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Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.details
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Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.details
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Identités psychophysiques et inférence à la meilleure explication.Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Pascal Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (1):171-195.details
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A new story about folk psychology.Leon C. de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271.details
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Reasons and psychological causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.details
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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
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Intentionality.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184.details
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Disembodied brains.Lawrence H. Davis - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):121-132.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):410-432.details
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Dualism, Monism, Physicalism.Tim Crane - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.details
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The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.details
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Supervenient causation and program explanation: a note on the difference.P. Coppock - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):346-354.details
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A cross-cultural assessment of the semantic dimensions of intellectual humility.Markus Christen, Mark Alfano & Brian Robinson - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (4):785-801.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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The illusion of conscious will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.details
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Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.details
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What is a brain state?Richard Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.details
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Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research.Denny Borsboom, Angélique O. J. Cramer & Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e2.details
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Agony in the Schools.James Bogen - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):1-21.details
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Phenomenal properties and the identity theory.J.-B. Blumenfeld - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):485-93.details
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Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem.Dieter Birnbacher - 1988 - Ratio 1 (1):17-32.details
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Fregean equivocation and ramsification on sparse theories: Response to McCullagh.George Bealer - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Semantic Eliminativism and the Theory-Theory of Linguistic Understanding.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):159-199.details
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Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):1-20.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Property Identity.Paul Audi - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):829-840.details
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Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
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A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity.István Aranyosi - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):489-517.details
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Against functionalist theories of consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.details
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David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):3--22.details
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Theroy of Mind in Non-Verbal Apes: conceptual issues and the critical experiments.Andrew Whiten - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:199-223.details
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On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion.Jens Harbecke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):209-238.details
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Property dualism without substance dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.details
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Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.details
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On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind.G. A. Zolotkov - 2018 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 10:130-142.details
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