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The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.details
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The limits of conceptual analysis.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.details
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The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):192-223.details
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The Epsilon-Reconstruction of Theories and Scientific Structuralism.Georg Schiemer & Norbert Gratzl - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):407-432.details
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Quiddistic Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):1-32.details
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Criteria of Theoreticity: Bridging Statement and Non-Statement View.Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S8):1-25.details
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Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-42.details
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Causality and Unification: How Causality Unifies Statistical Regularities.Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (1):73-95.details
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Causality as a theoretical concept: explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets.Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1073-1103.details
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Bootstrapping our way to samesaying.Laura Schroeter - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):177-197.details
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A slim semantics for thin moral terms?Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):191 – 207.details
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Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.details
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Analytic Functionalism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 504–518.details
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Axioms and Postulates as Speech Acts.João Vitor Schmidt & Giorgio Venturi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning.Ali Saboohi - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (3):513-525.details
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Interactive Realism.Emma Ruttkamp - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):41-52.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Realization, Completers, and C eteris Paribus Laws in Psychology.Robert D. Rupert - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-11.details
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On behalf of the moral realist.Gideon Rosen - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):794-802.details
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Theoricity, observation and homology: a response to Pearson.Ariel Jonathan Roffé, Santiago Ginnobili & Daniel Blanco - 2018 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (3):42.details
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Correction to: Theoricity, observation and homology: a response to Pearson.Ariel Jonathan Roffé, Santiago Ginnobili & Daniel Blanco - 2018 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (3):43.details
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In Search of the Holy Grail: How to Reduce the Second Law of Thermodynamics.Katie Robertson - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):987-1020.details
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Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.details
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Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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Structural realism and Davidson.Jack Ritchie - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):85 - 100.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Problems of other minds: Solutions and dissolutions in analytic and continental philosophy.Jack Reynolds - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (4):326-335.details
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Innate a nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies.Georges Rey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.details
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A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization.Matthew Rellihan - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):68-90.details
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The limitations of inertial frame spacetime functionalism.James Read & Tushar Menon - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):229-251.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Carnap, the Ramsey-sentence and realistic empiricism.Stathis Psillos - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):253-279.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Realization and the metaphysics of mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.details
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Identity theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value: a puzzle.Eli Pitcovski & Andrew Peet - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-20.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Analysis, schmanalysis.Steve Petersen - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 289-299.details
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Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?Caleb Perl - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):556-585.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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