Empirical studies on people's moral attitudes regarding ethically challenging topics contribute greatly to research in medical ethics. However, it is not always clear in which ways this research adds to medical ethics as a normative discipline. In this article, we aim to provide a systematic account of the different ways in which attitudinal research can be used for normative reflection. In the first part, we discuss whether ethical judgements can be based on empirical work alone and we develop a sceptical (...) position regarding this point, taking into account theoretical, methodological and pragmatic considerations. As empirical data should not be taken as a direct source for normative justification, we then delineate different ways in which attitudes research can be combined with theoretical accounts of normative justification in the second part of the article. Firstly, the combination of attitudes research with normative-ethical theories is analysed with respect to three different aspects: The extent of empirical data which is needed, the question of which kind of data is required and the ways in which the empirical data are processed within the framework of an ethical theory. Secondly, two further functions of attitudes research are displayed which lie outside the traditional focus of ethical theories: the exploratory function of detecting and characterising new ethical problems, and the field of ‘moral pragmatics’. The article concludes with a methodological outlook and suggestions for the concrete practice of attitudinal research in medical ethics. (shrink)

Der Einsatz empirischer Forschungsmethoden in der Medizinethik hat zu Forderungen nach einem gewandelten Selbstverständnis der Medizinethik geführt, die sich mehr als eine integrierte Disziplin aus Sozialwissenschaften und Ethik verstehen solle. Dagegen wird hier die These vertreten, dass über Sinn und Unsinn des Einsatzes empirischer Methoden zunächst eine moralphilosophische Diskussion erforderlich ist. Medizinethiker müssen ausweisen können, welche empirischen Forschungsresultate zur Beantwortung normativer Fragen erforderlich sind. Ein solcher Ausweis beruht seinerseits jedoch auf normativen Annahmen, die ihrerseits moralphilosophischer Legitimation bedürfen. Der Beitrag untersucht (...) daher den Einsatz empirischer Methoden in der Medizinethik im Hinblick auf Verhältnis von ethischem Grundlagendiskurs und Methodologie der angewandten Ethik. Abschließend wird gefragt, ob nicht ein Großteil von empirischen Studien in der Medizinethik aus forschungsethischen Gründen problematisch ist. (shrink)

Der Einsatz empirischer Forschungsmethoden in der Medizinethik hat zu Forderungen nach einem gewandelten Selbstverständnis der Medizinethik geführt, die sich mehr als eine integrierte Disziplin aus Sozialwissenschaften und Ethik verstehen solle. Dagegen wird hier die These vertreten, dass über Sinn und Unsinn des Einsatzes empirischer Methoden zunächst eine moralphilosophische Diskussion erforderlich ist. Medizinethiker müssen ausweisen können, welche empirischen Forschungsresultate zur Beantwortung normativer Fragen erforderlich sind. Ein solcher Ausweis beruht seinerseits jedoch auf normativen Annahmen, die ihrerseits moralphilosophischer Legitimation bedürfen. Der Beitrag untersucht (...) daher den Einsatz empirischer Methoden in der Medizinethik im Hinblick auf Verhältnis von ethischem Grundlagendiskurs und Methodologie der angewandten Ethik. Abschließend wird gefragt, ob nicht ein Großteil von empirischen Studien in der Medizinethik aus forschungsethischen Gründen problematisch ist. (shrink)

“Ethics” is used as a label for a new kind of expertise in the field of science and technology. At the same time, it is not clear what ethical expertise consists in and what its political status in modern democracies can be. Starting from the “participatory turn” in recent social research and policy, we will argue that bioethical reasoning has to include public views of and attitudes towards biomedicine. We will sketch the outlines of a bioethical conception of “public understanding (...) of ethics,” addressing three different issues: (a) the methodological relevance of moral questions and problems raised by lay persons in everyday life regarding biomedicine and technology, (b) the normative relevance of such lay moralities for the justification of ethical decisions, and (c) the necessity of public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw conclusions in view of the concepts and methods such a conception of “public understanding of ethics” should employ. (shrink)

This paper considers the roles and definitions of expert and lay members of ethics committees, focussing on those given by the National Research Ethics Service which is mandated to review all research conducted in National Health Service settings in the United Kingdom. It questions the absence of a specified position for the ‘professional ethicist’ and suggests that such individuals will often be lay members of ethics committees, their participation being a reflection of their academic interest and expertise. The absence of (...) a specified position for professional ethicists and the concomitant but implicit denial of ethical expertise appear to be an anomalous state of affairs if one considers that the training offered to members of ethics committees is often delivered by academic ethicists. It is suggested that this is based on a misunderstanding of the concept ‘ethical expertise’ and that properly understood the ethicist can assist the work of ethics committees by drawing on their expert knowledge. (shrink)

