Love is not stronger than death. In Death and Time Levinasreminds us that, contrary to how it is often quoted or remembered, The Song of Solomonsays that love is as strong as death not stronger than it . Love doesnot conquer death, it does not give to loss a sense which makes it bearable. And yetLevinas goes on to describe the claim that love is stronger than death as a ‘privilegedformula’ , suggesting that even if it is nottrue it is (...) worth saying and believing all the same. He refers to deliberately paradoxicalformulations by Vladimir Jankélévitch according to which love, thought, freedom andGod are all stronger than death, whilst death is also stronger than all of them . So Levinas suggests that love isstronger than death, death is stronger than love, and each is as strong as the other.There is no triumph of one over the other. Against Heidegger, Levinas insists that thedeath which concerns me is not my own so much as that of the beloved other. The deathof the beloved makes of me a guilty survivor, bereft of the possibility of dialogue with thedeceased. But even as I am torn apart in grief, death does not conquer love any morethan love conquers death. Death is not pure nothingness; something persists. Love is as strong as death. (shrink)

Cuando E. Lévinas afirma que la paz es "el acontecimiento inicial del encuentro" y que es un "primer lenguaje", se podría creer que suspende su actitud crítica en beneficio de una ingenua confianza en el ser humano, olvidando así la violencia sin límites de las relaciones humanas. Todo cambia, sin embargo, cuando se comprende que ese "acontecimiento primero" proviene de lo anárquico, que no se fija y no permite entonces ninguna especie de conciliación. Se analiza cómo Lévinas renueva, después de (...) la La Paz perpetua de Kant, el sentido de la palabra paz. Se pregunta qué actitud crítica permite pensar la paz sin remitirse a las ilusiones de la moral, y qué peso tiene una paz que no se encarna en instituciones. It could be possible to think that when E. Lévinas states that peace is "the first event of the encounter" and that it is a "first language", he gives up his critical attitude in favor of a naive faith in human beings, thus forgetting the unlimited violence that characterizes human relations. Everything changes, however, when one understands that the "first event" arises from anarchy, that it is not fixed, and that it allows for no conciliation. The article analyzes how, after Kant's Perpetual Peace, Lévinas provides a renovated meaning of peace. Likewise, it inquires into the critical attitude that makes it possible to think peace without falling into the illusions of morality, and what significance would a peace not actualized in institutions might have. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In reference to the article by Hanan Alexander ‘Education in nonviolence’, the text takes up the issue of reading Emmanuel Levinas’s Talmudic texts for the philosophy of education. It intends to positively answer the question about the value and potential of such inspiration, focusing on concepts from two of Levinas’s Talmudic readings. The first part of the text is devoted to the characteristics of the intellectual output of the thinker. The second part analyses and discusses Alexander’s commentary on one (...) of Levinas’s Talmudic readings, ‘Toward the Other’. Alexander aims to show the specificity of the idea of education in nonviolence, heavily indebted to the Jewish tradition and thought. The third part of the text is an extension of Alexander’s comment, focuses on another Talmudic reading by Levinas, ‘Cities of Refuge’, and aims to outline the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of the pedagogy of asylum. (shrink)

This paper traces the relationship between Hegel and Levinas regarding their understanding of difference in relation to truth and history. It is the aim of this paper to show that Levinas is not a thinker in opposition to Hegel, since opposition would only confirm what it seeks to oppose. Instead, I argue that Levinas interrupts Hegel’s thought in such a manner that it is opened to a supplement of ethical meaning. This ethical meaning is irreducible to truth and history as (...) Hegel understands them, yet it invokes them and makes them possible. (shrink)

Procuramos pensar um entrelaçamento possível, ou, ao menos, uma aproximação entre a Estética de Adorno e a Ética de Levinas, especialmente a partir do não idêntico e da experiência estética como uma experiência do encontro com o Outro. Veremos que o instante da realização da obra é o seu instante ético. Aquele que a obra se desprende daquele que a coloca no mundo e abre caminhos para outras subjetividades se formarem. Por isso, estamos as voltas com o movimento estético que (...) pode provocar irrupções de novos sentidos e percepções, como inquietações que mantém vivo o não idêntico sem subsumi-lo ao idêntico. E, por outro lado, trazemos alguns aspectos da obra de Levinas para pensar a obra de arte e a poesia, especialmente aquela da obliteração, enquanto resistência à razão idolátrica. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar la lectura política que hace Miguel Abensour de Lévinas cuando analiza el sentido del eje conceptual levinasiano de la responsabilidad-para-elotro y sus vinculaciones ético-políticas. Así, podemos redescubrir la irreductibilidad de lo político como una dimensión que requiere de lo humano, todo esto bajo el lema de la extravagante hipótesis. Lo humano –a la luz de Lévinas y en lo cual Abensour se ancla– instala su propia irreductibilidad que hace renovar lo político y deja aparecer una filosofía (...) política crítica que quiere pensar de otro modo el Estado y la justicia. (shrink)

