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On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities.Gregory Wheeler & Fabio G. Cozman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3761-3782.details
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Psychology, or sociology of science?N. E. Wetherick - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):489-489.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):125-143.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Should we respond to evil with indifference?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):613–635.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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On the formal properties of weighted averaging as a method of aggregation.Carl Wagner - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):97 - 108.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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Standard Decision Theory Corrected: Assessing Options When Probability is Infinitely and Uniformly Spread.Peter Vallentyne - 2000 - Synthese 122 (3):261-290.details
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Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Extending explanatory coherence.Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):490-502.details
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Explanatory coherence (plus commentary).Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):435-467.details
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When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
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Changing the theory of theory change: Towards a computational approach.Neil Tennant - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):865-897.details
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Rejoinder.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):309.details
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Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):267.details
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Katz’s revisability paradox dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.details
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Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.details
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Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?William J. Talbott - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2277-2298.details
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A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
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A critique of empiricist propensity theories.Mauricio Suárez - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):215-231.details
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Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
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Bayesian confirmation theory: Inductive logic, or mere inductive framework?Michael Strevens - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.details
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Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.details
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Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.details
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The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory.Stephen Morris - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):227.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
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Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.details
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Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences.Katie Steele - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):189-205.details
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Distention for Sets of Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):604-620.details
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Climate Change and Second-Order Uncertainty: Defending a Generalized, Normative, and Structural Argument from Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (6):696-721.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.details
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Are theories of rationality empirically testable?Howard Smokler - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):297 - 306.details
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Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Theory autonomy and future promise.Matti Sintonen - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):488-488.details
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Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
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ECHO and STAHL: On the theory of combustion.Herbert A. Simon - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):487-487.details
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