The UK has a long established programme of newborn bloodspot screening. This operates under a model of informed choice. Understanding is central to the `informed’ element of an informed choice yet it is rarely assessed. To date most research within the context of newborn bloodspot screening has focussed on parental recall of information. In this paper I argue that simplistic assessments of knowledge through recall fail to reflect more complex notions of understanding. In support of this contention I draw on (...) qualitative interviews with parents of children who have undergone newborn bloodspot screening. (shrink)

The French bioethics laws of 1994 contain the principles of the anonymity and non commodification of all donations of body parts and products including gametes in medically assisted reproduction. The two revisions of the law, in 2004 and 2011 have upheld the rule. In view of the latest revision process, the French government organized a large public consultation in 2009. Within the event a “consensus conference” was held in Rennes about different aspects of assisted reproduction. In what follows we shall (...) first describe the anonymity clause for gamete donations in the French law and the debates surrounding it. We shall then analyse the procedure used for the 2009 public consultation and the related consensus conference, as well as its upshot concerning the anonymity doctrine. In this respect we shall compare the citizens’ own recommendations on the gamete anonymity issue and its translation in the consultation’s final report drafted by a philosopher mandated by the organizing committee. Whereas the final report cited some fundamental ethical arguments as reason for upholding the provisions of the law—most notably the refusal of the ‘all biological’ approach to reproductive issues—citizens were more careful and tentative in their position although they also concluded that for pragmatic reasons the anonymity rule should continue to hold. We shall argue that the conservative upshot of the public consultation is due to some main underlying presuppositions concerning the citizens’ role and expertise as well as to the specific design of the consensus conference. Our conclusion will be that public consultations and consensus conferences can only serve as an empirical support for devising suitable bioethics norms by using second-order normative assumptions. (shrink)

The institutionalization of ethics and the direct influence of politics on how ethics bodies frame their opinions have been widely recognized and explored in the last few years. Less attention has been paid to what kind of normative instrument ethics as an institutional phenomenon has become in the State under the rule of law, and which institutional powers it has depended on. This paper analyzes the rise of ethics in the European Union context, where ethics, constructed as an isolated set (...) of values, has been exploited for its symbolic capacity to evoke citizenship, has become quite formalized as to certain features, and has acquired the potential to redefine the traditional divisions of powers in the State under the rule of law. (shrink)

Much bioethical scholarship is concerned with the social, legal and philosophical implications of new and emerging science and medicine, as well as with the processes of research that under-gird these innovations. Science and technology studies (STS), and the related and interpenetrating disciplines of anthropology and sociology, have also explored what novel technoscience might imply for society, and how the social is constitutive of scientific knowledge and technological artefacts. More recently, social scientists have interrogated the emergence of ethical issues: they have (...) documented how particular matters come to be regarded as in some way to do with ‘ethics’, and how this in turn enjoins particular types of social action. In this paper, I will discuss some of this and other STS (and STS-inflected) literature and reflect on how it might complement more ‘traditional’ modes of bioethical enquiry. I argue that STS might (1) cast new light on current bioethical issues, (2) direct the gaze of bioethicists towards matters that may previously have escaped their attention, and (3) indicate the import not only of the ethical implications of biomedical innovation, but also how these innovative and other processes feature ethics as a dimension of everyday laboratory and clinical work. In sum, engagements between STS and bioethics are increasingly important in order to understand and manage the complex dynamics between science, medicine and ethics in society. (shrink)

Societal views about livestock production systems in Europe are changing dramatically in a negative direction. Based on the tradition of pragmatism in applied philosophy I develop a Moral Operating System of animal production systems in cooperating a plurality of ethical views. This moral operating system of animal production systems consists of two interactive, dynamic parts: an internal professional care ethics combined with an emergent ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation, and external ethical boundary conditions based on societal (...) values and concerns in animal ethics and environmental ethics. I focus on the emergent ethics in life sciences because it most normative ethical theories have problems in dealing with the future. In moral reasoning about innovations in the making, the relevant moral facts and the appropriate principles are more or less still unknown, as also the relevant moral consequences. Only by doing ethics in life sciences in future projects will the moral dilemmas emerge in the trajectories of responsible innovation like molecular technologies in animal sciences and precision livestock farming. (shrink)

Consulting the public about the ethical approaches underlying health policies can seem an appealing means of addressing concerns about limited public participation in development of health policy. However ambiguity surrounds questions of whether, or how consultation can really contribute to more defensible decisions about ethical aspects of policy. This paper clarifies the role and limits of public consultation on ethics, beginning by separating different senses of defensibility in decisions on ethics. Defensibility of ethical decisions could be understood either in the (...) sense of legitimacy in virtue of reflecting the opinions of the public whose interests are affected, or in the sense of being able to withstand and respond to challenges presented in ethical debate. The question then is whether there are forms of consultation which have the potential to realise more defensible decisions in either of these senses. Problems of adequately accounting for the views of those affected by policy decisions casts doubt on the plausibility of using consultation as a means of determining the opinions of the public. Consultation can have a role by bringing new ideas and challenges to debate, although it is uncertain whether this will increase the defensibility of any decision on ethics. (shrink)