How does scientifically informed metaphysics make progress? One response is that scientifically informed metaphysics makes progress off the back of science. Some argue that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. Kerry McKenzie claims that metaphysics cannot make progress off the back of science because metaphysical theories cannot approximate the truth like science can. She concludes that metaphysics based on science cannot make progress, even in principle. In this paper, I use McKenzie’s argument as a jumping-off point from (...) which to make two claims. First, I claim that metaphysics is capable of making progress on a known account of scientific progress, the truthlikeness account. Second, I present the groundwork for a new account of metaphysical progress, which I call the ‘Tool Building Approach’. (shrink)

Categorial logic, as its name suggests, applies the techniques and machinery of category theory to topics traditionally classified as part of logic. We claim that these tools deserve attention from a greater range of philosophers than just the mathematical logicians. We support this claim with an example. In this paper we show how one particular tool from categorial logic---hyperdoctrines---suggests interesting metaphysics. Hyperdoctrines can provide semantics for quantified languages, but this account of quantification suggests a metaphysical picture quite different from the (...) one suggested by standard model-theoretic semantics. (shrink)