction (like hereandnow events) which in turn subsumes possible signaction (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric (...) 



Spider diagrams are based on Euler and Venn/Peirce diagrams, forming a system which is as expressive as monadic first order logic with equality. Rather than being primarily intended for logicians, spider diagrams were developed at the end of the 1990s in the context of visual modelling and software specification. We examine the original goals of the designers, the ways in which the notation has evolved and its connection with the philosophical origins of the logical diagrams of Euler, Venn and Peirce (...) 

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenologicalepistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) 

What is the relationship between the world and logic, between intuition and language, between objects and their quantitative determinations? Rationalists, on the one hand, hold that the world is structured in a rational way. Representationalists, on the other hand, assume that language, logic, and mathematics are only the means to order and describe the intuitively given world. In World and Logic, Jens Lemanski takes up three surprising arguments from Arthur Schopenhauer’s hitherto undiscovered Berlin Lectures, which concern the philosophy of language, (...) 

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – (...) 

It seems possible to know that a mathematical claim is necessarily true by inspecting a diagrammatic proof. Yet how does this work, given that human perception seems to just (as Hume assumed) ‘show us particular objects in front of us’? I draw on Peirce’s account of perception to answer this question. Peirce considered mathematics as experimental a science as physics. Drawing on an example, I highlight the existence of a primitive constraint or blocking function in our thinking which we might (...) 

One of the leading concerns animating current philosophy of mind is that, no matter how good a scientific account is, it will leave out what its like to be conscious. The challenge has thus been to study or at least explain away that qualitative dimension. Pursuant with that aim, I investigate how philosophy of signs in the Peircean tradition can positively reshape ongoing debates. Specifically, I think the account of iconic or similaritybased reference we find in semiotic theory offers a (...) 