- Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
|
|
A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity.István Aranyosi - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):489-517.details
|
|
Against functionalist theories of consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.details
|
|
Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
|
|
David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):3--22.details
|
|
Identités psychophysiques et inférence à la meilleure explication.Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Pascal Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (1):171-195.details
|
|
Theroy of Mind in Non-Verbal Apes: conceptual issues and the critical experiments.Andrew Whiten - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:199-223.details
|
|
On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion.Jens Harbecke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):209-238.details
|
|
Property dualism without substance dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.details
|
|
Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.details
|
|
Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
|
|
Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.details
|
|
Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
|
|
Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
|
|
Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.details
|
|
On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind.G. A. Zolotkov - 2018 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 10:130-142.details
|
|
Taking Emergentism Seriously.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):31-46.details
|
|
The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
|
|
Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
|
|
Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.details
|
|
Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.David Yates - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1057-1072.details
|
|
Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics.David Yates - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110-131.details
|
|
Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states.Bill Wringe - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.details
|
|
Is folk psychology a Lakatosian research program?Bill Wringe - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.details
|
|
Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
|
|
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.details
|
|
Theory of mind in non-verbal apes: Conceptual issues and the critical experiments.Andrew Whiten - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-223.details
|
|
Mind-brain analogies.Alan R. White - 1972 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):457-472.details
|
|
Beliefs and Sentences in the Head.Ken Warmbrōd - 1989 - Synthese 79 (2):201 - 230.details
|
|
Everett and structure.David Wallace - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (1):87-105.details
|
|
The standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience: Some lessons from Broca’s area.Marco Viola & Elia Zanin - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):945-969.details
|
|
An enlightened revolt: On the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell.Agustin Vicente - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):38: 631- 648.details
|
|
Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
|
|
Inconceivable physicalism.Jonathon VandenHombergh - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):116-125.details
|
|
Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
|
|
Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
|
|
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.details
|
|
Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):501-522.details
|
|
Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
|
|
Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
|
|
Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
|
|
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
|
|
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
|
|
Two theories of group agency.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1901-1918.details
|
|
Dispositions, bases, overdetermination and identities.Stephen Mumford - 1995 - Ratio 8 (1):42-62.details
|
|
Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
|
|
The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
|
|
Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
|
|
Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
|
|