Identity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is (...) the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: Premiss; Justice, uniqueness, and love; Sign and language; Dialogue and alterity; Semiotic materiality; Globalization and the trap of identity; Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; Ethics; The World; Outside the subject; Responsibility and Substitution; The face; Fear of the other; Alterity and justice; Justice and proximity; Literary writing; Unjust justice; Caring for the other. (shrink)

Advances in digital technology are changing the methods of teaching and learning. In the course of this stream of changes, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a topic of great interest and concern. The development of teaching AIs (artificial intelligences that teach), which can provide adaptive and personalized dialogue with students, has shifted the relationship between teachers and students, and has raised new questions regarding the role of teachers. The purpose of this paper is to rethink the meaning (...) of the act of teaching, without denying its variety, and to reflect on the role of teachers in the relatively unfamiliar situation created by the emergence of AI teaching machines. To this end, I attempt, first, to re-examine the nature of teaching by considering two possible orientations: teaching as a return to homogeneity and teaching as exposure to heterogeneity. My purpose is to consider the characteristics and limitations of the teaching implemented by AI and to discuss the role of human teachers in overcoming these limitations. Second, I seek to reveal what it is for the teacher to speak, which is often understood as the most important aspect of teaching, again by way of two characterizations: the closed conversation, which converges on a conclusion, and the open conversation, oriented towards ethical responsibility. In doing this, I shall examine critically some characteristics of language used by AI teaching machines and suggest alternatives that might constitute openness to an ethical conversation. In furtherance of this, I shall consider the account of teaching that is central to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

I seek to draw out the unique character of Levinas’ theory of recognition by highlighting its transitional character in a double sense. It is transitional, firstly, in that it stands between two models of recognition: the earlier agonistic model of Kojeve and the later model of Honneth which takes as its point of departure a primordial relation of mutual affirmation between individuals. It is transitional secondly in the sense that, while Levinas initially employs the concept of recognition, he is later (...) explicit in his rejection of it. The interest of Levinas’ transitional model of recognition for the philosophy of religion is that Levinas negotiates both transitions by calling on archetypes borrowed from the Jewish tradition. An exploration of this model thus provides us with a fresh vantage point from which to address anew the question of the articulation of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion in his work. (shrink)

La relevancia del pensamiento de Emmanuel Levinas para comprender el surgimiento de la filosofía de la liberación –uno de los movimientos filosóficos más importantes de América Latina durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX– es innegable. En este artículo se analiza la interpretación geopolítica y analógica que Enrique Dussel realizó de los conceptos levinasianos de “Alteridad” y “Otro” para mostrar su equivocidad en el ámbito de lo político.

Levinas ̓s work is explicitly placed within the heritage of the Phenomenological school. Nevertheless, he repeatedly uses notions drawn from the religious tradition, especially Jewish, up to the point of stating that Judaism is a “category of being”. This paper analyses the role of Judaism as a category, beginning with a reconstruction of this notion in the most influential authors within Levinas’s philosophy. Finally, the role and meaning that this categorial structure take on in Levinas will be shown, through the (...) examination of four main components: the exposition of alterity as separation and glory; the relationship of responsibility as election and substitution; the understanding of temporality as creation and redemption; and the prophetical understanding of language. (shrink)

O trabalho articula alguns conceitos da ética e da filosofia política para pensar a crise dos refugiados. O que significa tolerar e acolher são questões que buscamos investigar para lançar luz sobre o campo de problematização da ética e da política. Se a pluralidade é a condição fundamental da política, o conceito de alteridade ética deverá funcionar como um dispositivo para uma interpretação consequente do atual estado de nosso engajamento ético-político. O conceito de natalidade, que em Arendt fundamenta a ação (...) política, é apropriado para afirmar uma ética e uma política do acolhimento e para indicar os limites de uma suposta ética da tolerância. Palavras-chave: Tolerar. Acolher. Natalidade. Alteridade. (shrink)

In this paper I explain what is the difference between a book and a document according to Levinas. T hen I explain why, although he was very reluctant to read "cabalistic documents" he was interested by R. Haïm of Volozin's book, Nefesh HaHaïm , and even praised the French translation of the book as an event worth the attention of Jews, Christians and Muslims. T he main point is concerns his understanding of God "from our view point".

En varios pasajes de la obra de Lévinas vemos que su manera de presentarse frente a lo político es ambigua. O bien, resulta mejor decir que solo en apariencia el "objeto" de lo político en sus reflexiones sobre la justicia y el Estado resultan claras; hay una suerte de equívoco que vale la pena precisar y distinguir. Así, el objetivo central de este trabajo es describir dos momentos políticos en Lévinas leídos en clave Estado, como una figura posible de la (...) política; desentrañamos así la trama anti-política en tanto crítica política al Estado, para llegar a la trama del Estado justo e igualitario, lo que abre nuevas puertas para pensar lo político. A partir de esta descripción reflexionamos, por un lado, una postura crítica frente a las ideas sobre el Estado de Lévinas desde las vinculaciones ético-políticas que hace, tal como la de Alberto Sucasas. Y por otro, en contraposición a éstas, las interesantes y extravagantes lecturas que hace Miguel Abensour de Lévinas creyendo que las relaciones ético-políticas levinasianas aportan a renovar críticamente una nueva figura de Estado dejando el terreno político y estatal abierto a nuevas reflexiones. In several passages of Levinas' work we see that his way of presenting the political front is ambiguous. Or, more precisely, that the "object" of the political in his reflections about justice and the State is only apparently clear; there is a sort of equivocalness that is worth clarifying and distinguishing. The aim of this article is to describe two political moments in Levinas, read in terms of the State as a possible figure in politics. We thus unravel an anti-political theme which is critical of the politics of the State, in order to reach a theme of a State that is just and egalitarian. This opens up new territory from which to think of the political. One critique of Levinas' ideas of the State in terms of its ethical-political linkages is that put forth by Alberto Sucasas. A second contrasting critique is the interesting and extravagant reading of Miguel Abensour, in which Levinasian ethical-political relationships lead to a critical renewal of a new figure of the State, leaving the political and state terrain open to new reflections. (shrink)

The paper, which retains a hypothetical character, argues that Spinoza's propositions referring to God (or involving the use of the name ‘God’, essentially in the Ethics), can be read in a fruitful manner apart from any pre-established hypothesis concerning his own ‘theological preferences’, as definite descriptions of three ‘ideas of God’ which have the same logical status: one (akin to Jewish Monotheism) which identifies the idea of God with the idea of the Law, one (akin to a heretic ‘Socinian’ version (...) of Christianity) which identifies it with the idea of Human Love, and one (akin to a form of Cosmotheism, rather than ‘Pantheism’) which identifies it with Nature. Evidence of this analytic tripartition can be found in the letter of the texts themselves. If accepted (at least as a thought experiment), it would carry three interesting consequences: 1) to renew our understanding of the theory of the ‘three kinds of knowledge’, which have obvious affinities with the three possible ways of understanding the idea of God; 2) to emphasize the critical move associated by Spinoza with each of the three ideas of God (passing from an anthropomorphic legislator to an impersonal command, passing from an imaginary community of similarities to a practical community of singularities, and passing from a teleological and harmonious idea of nature to a causal, even conflictual, idea of its infinite power); 3) to locate the essential ethical and political questions associated with religion on the ‘vectors’ which lead from one idea to another, and represent themselves practical conatus: obedience, utility, order. It is also assumed that such a reading enhances the relevance of Spinoza's philosophy with respect to contemporary debates about religion and secularism. (shrink)

The article centres on the notion of responsibility in Tom Stoppard’s Darkside (2013). While Pink Floyd’s original album, which inspired the playwright, thematises its connection to ethics in a spectral and hauntological manner, through the use of field recording sound snippets interwoven in the music, the radio play explores the notion of responsibility through what is called “thought experiments.” The article identifies the subversive function of these narrative examples and, following Emanuel Levinas’ suggestions concerning the instability of the link between (...) the philosophical discourse and that of examples, shows the latter’s insolent and disruptive nature. The notion of responsibility is further linked to its discussion by Jacques Derrida in his Gift of Death (1995) which consequently makes it possible to view the relation between responsibility and responding from a subversive, hauntological and undecidable perspective. (shrink)

N'ayant pas réussi à joindre Masato Goda, nous publions ce magnifique texte sans son autorisation. Nous espérons qu'il nous en excusera. It has been more than thirty years since I discovered the texts of Emmanuel Levinas. Before publishing the Japanese translations of Totality and Infinite and Otherwise than being, I published an anthology of Levinas' work that included texts such as ‘‘Il y a'', ‘‘Reality and its shadow'' and so on. While I translated these texts, I noticed the importance - (...) Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Religious systems are organised semiotic structures providing people with values and rules, identities, regularity, and meaning. Consequently, a person moving out of a religious system might be exposed to meaning-ruptures. The paper presents the situation of young people who have been in Yeshiva, a rabbinic high-school, and who have to join secular university life. It analyses the changes to which they are exposed. On the bases of this case study, the paper examines the following questions: can the religious symbolic system (...) internalised by a person in a religious sphere of experience be mobilised as a symbolic resource once the person moves to a secular environment? If yes, how do religious symbolic resources facilitate the transition to a secular life? And if not, what other symbolic and social resources might facilitate such transitions? (shrink)